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This thesis presents a recollection of the relation of “being” and thinking through an
articulation of the gesture of etho-poetic thinking. Part I marks out a path towards such a
thinking through an encounter with Martin Heidegger’s “sketch” of the self as Dasein, where
his description of being-there is read as an originary language of inquiry – one which
attempts to respond to the issue of being, to the questionability and groundlessness of
existence stemming from simply being-in-the-world. Part I follows out a description of this
language of inquiry as a pre-conceptual, pre-cognitive, attuned, bodily understanding,
through chapters which unfold this sketch of Dasein. This language of inquiry is construed
as a two-fold action of being begun, being sketched, and beginning, sketching-out. The final
chapter of part I connects Heidegger’s articulation of “Care” to the ancient practice of “care
of the self” and the transformative, etho-poetic potentiality of thinking.
As the thesis proffers, it is this pre-conceptual language of inquiry which must be repeated in
a resolute thinking, as Heidegger articulates it in Being and Time, seeking not to objectivise
the world, to represent it, but to resonate with it. In this sense, the “purpose” of thinking is
not so much the obtainment of knowledge as it is an attempt to come back into “Care” for
the questionability of one’s existence. As the thesis gestures to in the conclusion, part of the
attempt of the thesis is, thus, an implicit critique of the contemporary situation and discourse
on thinking with its emphasis on outcomes and outputs.
The thesis itself follows the two-fold structure of the language of inquiry. Whilst part I
depicts Heidegger’s sketch of this originary language of inquiry, part II sketches-out this
language, seeking to articulate how an etho-poetic language of inquiry can occur in writing
by bringing the sketch of part one into conversation with other etho-poetic thinkers; Walter
Benjamin, Henri Meschonnic, Jan Zwicky, Giorgio Agamben, Lisa Robertson. In this way,
through the textual composition of the writing, the thesis presents itself as the primary
example of such a language of inquiry, making it not an investigation which objectifies an
etho-poetic thinking, but makes an attempt at its own performance of it.
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LAY SUMMARY
This thesis is an attempt to articulate an etho-poetic thinking, as distinct from an objective,
logical or scientific approach to understanding the world. Such a thinking, as the thesis
proposes, cannot be divorced from living but is formative of it. As Part I sketches, this
thinking is based on the mode of understanding we are always already involved in – the pre-
conceptual, pre-cognitive attuned understanding, the “language of inquiry” we are always
carrying out. Drawing upon the phenomenological theory of the “self” Martin Heidegger
proposed, in particular in Being and Time, part I describes this pre-conceptual understanding
through chapters which unfold this originary language of inquiry we are already involved in.
As the thesis proffers, it is this pre-conceptual language of inquiry which must be repeated in
a thinking that seeks not to objectivise the world, to represent it, but to resonate with it. In
this sense, the “purpose” of thinking is not the obtainment of knowledge so much as it is an
attempt to come back into “Care” for the questionability of one’s existence. As the thesis
gestures to in the conclusion, part of the attempt of the thesis is, thus, an implicit critique of
the contemporary situation and discourse on thinking with its emphasis on outcomes and
outputs.
The thesis itself follows the two-fold structure of the language of inquiry. Whilst part I
depicts Heidegger’s sketch of this originary language of inquiry, part II sketches-out this
language, seeking to articulate how an etho-poetic language of inquiry can occur in writing
by bringing the sketch of part one into conversation with other etho-poetic thinkers; Walter
Benjamin, Henri Meschonnic, Jan Zwicky, Giorgio Agamben, Lisa Robertson. In this way,
through the textual composition of the writing, the thesis presents itself as the primary
example of such a language of inquiry, making it not an investigation which objectifies an
etho-poetic thinking, but makes an attempt at its own performance of it.
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do Cecelia, a thug domsa ar dtús an rud is fiúntach – a bheith ag éisteach leis an cheoil cúin
do mo mham agus mo dhadeo, a thug domsa ní amháin brontanas na beatha, ach na
bronntanais de mo chroí is m’anam
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We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not
– Heraclitus, fragment 91
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The Gift
Sometimes the recompense arrives
so far ahead of what you’ll give
that you will fail to recognise
the reciprocity, the love
That circles in the universe:
This life a grace advanced, its knack
to meet requital with its cause –
the offering up, the giving back.
Kona Macphee1
1 Kona Macphee, “The Gift”, Perfect Blue (London: Bloodaxe Books, 2010), 62.
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OPENING
And now to begin as if to begin.
– Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation”
12
The gap, I suspect, is not a modern phenomenon, it is perhaps not even a historical datum but
is coeval with the existence of man on earth. It may well be the region of the spirit or, rather,
the path paved by thinking, this small track of non time which the activity of thought beats
within the space time of mortal men and into which the trains of thought, of remembrance
and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time.
This small non time space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into
which we are born, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the
past; each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an
infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.
– Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought
Crossing and crossed, the eloquence of the line is interrupted, and ambiguity installed as the
mark of communication...The Greeks identified chaos as the yawning, or gaping open of time
and space to permit creation...Greek chaos imagines the interpenetration of lines, a crossing
that does not cancel out but mutually transforms.
– Paul Carter, "Chi complex”
There is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that comes to be known.
What is known remains inexact, what is mastered insecure. What is, is never of our making
or even merely the product of our minds, as it might all too easily seem. When we
contemplate this whole as one, then we apprehend, so it appears, all that is though we grasp it
crudely enough. And yet beyond what is, not away from it but before it, there is still
something else that happens. In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is
a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a
greater degree than are beings. This open centre is therefore not surrounded by what is;
rather, the lighting centre itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know.
That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands without and stands out within what is
lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to
those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are.
– Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"
A gesture is meaningful to the extent that it addresses a being in its life, from out of the life
of the gesturing being. Another way of putting this is to say that meaning lives through, or
rides, the recognition of what is common. More strongly: a meaningful gesture recognises
that if one context or conceptual situation is laid over another, just so, they will be seen to
stand in resonant relation  and awareness of this relation makes a difference to our grasp of
the individual contexts or concepts. ("You must change your life.") Another way of saying
this is to say that to mean is always, in some measure, to carry across: meta pherein.
– Jan Zwicky, Wisdom and Metaphor
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The question I begin with, is a question of beginning.
Beginning is governed by a question of where –
a quest for a place from which to begin.
Yet beginning never begins from thin air, but is begotten
here –
a burgeoning atmosphere already begun.
At the heart of beginning is a place al-ready – an opening.
To begin is to arrive at a readied place.
It is a welcoming, a bidding to the long abiding.
Yet to begin is also to close,
to draw the line;
delimit, determine, differentiate.
Beginning's light reveals through the darkness of its edges;
a revelation veiled in thick concealment.
A beginning begins in a complicated matrix of possibility,
a milieu of complexity,
the sole nexus heart of this
– bodily being –
The place from which I imperatively,
continuously,
begin.
The X that marks the spot.
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It is not me who makes me think, no more than it is me who makes my heart beat.
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible
When he was still a student, or so the story is told, Giorgio Agamben was invited, in the
summer of 1966, to par-take in a seminar series with that strange midwife of thought, the
philosopher Martin Heidegger. The call set into motion a swerve in Agamben’s life as a
student, interrupting the trajectory he had been taking up to that point. Through the
configured, contextual event of the encounter with Heidegger, Agamben’s thinking changed
course from the discipline of Law to the a-disciplinarity of Philosophy – what became
possible through the event of those philosophical seminars hosted by the poet René Char in
Le Thor – one who had himself been inspired by an encounter with Heidegger. The seminars
formed, as Leland de la Durantaye depicts it, “a constellation: a coming together of elements
resulting in something truly unexpected. This unexpected thing was, simply, philosophy”.2
But it was also life, or it was the nexus where the boundary separating these realms from
each other was revealed to be porous – opening to a thinking as living and a living as
thinking, which Agamben would, in his writing’s to come, call a form-of-life – otherwise
known as an etho-poesis.
In Lyn Hejinian’s “Some Notes toward a Poetics”, she makes an appeal to the figure of
contradiction, the figure of what she names, through the Greek, as xenos, for what marks the
singularity of aesthetic discovery made through “encounters, at points of contact…points of
linkage”.3 Xenos means “stranger”, or “foreigner”, and is that from which two seemingly
oppositional words in English are formed – that of “host” and “guest”.
A guest/host relationship comes into existence solely in and as an occurrence, that of
their meeting, an encounter, a mutual and reciprocal contextualisation. The host is no
host until she has met her guest, the guest is no host until she meets her host. In
Russian the word for ‘occurrence’ captures the dynamic character of this encounter.
The word for event in Russian is sobytie; so (with or co-) and bytie (being), ‘being
with’ or ‘with being’ or ‘co-existence’. Every encounter produces, even if for only
the flash of an instant, a xenia – the occurrence of co-existence which is also an
event of strangeness or foreignness. A strange occurrence that, nonetheless, happens
constantly – we have no other use for language than to have them.4
Hejinian captures the radical self-estrangement of an encounter, where a taken for granted
identity is interrupted, broken open, into the queer coexistence of being both self and other;
2 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Standford: Stanford University
Press, 2009), 2.
3 Lyn Hejinian, “Some Notes toward a Poetics”, American Women Poets in the 21st Century: where
lyric meets language, Edited by Claudia Rankine and Juliana Spahr (Middleton CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 2002), 235.
4 Ibid., 236.
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of being a simultaneity, a co-incidence, a synchronised jointure of host-guest. The encounter
is a crossing indicative of the necessary contingency of your own existence – the always
happenstantial context of dynamically existing in a congruous incongruity, rather than
already enacted in unfailing consistency. To undergo a xenos experience is to inhabit, as
Hejinian would have it, the threshold of encounter – the limit – the realm of entwined
reversibilities – the exchange of host-guest.
The border is not an edge along the fringe of society and experience but rather their
very middle – their between; it names the condition of doubt and encounter which
being foreign to a situation (which may be life itself) provokes – a condition which
is simultaneously an impasse and a passage, limbo and transit zone, with
checkpoints and bureaus of exchange, a meeting place and a realm of confusion.5
One of Agamben’s first pieces of published writing, appearing a year after the initial
encounter with Heidegger and dedicated to the philosopher himself, was a poem entitled
Radure in the Italian – translated as “Clearings”. In a stanza which begins by proffering that
“beauty is destiny”, he asks the following question:
How can a man
stop on the street and ask: This
is my destiny?6
As Medard Boss recounts, in his introduction to the collected Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger
“often spoke about there being a particular blindness to his insights and about how those
[people] who were not struck by them could not be helped”.7 Those who cannot see, who
cannot be helped, are not the ones who are blinded, but rather, those who have failed to be
struck – those who have not let themselves be claimed by something they cannot see but are
nevertheless summoned, called to respond to – a latency, a hiddenness, that allows them to
perceive the thinker’s thoughts – the quality of strangeness which undoes them – the xenos
experience of encounter.
In his later reflection on the Le Thor seminars with Heidegger, in “The Idea of the Muse”,
Agamben recounts how, towards the end of a seminar one day, the students crowded around
the thinker, pressing their questions upon him. Heidegger simply responded by saying, “You
can see my limit: I can’t”.8 Thinking is here construed as a fidelity to a limit, to a blindness
5 Lyn Hejinian, “Barbarism”, The Language of Inquiry (California: University of California Press,
2000), 327.
6 Quoted in de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 4.
7 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars: Protocols – Conversations – Letters, trans. Franz Mayr and
Richard Askay (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001), xx.
8 Agamben, The Idea of Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1995), 59.
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at the core of perception – the invisibility which makes for the capacity to perceive anything
at all, and what Agamben attributes to inspiration – to the limit of an inappropriable
beginning.
That a hiddenness be maintained in order that there be disclosure, a forgetfulness
maintained in order that there be memory, this is inspiration, the rapture of the
muses which brings man, word, and thought into accord with one another. Thought
is close to the thing only if it gets lost in this latency, only if it no longer sees its
thing. It is this which is dictated in it: the dialectic hiddenness/disclosure,
oblivion/memory, so that the word can come, and not simply be manipulated by the
subject (I cannot – obviously – inspire myself).9
What Agamben’s recollection indirectly pays tribute to is the xenos experience of the
encounter with Heidegger as teacher – one who returns the young Agamben not to the study
of something in particular, but to study as possibility, to a study returned to inspiration.10 As
Agamben remarks in an interview:
That is the real interest of encounters, in life as in thought: they serve to make life
possible (or at times impossible). In any event, that is what happened with my
meeting with Heidegger – and at nearly the same time with my coming into contact
with Benjamin’s thought.11
What Agamben underscores is not the inquiry of this or that, but being given over to the
ability to inquire – something echoed in another interview where he reflects on his even
younger student self’s desire to undergo an experience of possibility:
Leaving secondary school, I had just one desire – to write. But what does that mean?
To write – what? This was, I believe, a desire for possibility in my life. What I
wanted was not to ‘write’, but to ‘be able to’ write. It is an unconscious
philosophical gesture: the search for possibility in your life, which is a good
definition of philosophy.12
The poem Agamben writes in dedication to his teacher can be read, in this way, as a thank-
you note for his gift not of something in particular – what is given in the chancery
configuration of the encounter is only an experience of inspiration which makes life
(im)possible for the young Agamben. The poem is an acknowledgement only of a xenos that
has opened him up to the opening of being in coexistence – a gifting of being given over to
9 Ibid., 59.
10 I am here echoing Agamben in his conclusion to the “The Idea of Study”, where the student “shakes
off the sadness that disfigured it and returns to its truest nature: not work, but inspiration, the self-
nourishment of the soul”, Idea of Prose, 65.
11 de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 53.
12 Giorgio Agamben, “Thought is the courage of hopelessness: An interview with philosopher Giorgio




himself – the gift of the self to itself, where this to indicates not a self-coincidental identity,
but the clearing, as the title suggests, which gathers the self to itself by setting it apart;
where an “I” is in a parting-with itself.
The poem is a reciprocation of the gift in itself being a giving marked as a gesture, which, as
with the binding of paper and string in the presentation of a present, says nothing, except the
event of the giving – its dedication. The poem is an address not simply to Heidegger, or to
the event of his re-beginning, but is an affirmation to dedication itself – a way of saying that
is a way of remaining open to an opening – to a thinking that plays host to the not-saying, the
latency, the hiddenness, which is the work of the muse, the dictation of inspiration – the
beginning that begins us. Agamben demonstrates, through the poem, his commitment to the
calling of beauty, to what exists not functionally, but for the sake of itself, to a writing-living
which is the attempt to construct an “experience of the possible”13 – as reader-writer, as
guest-host, inhabiting the limit of language as that schismic between otherwise segregated
into poetry and philosophy.
The schism in question is that between poetry and philosophy, between the poetic
word and the word of thought. The split is so fundamental to our cultural tradition
that Plato could already declare it ‘an ancient enemy’. According to a conception
that is only implicitly contained in the Platonic critique of poetry, but that has in
modern times acquired a hegemonic character, the scission of the word is construed
to mean that poetry possess its object without knowing it while philosophy knows its
object without possessing it. In the West, the word is thus divided between a word
that is unaware, as if fallen from the sky, and enjoys the object of knowledge by
representing it in beautiful form, and a word that has all seriousness and
consciousness for itself but does not enjoy its object because it does not know how
to represent it…Insofar as philosophy and poetry have passively accepted this
division, philosophy has failed to elaborate a proper language, as if there could be a
royal road to truth that would avoid the problem of its representation, and poetry has
developed neither a method nor self-consciousness. What is thus overlooked is the
fact that every authentic poetic project is directed toward knowledge, just as every
authentic act of philosophy is always directed toward joy.14
The dedication to a way of saying that attempts a correspondence with an opening is re-
begun throughout the rest of Agamben’s writing, as he highlights in an interview where he
again attempts to undermine the gulf between poetry and thinking: “I indeed began by
writing poems, but I don’t believe I ever renounced that. On the contrary, it was as if I didn’t
really begin to write poems until philosophy entered my life’…‘Poetry is something one can
13 Giorgio Agamben, “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, Potentialities, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 249.
14 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, trans. Ronald L. Martinez
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xvi – xvii.
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do only through philosophy”.15 A statement which implies the reverse applies too, that
philosophy is something that can be done only through poetry. Or to say the same differently
with Ludwig Wittgenstein “I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said:
Philosophy ought really to be written only as poetic
composition”.16
In Heidegger’s “On the Way to Language”, to which Hejinian makes recourse in her “Notes
towards a poetics”, the following lines from Goethe are quoted: “Only when it owns itself to
thanking/ Is life held in esteem”. Owning is here understood by Hejinian as an act of
hospitality – to what has opened up in an encounter. To own is to “grant, to acknowledge, to
own up, to love, to thank, to make a hospitality bond with”, what has already begun.
Every thinking that is on the trail of something is a poetizing, and all poetry a
thinking. Each coheres with the other on the basis of the saying that has already
pledged itself…, the saying whose thinking is a thanking.17
Agamben’s “The Idea of the Muse” is followed by “The Idea of Study”, with only the
slightest of ideas inserted in-between – “The Idea of Love” which reads, in its entirety, as
follows:
To live in intimacy with a stranger, not in order to draw him closer, or to make him
known, but rather to keep him strange, remote: unapparent – so unapparent that his
name contains him entirely. And, even in discomfort, to be nothing else, day after
day, than the ever open place, the unwaning light in which that one being, that thing,
remains forever exposed and sealed off.18
To own the inappropriable opening is a thinking as thanking, a thinking as compassion – a
love fuelled not by the ego’s marred will to appropriate and make the different same, but the
self-less acceptance of the inexplicability, the impenetrability, the inaccessibility of the
closest strangeness; the (co)existence in xenos, where guest-host roles oscillate. A language
of inquiry is begun by love, by Eros – what opens the gap between inspiration and study – an
idea of the muse and an idea of study.
15 de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, 59.
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. Von Wright (in collaboration with Heikki
Nyman), trans. Peter Winch (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980), 24.
17 Hejinian, “Some Notes toward a Poetics”, 221.
18 Agamben, “The Idea of Love”, The Idea of Prose, 61.
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*
The hours run down
The days pass on.
One achievement remains;
Mere being alive.
– Hannah Arendt, Hannah arendt, for love of the world
Just a few years after Agamben’s encounter with Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, in 1971, on the
occasion of the philosopher’s 80th Birthday, dedicated an essay to scribing her own
encounter with the younger philosopher at a point which she describes as his initiation into
philosophy – his beginning, which she marks as belonging not to the author of a first book
entitled Duns Scotus, but to the university teacher sketching-out his thoughts towards what
would become all too quickly, incompletely gathered as Being and Time:
If it is true, as Plato once remarked, that ‘the beginning is also a god; so long as he
dwells among men, he saves all things’ (Laws 775), then the beginning in
Heidegger’s case is neither the date of his birth (September 26, 1889, at Messkirch)
nor the publication of his first book, but the first lecture courses and seminars which
he held as a mere Privatdozent (instructor) and assistant to Husserl at the University
of Freiburg. For Heidegger’s ‘fame’ predates by about eight years the publication of
Sein und Zeit.19
The strangeness of Heidegger’s fame, as Arendt attests, lies in the fact that it did not rest on
any determinable basis. Whilst lecture notes circulated, they did not proffer any consumable
content, only readings of certain familiar texts – there was, as Arendt puts it, “hardly more
than a name”.20 What the students were drawn to was the stranger whose name contained
him, one who was offering, not a discipline of thought, not an object of scholarship, but the
possibility of thinking. What was experienced, as Arendt recounts, was the passion of a
thinking-as-living and a living-as-thinking.
I have said that people followed the rumour of Heidegger in order to learn thinking.
What was experienced was that thinking as pure activity…can become a passion
which not so much rules and oppresses all other capacities and gifts, as orders them
and prevails through them. We are so accustomed to the old opposition of reason
versus passion, spirit versus life, that the idea of a passionate thinking and aliveness
become one, takes us somewhat aback. Heidegger himself once expressed this
unification – on the strength of a proven anecdote – in a single sentence, when at the
beginning of a course on Aristotle he said, in place of the usual biographical
introduction, ‘Aristotle was born, worked, and died’”. That something like
Heidegger’s passionate thinking exists is indeed, as we can recognise afterward, a
condition of the possibility of there being any philosophy at all. This passionate
thinking, which rises out of the simple fact of being-in-the-world and now ‘thinks
recallingly and responsively the meaning that reigns in everything that is’
19 Hannah Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty”, The New York Review of Books 17, no. 6 (1971): 50.
20 Ibid., 50.
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(Gelaissenheit, 1959, p. 15), can no more have a final goal – cognition or knowledge
– than can life itself. The end of life is death, but man does not live for death’s sake,
but because he is a living being; and he does not think for the sake of any result
whatsoever, but because he is a ‘thinking, that is, a musing being’.21
Rather than an anomaly to philosophy, Heidegger’s passionate thinking, Arendt recognises
retrospectively, is the very possibility of there being any philosophy at all – it is the veritable
beginning or opening of any thinking in living, in simply being-in-the-world, and as such,
cannot have an end, result, or aim, but is characterised by continuously having to begin
again. “If one wished to measure thinking, in its immediate, passionate liveliness, by its
results, then one would fare as with Penelope’s veil – what was spun during the day would
inexorably undo itself again at night, so that the next day it could be begun anew”.22 What
was proffered was a thinking not from the “I” of “self of consciousness”,23 but from the
expropriation of an encounter – an experience of otherness, of being othered to one’s self, as
life itself in its intimate strangeness. What was proffered was a bearing-out, and under-going
an opening, which Arendt ascribed to the beginnings of philosophy in the ancient pathos of
thaumazein:
The first and, so far as I know, the only one who has ever spoken of thinking as a
pathos, as something to be borne by enduring it, was Plato, who, in the Thaetetus,
calls wonder the beginning of philosophy; he certainly does not mean by this the
mere surprise or astonishment that arises in us when we encounter something
strange. For the wonder that is the beginning of thinking – as surprise and
astonishment may well be the beginning of the sciences – applies to the everyday,
the matter-of-course, what we are thoroughly acquainted and familiar with; this is
also the reason why it cannot be quieted by any knowledge whatever. Heidegger
speaks once, wholly in Plato’s sense, of the ‘faculty of wondering at the simple’, but,
differently from Plato, he adds, ‘and of taking up and accepting this wondering as
one’s abode’.24
What is proffered in both Agamben and Arendt’s depictions of  their encounters with
Heidegger, is a thinking that does not so much begin, as is begun, not through the will of an
“I”, but in the passion of the xenos of encounter – the expropriative experience of coming
face to face with an inappropriable limit. What is experienced is thinking as an abiding, an
inquiry set in the thick heart of the everyday – the tumultuous time of a present both giving
and taking in the unsteady wavering of an arising and passing – attempting to correspond to
what has opened-up – making good on what has already been proffered and yet never being






being-in-the-world – being a human being who is both guest to the world and its host in
bearing-forth its being as such.
The figure which stands for this opening of encounter, as Hejinian’s word xenos gestures to,
is the figure of chiasm, the chi letter which begins the word she chooses for the ambivalence
of this experience – the intercalated X sign – what also begins the Greek word for chaos,
with its crossing marking the gap mythologically ruled by Eros. Chiasm stands for the origin,
the place-marking, which is neither identical to itself, nor purely different, but an identity-in-
difference; not the same, not simply other, but similar – an entwinement of xenos which is an
enantiomorphic structure, one which, as Juri Lotman notes "creates the necessary relations
between structural diversity and structural similarity, which allow dialogic relations to be
built".25 Chiasm is the figure of reciprocal co-constitution par excellence – a host-guest
structure of xenos. A language of inquiry is owed, in this way, to the ambiguity of this
structure where the human being is both self and other; being and non-being; one who steps
and does not step continuously into the same river.
What this thesis proffers, in this way, is simply an attempt to come into this language of
inquiry which is always already begun – a language already on the way – one which is on-
going, and constitutive of our dwelling in the world – an inquiry not divorced from living,
but the very possibility for abiding at all – abiding, that is, in the ambivalence of a saying
that also does not say.
Hejinian writes, in the introduction to her collection of essays The Language of Inquiry, that
poetry is that thinking which stems from not-knowing – a knowing which she attributes to
the knowledge of acknowledgement. “To know that things are is not to know what they are,
and to know that without what is to know otherness (i.e., the unknown and perhaps
unknowable”.26 Poetry is proffered not as the “language of a genre”, but a “language of
inquiry” – “that language in which a writer (or reader) both perceives and is conscious of
perception”27 it is language as “experiencing experience”, where this experience is not the
narrative of an “I”, but the plotlessness of existence – the strange encounter of the everyday
in its simple suchness, where we are not outside the world, or cast against it, but in the midst
of its strange similarity.
This language we are already in is a poetic saying of this ilk – a poetry not as the expression
of an “I”, but as the gifting of the self in the acknowledgement of what is; a language that
25 Juri Lotman, trans. Wilma Clark, "On the Semiosphere", Sign Systems Studies 33, no. 1 (2005): 220.
26 Hejinian, “Introduction”, The Language of Inquiry, 2.
27 Ibid., 3.
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does not explain, does not appropriate, but allows us to dwell in nearness to the daimonic;, in




but the well-known is not necessarily known at all.
– Lyn Hejinian, The Language of Inquiry
The known comes perpetually bearing the unknown, as its elusive other, on its very back.
– Edward S. Casey, “Keeping Art to its Edges”
Existence can be questionable.
– Martin Heidegger Being and Time
We are strangers to ourselves, the strangeness never leaves us, but we become adept at
covering it over, experts in the avoidance of our own uncanniness. The world is
unfathomable, ungraspable in all its transitional “thisness”, yet standing out in such openness
is hard to bear – we become great constructionalists, scaffolding buttresses and layer upon
layer of ground; taking up home in the thick skin of an unquestionable “I”; inhabiting the
blanket of comfort Vilém Flusser describes and decries:
Habit is like a cotton blanket. It covers up all the sharp edges, and it dampens all
noises. It is unaesthetic (from aisthesthai = perception), because it prevents bits of
information from being perceived, as edges or noises. Because habit screens
perceptions, because it anaesthetizes, it is considered comfortable...Habit makes
everything nice and quiet.28
And even so, the strangeness still pervades our being, awakening in moments of doubt,
wonder, perplexity; the death of a loved one; the shock of the sea; the dark heart of the night
and its echoing question, ‘who am I?’; the flicker of otherness across a known face; the
immensity of a child’s astonishment; moments of unearthed groundlessness where a tear
forms in the fabric of the snared weave, through which I glimpse the fleeting phenomenality
of the world and the ephemeral haecceity of my own being – this all too brief dash of a
passage between birth and death; moments where the thick skin of this “I” is disturbed,
unsettled, in the ec-stasis of a here and now; moments of exile from the soft blankets of
habit, the comfort of the known, where the “everyday” ordinarily blundered through, is
perceived anew in the shock of the aesthetic “eventness” of the strange.
Yet, to speak with Edward S. Casey, it is not so much that this unknown is divorced from the
habitual, but that it is its very companion – the “elusive other” riding on its back.29 What is
strangest and uncanniest of all, as Martin Heidegger proffered, is not the sudden “thisness”
of the world, but that this suchness has been dialled down through habit. The strange, the
unheimlich, is not the weird, or extraordinary, but the very ordinary itself, awoken to itself –
the habitual in its questionability – the xenos of experience:
28 Vilém Flusser, “Exile and Creativity”, Writings, trans. Erik Eisel (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002), 105.
29 Edward S. Casey, “Keeping Art to its Edges”, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 9,
no. 2 (2004): 146.
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This possibility of the intensification of the character of the there of something
which comes down on us like a storm or is already there as an inconvenience lies
right within the inexplicit self-evidence of the familiarity of the there of the everyday
world. The strange is only this inexplicit familiarity insofar as it has been shaken up
and awakened and is now being encountered in the character of unfamiliarity. This
lack of familiarity is not merely something occasional, but rather belongs to the very
temporality of the world’s being-encountered. The familiarity is disturbed, and this
disturbable familiarity is what gives to the contingent “otherwise than one thought”
the recalcitrant sense of its there. Through the disturbability of inexplicit familiarity,
what is being encountered is there in its unpredictability, its incalculability. The
there encountered has the peculiar rigidity of something oppressive, contingent. This
for-the-most-part-some-how-otherwise pervades the world’s being encountered – it
is comparative: otherwise than one thought, planned, etc.30
As Heidegger would have it, the questionability of the world belongs to the very experience
of living which is constantly turning, unfolding, differently, otherwise than expected.
Questionability, rather than being an anomaly to our existence in the world, belongs to the
very structure of our experience, where our encounters, however familiar, are always
accompanied by the shadow of the unforeseeable and unknown. The uncanny, in this sense,
lies not in this alterity of the world, this always otherwise, but that such strangeness gets
covered over – we become benumbed to the very questionability of the everyday and the
“world being encountered appears as simply there in a straightforward manner”.31
What gets covered over, as Heidegger articulates in these lectures in Ontology: The
Hermeneutics of Facticity, and later in Being and Time, is the “Care” through which we
inhabit the world, the manner in which this “there” is at all: “Care disappears in the habits,
customs and publicness of everydayness – and this does not mean it comes to an end, but
rather that it does not show itself any longer, it is covered up. Being-concerned-about and
going about dealings have the immediate aspect of carefreeness”.32 The irruptive moments
of the strange are interruptions, then, of such “carefreeness” – what bring us back to the
disturbability, the questionability of our existence and the “Care”, through which we are
there – the xenos of our experience. The uncanny calls us back to the heightened and
awakened sense in which we already exist – the perplexing address of the world, its
appearance as such, in all its strange singularity from day to day, and the pondering
response it elicits from us. The eruption of the uncanny presents the world to us not as it has
been taken to be, but in its questionability, in the wonder and puzzlement it provokes in us,
which is not extraordinary, but the very ordinariness, the very appearance of the ordinary, as
30 Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. Jon van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana




it is. To perceive the strange, in this way, is to perceive explicitly the inexplicit “Care”
through which we are inhabiting the world all the time – the manner in which we are
attempting to understand and respond to this ever surprising, ever improbable miracle of
existing – of being here at all.
And that is just the point: how the world, moist and beautiful, calls to each of us to
make a new and serious response. That’s the big question, the one the world throws
at you every morning. ‘Here you are, alive. Would you like to make a comment?’33




The real foundation of philosophy is radical existential intervention and the production of
questionableness; placing oneself and life and the crucial implementations into questionableness is the
basic concept of all, and the most radical, illumination
– Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil
If, as Heidegger proposes, a thinker only thinks one inexhaustible thought, one question
which they pursue, (or are pursued by), throughout their life’s work, Heidegger’s own
thought might be considered as the following out of the questionability of “Being”,34 which
is to say that his is a thinking ignited not so much by the attempt to answer a question, as it is
an effort to reawaken the necessity of asking it; not the articulation of a question, but a
questioning where the very possibility of the question itself is at stake; that something is
questionable in the first place.35 In such a way, what stimulates the incomplete(able) quest of
Being and Time, for example, is not so much the attempt to sketch out a response to the
question of the meaning of “Being”, as it is a case of showing that “Being” could be
questionable in the first place – an effort which corresponds with that inaugural figure of
philosophy in the West, Socrates, whose own incitement of questionability is the book’s
inceptive epigram:
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the
expression “being”. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now
become perplexed.36
Such an opening evocation calls into question whether in Heidegger’s own time there is an
understanding of the question of “Being”? “Not at all”, Heidegger swiftly replies to himself
34 This sense of a perduring, unanswerable question is something Samuel Weber speaks to, where
what is imperative in such a repetitive asking as he notes, is an awareness and acknowledgement of
the strange, the otherness of the inquiry – the difference of the same, rather than the deadeningly
identical: “Nietzsche – who, together with Kierkegaard, placed the question of repetition, recurrence,
Wiederkehr on the agenda – writes somewhere that with passing years one finds oneself returning to
certain questions that seem to change very little over time. These questions, which function as a kind
of bedrock of identity, are more difficult to ‘lose’ than to retain. Whether this ‘bedrock’ becomes a
source of strength and discovery or a prison depends on how those questions ‘return’: whether they
primarily only ‘determine’, in the simply restrictive sense of setting limits, or whether the limits they
trace gesture toward a space not simply contained within the area they demarcate. This is one of the
reasons why a sense of the ‘uncanny’ – indeed, an openness to it – is indispensable, if one is to avoid
the kind of entropy that a purely obsessive recurrence would entail”, Theatricality as Medium (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 338.
35 This “being able” to be questioned is something the translator of Heidegger’s Ontology:
Hermeneutics of Facticity highlights: “The term Fraglichkeit…has been rendered as
‘questionableness’. Retaining overtones of its normal meaning of ‘doubtfulness’ or ‘uncertainty’
Fraglichkeit means for Heidegger something like ‘being able to be questioned’, ‘open to question’, or
‘disputable’”, Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity, 114.
36 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd, 1962), 1.
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– no chance for such an understanding in a time that sleeps in slumber, ignorant that such a
question would ever need to be posed – when there is a lack not simply of an answer, but of
the requisite perplexity to ask the question in the first place. “Being” has ceased to be a
puzzlement, its questionableness dialled down, and the issue of “Being” forgotten. Thus, the
task at hand, what Heidegger demands of himself, is to place “Being” into questionableness
again, that is, to “reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question”.37
Doing so involves reawakening to the manner in which an entry lies readied onto this
question, a threshold laid open onto the question of “Being”. Such an opening belongs to the
one Heidegger comes to call Dasein – the human being – the one who has their own “Being”
as an issue; the one whose own being is questionable.
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.
But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that
Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relationship which
itself is one of Being...It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this
Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of
Dasein’s Being.38
In this sense, the human being is the one who, rather than posing the question of the meaning
of “Being” as an abstract philosophical problem, is such an inquiry. Each human’s own
being is experienced as questionable; constitutes them in a relationship towards themselves;
an issue which is, “in each case mine”.39 The task at hand for Heidegger in Being and Time
is, thus, to describe this inquirer, to describe this opening already laid out onto the meaning
of “Being” – the prior understanding we are already involved in which prepares the way for
all other understanding. In this way, Heidegger’s description of Dasein as a project of
“Care”, where he depicts a “self” who is questionable, might be considered as the beginning
of his attempt to sketch-out the questionability of “Being” – a beginning which is only ever
later re-begun, returned to differently, taken back up again from another point – for
understanding, as Heidegger comes to describe it, is always a re-beginning, constituted as it
is in a time that is not a progressive linearity, but a spiral time of a beginner’s tending






To begin with, “Care” is what Heidegger suggests first begins us in the world – something he
tenders through an example gleaned not from a philosophical tome, or a scientific treatise,
but from the more esoteric realm of the fable – a truth belonging to a time of the “pre-
ontological”, which indicates the manner in which an understanding of the inextricability of
“Care” and the human being has “been sketched out beforehand in elemental ways”.40
Once when ‘Care’ was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up
a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made,
Jupiter came by. ‘Care’ asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But
when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded
that it be given his name instead. While ‘Care’ and Jupiter were disputing, Earth
arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had
furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made
the following decision, which seemed a just one: ‘Since you, Jupiter, have given its
spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its
body, you shall receive its body. But since ‘Care’ first shaped this creature, she shall
possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its
name, let it be called ‘homo’, for it is made out of humus (earth).41
The sketch depicts the happenstantial formation of the human being as a beginning
opportunely begun in a crossing, in a passage between, where the first thoughtful sketch of a
human from the humus of the earth is shaped, is opened up as an opening, which binds and
holds together the tensional poles of both earth and spirit and, as decided by Saturn, who also
stands for “time”, is an opening which will continue to possess us for as long as we live.
Time gives to the human, for the span of their life, their being as a continual project of
“Care” – an existence owed to an on-going inspired making, shaping a living in the between
of earth and spirit; of the human and the daimonic. It is an example which Heidegger
himself, as he mentions in a footnote, “ran across” in a passage from an article by K.
Burdach, who also “calls attention to a double meaning of the term ‘cura’ according to
which it signifies not only ‘anxious exertion’, but also ‘carefulness’ and ‘devotedness’”.42
“Care” is, in this sense, the name Heidegger gives to an existential structure of our being as




43 This inceptive and incomplete quality of existence in thrownness is one which is often
overshadowed by Dasein’s being-towards death, as Heidegger characterises it. Yet it is, as I will
proffer below, this being-towards death which makes for an existing as a constant (re)beginning, for it
is only against a limit that something can come into appearance.
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existence through an on-going concern and devotion – a creative making, a “designing” of a
“Dasein” – Heidegger’s strange word for “the self” as one who is only ever the passage, the
hyphenated reality of “being-there” – a tensional opening. Being begun by “Care” is a
beginning from which we are never released, but is what continues to belong to us, that to
which Dasein “is held fast, dominated by it through and through as long as this entity ‘is in
the world’”.44 The opening of “Care”, as Heidegger comes to proffer, institutes Dasein into
the world not as a finished product, a given identity, but as a begun project which is to be
carried through – what he signals in his calling Dasein a “geworfener Entwurf”, a “thrown-
projection”, where the German Entwurf signifies a “‘throwing’ something ‘off’ or ‘away’
from one”,45 but can also, “in ordinary German usage, and often in Heidegger” take on a
sense of “‘designing’ or ‘sketching’ some ‘project’ which is to be carried through”.46 To be
human, in Heidegger’s sense of Dasein, is to be set in motion to carry through an existence
in the world, where each person is first and foremost cast not into an identity, but into a
project of responsibility for their existence, assigned to the task of this “there” into which
they have been flung: “we call it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is
thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’. The expression
‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over”.47 Rather than a
“facticity” which would refer to the given “fact” of “some kind of mineral, for example”,
where existence could be understood as a certain property or element, an already defined and
delineated sense, this “facticity” is one which speaks more closely to the “ficticity” of this
existing in “Care” – the way in which the human being is thrown into a “there” not as a given
sense, but a “there” as the sense which Dasein is in its sketching-out – a “there” which
cannot be given in advance, but is the suchness of a factitious fashioning. Indeed, as
Agamben reads Heidegger’s use of it, the term is an inheritance from St. Augustine, who
understands the human soul as that which is made by hand rather than simply given. “If one
wants to understand the development of the concept of facticity in Heidegger’s thought, one
should not forget this origin of the word, which ties it to the semantic sphere of non-
originarity and making”.48 The “facticity” which Heidegger speaks to in this case, is one
which indicates our being thrown to a project of making, rather than in the “factum brutum”
of a given “factuality” – a “there” which would not need to be sketched-out, a “Dasein”
44 Heidegger, Being and Time, 243.
45 Ibid., 185.
46 Ibid., 185.
47 Heidegger, Being and Time, 174. This “thrownness” as William McNeill notes, “encompasses not
only one’s embodiment, but one’s having been born and thrown into a tradition of discourse,
interpretation, and history, as well as the particular situation of praxis or ethical engagement in any
given instance”, Time of Life (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 65.
48 Giorgio Agamben, “The Passion of Facticity”, Potentialities, 189.
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which would not need to be “designed”. As it is, the human being is cast into an existence
comprised of the “fact” “that-it-is-and-has-to-be”49 – an existence cast not onto the ground of
an identity, but into the project of being-there.
in being its Self, ‘Dasein’ is as a Self, the entity that has been thrown. It has been
released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis.
‘Dasein’ is not itself the basis of its Being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from its
own projection; rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the Being of its basis. This basis is
never anything but the basis for an entity whose Being has to take over Being-a-
basis.50
“Thrownness”, in this sense, is Heidegger’s way of signalling how the human being is not
given over to a determinable ground, but only the “ground” of their own throwing – their
sketching-out, their factitious making. This “there” is not a given spot upon which they land,
but is the “there” they are in their disclosive sketching-out. The human being is begun from
an “is not”, cast into the world “not of its own accord”,51 and this is not, this “nullity” 52 as
Heidegger calls it, is not something we overcome or overthrow, but what we, curiously,
inhabit. We never get behind our having been already begun: “Thrownness…does not lie
behind it as some event which has happened to Dasein, which has factually befallen and
fallen loose from Dasein again; on the contrary, as long as Dasein is, Dasein, as care, is
constantly its ‘that-it-is’”.53
Dasein’s concern includes a concern for its own being. As being out for something,
it is out for what it still is not. As care, Dasein is essentially underway towards
something; in caring it is toward itself as that which it still is not. Its own sense of
being is to always have something before itself which it still is not, which is still
outstanding. That something is always still outstanding means that the being of
Dasein as care, insofar as it is, is always incomplete; it still lacks something so long
as it is.54
Yet this is not is not a lack that could somehow find a completion, but is the emptiness which
is, paradoxically, our plenitude, the peculiar gift of life, which in its giving, refuses – on the
one hand granting us existence, on the other hand withdrawing it, by imparting us to being
only through what we are not. In this sense, it is not a privation, a being-without, it is not a
desire needing to be sated, but is, strangely, an incompletion which is the human being’s





54 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 308.
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greatest possibility for being – Dasein’s “who” is still outstanding so long as it is being-
there.
Possibility, as an existential, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in
the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae). In every case
Dasein…has already got itself into definite possibilities. As the potentiality-for-
Being which is is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the
possibilities of its Being, or else it seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this
means that Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – thrown
possibility through and through.55
What Dasein has to be is this not, this nothingness but the there. “Thrownness” is not, in this
sense, an event of our birth which we then overcome in our sketching-out, but the taking-up
of this nothingness as our “ground”: “In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection,
there lies essentially a nullity”.56 As such, it cannot be the wilful project of an “I”, an
intentional projecting, but is the factitious making of being the there – this “that-it-is”. The
facticity of the “there” is not a spot sketched-out once and for all, but is the suchness of our
existence as only, each time being the there. The human being, in this sense, occupies the
strange position of having been begun and being not yet complete; between what has been
and not yet; between a birth and death. This existing in possibility is oddly made possible
through the impossibility of getting behind our being begun, or, indeed, our indefinite
ending, for death, as much as our thrown birth, is not an event that befalls us at the end of
our life, but something which conditions this sketching-out of an existence, is a limit.
Between an inappropriable beginning and an inappropriable ending, in the not, the absence
of no longer and not yet, this project of “Care”, this language of inquiry, dwells.
The questionability of Dasein is, in this sense, a formal one, considering that though any
existence begins in a certain sketch, a given outline, a happenstantial circumstance that limits
the possibilities of what a life may be – being born into a country town in the middle of
Ireland; the second child and first daughter; having red hair; being baptised – they cannot
condition a life entirely. In fact, it is only from such an outline that any life can begin – the
limit being, as Heidegger would understand it in “Building Dwelling Thinking”, the place
from which presencing begins. The “who” is not isolatable from this thrown beginning, but it
is not confined to it, for who she is is always in question – given that there is no ground to
her being, other than her on-going sketching-out the facticity of a “there”. The question of
the form of her existence cannot be isolated from a “content” and it cannot be a form that is
formed once and for all, but is more of a form-in-formation. Her language of inquiry is an
55 Heidegger, Being and Time, 183.
56 Ibid., 331.
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on-going attempt – she is not presented, upon birth, or the coming to consciousness, with a
handbook on how to proceed – a theory divorced from the practice. The question of her
existence only unfolds as her existence: “The question of existence never gets straightened
out except through existing itself”.57
By appealing to this preliminary sketch of the human, Heidegger unsettles and places into
question the seeming “givenness” and “carefreeness” of our existence as instituted, complete
“subjects” in the world – those whose position is already given and who can come to
determine and know an objectifiable world. In contrast, the “self” Heidegger proffers as a
project of “Care”, as an existence which is to be carried through, cannot be a fixed or stable
subject, a determinable sense, but is the on-going opening up to the breach of being-there, of
being a begun beginner – one who must continuously tend towards their existence, rather
than being already established or set in position – caught, like “Care’s” making in a crossing
at the river, in a factitious sketching-out between what has been sketched, and is not yet –
What Heidegger signals in this two-fold structure of our being, this thrown-projection, is a
structure of opening where we are cast into a situation, sketched, thrown and throw it open,
sketch it out, in a projective understanding. It is an opening that is not a one-off event in
anyone’s life, but what is, in each case mine – an opening, a beginning, always re-opening,
always re-beginning. The issue of our being, the relation towards our existence, our
questionability, is this structure of opening, rather than a solipsistic interiority, a
conversation with a self already constituted – what William McNeill emphasises when he
notes how it is not “the relation of a self to the self” which would presuppose an already
existing self in relation to a self, but is a relation as “Dasein’s openness to the world”.58 The
relation is this hyphen – indicating an existence still in formation – an existence which each
time is the facticity that-it-is-and-has-to-be.
*
Being-there indicates that the “self” and the “world” are not two separate entities – it is not
that there is a world and then a subject, but this opening is their co-constitution – not as a
one-off event, but as the facticity of an on-going thrown-projection – each day another
strange-familiar that-it-is-and-has-to-be. This opening up to the hyphenation, to the facticity
of existence, is made known to us, not, as Heidegger would have it, through a cognitive or
rational grasping, but through mood, what he evokes in the German as the Stimmung of a
57 Ibid., 33.
58 McNeill, Time of Life, 59.
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Befindlichkeit, where “Befindlichkeit”,59 in colloquial German asks: “Wie befinden Sie sich?”
– a question as to how someone is, or more literally, how they are finding themselves.60
A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’. In this ‘how one is’,
having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.61
Stimmung has been rendered as a “state-of-mind” and “mood” in the Macquarrie and
Robinson translation of Being and Time, yet, as the scholar Leo Spitzer argues in his
extensive research on the concept, what is captured in the German and difficult to translate
smoothly into its European language counterparts, is the sense expressed in it of a lack of
distinction between “the self” and their environment. It is, as he highlights, “a term that
would express the unity of feelings experienced by man face to face with his environment (a
landscape, nature, one’s fellow man), and would comprehend and weld together the
objective (factual) and the subjective (psychological) into one harmonious unity”.62 Any
rendering of Stimmung, as Spitzer would have it, necessitates a splitting of subject and
environment, a “dualism prescribed to him by his Romance language”. In this way, the
relation of self and situation is perhaps better captured, as Spitzer suggests, in a rendering of
Stimmung as “attunement” – playing on the musical connotations resonant within Stimmung
as a“basso ostinato”, where Stimmung stems from “gestimmt sein”, meaning “to be tuned”.63
Attunement captures the sense, in this way, of the manner in which the human being stands
not apart from the “there”, not in front of the world they are thrown into, but intimately
implicated in it, caught up in this “there” into which they have been cast – indicating an
opening which links us with world and simultaneously dis-joins us from it – the articulation
of a connecting and separating rather than the split of a self against the world. Indeed, in one
of the intensely detailed footnotes of Spitzer’s book, he mentions how a certain Professor A.
Rustow pointed out to him that the Greek word of harmony originally came from “the tactile
and visual spheres: they are terms of the carpenter (the “joiner”) who “fits together”...and
59 The traditional translation of “Befindlichkeit” rendered it as “state-of-mind”, which has come under
critique in recent times, but the limitations of which were already admitted by the translators
themselves: “‘Befindlichkeit’. More literally: ‘the state in which one may be found’. (The common
German expression ‘Wie befinden Sie sich?’ means simply ‘How are you?’ or ‘How are you
feeling?’) Our translation, ‘state-of-mind’, comes fairly close to what is meant; but it should be made
clear that the ‘of-mind’ belongs to the English idiom, has no literal counterpart in the structure of the




62 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian ideas of world harmony; prolegomena to an interpretation of
the word "Stimmung" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 5. It should be noted here the
coincidence of Spitzer and Heidegger working at Marburg at the time Spitzer was working on this
study of Stimmung – indicating a certain attunement perhaps, or tuning in by Heidegger.
63 Ibid., 5.
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have been secondarily applied to the acoustic sphere”.64 The human being is, in this sense, an
articulated jointure, a hyphenated reality, existing as the suture of an in-between – connected
to the world and disconnected from it daily in the suchness of a facticity. Indeed,
Heidegger’s choice to speak of the human being as a “being-in-the-world” visually draws
attention to this articulation, and is something captured too in the English translation of
Dasein as the hyphenation of being-there.
It is in Stimmung, thus, where we confront the thrownness of our questionability, or are
confronted by it, for Stimmung is not so much something we grasp, as it is what grasps us;
what knows us, rather than what we know.
Having a mood brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness in such a manner that
this thrownness is not known as such but disclosed far more primordially in ‘how
one is’. Existentially, ‘Being-thrown’ means finding oneself in some state-of-mind
or other.65
It is in Stimmung that the human being is brought to awareness that they have already been
opened up into the uncanny facticity of not being an autonomous, knowing, self-enclosed
“I”, but a being who has been delivered over to a there – one who is a situation, and thus, is,
first and foremost, ecstatic, not themselves.  “Essentially, a state-of-mind implies a
disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to
us”.66 “In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has
been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being
which, in existing, it has to be”.67In Stimmung they confront their own groundlessness – their
emptiness of being only the facticity of how they are there, where this “how” does not tell
them “how” they got there, or where they are going, but only that they are there – without a
“whence” or “whither”;68 already thrown. What we are confronted with in Stimmung is not
what the world is, not who we are, but only the inexplicable suchness that there is a there we
have been given over to, which we are. What is experienced is a certain dispossession, a
certain not-knowing, but being-known, being claimed by the there, addressed – the “voice”
of Being, Stimmung holding within it the Stimme of “voice”. In Stimmung we are made
aware of our calling as beings who are not – nothing but the emptiness of a there resounding.
In this way, the opening of Stimmung “does not mean ‘to be known as this sort of thing’”,
but is what reveals the perplexity, the questionability of this having been cast: “the mood
64 Ibid., 143.





brings Dasein before the ‘that-it-is’ of its ‘there’, which, as such, stares it in the face with the
inexorability of an enigma”.69 In Stimmung we confront the issue of our being as what is not
known – “Why that should be, one does not know”,70 nor is it something one could one day
know, “because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a
way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is
brought before its Being as ‘there’”.71 The facticity cannot be gotten behind – it belongs not
to the piecemeal knowing of an “I”, but to the whole understanding of the situation. “The
mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole”,72 “mood is a
primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all
cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure”.73 Here is the heart of this
strange and paradoxical Stimmung Heidegger sketches – mood is what simultaneously
exposes us to existence, and to this issue of our being, and yet, because it is not something
that is cognitively graspable, it is also how this questionability of our being is most
preserved. This ambiguity and ambivalence is, as Agamben would have it, the “concealment
and unconcealment” of facticity – the “condition of what remains concealed in its opening,
of what is exposed by its very retreat”.74
This nebulous, unknowable, yet perceptible quality of this voice of Being, this Stimmung, is
evoked by Heidegger in his further treatment of Stimmung in Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics where this in-between articulation of facticity is captured as the medium of
Dasein, which he renders in decidedly musical terms. Attunement is, as he puts it,
a way [Weise] – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-
called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes
and determines the manner and way [Art und Wie] of his being…Attunements are
the ‘how’ according to which one is in such and such a way. Certainly we often take
this ‘one is in such and such a way’...as something indifferent, in contrast to what we
intend to do, what we are occupied with, or what will happen to us. And yet this ‘one
is in such and such a way’ is not – is never – simply a consequence or side-effect of
our thinking, doing and acting. It is – to put it crudely – the presupposition for such
things, the ‘medium’ within which they first happen. 75
Stimmung is the way we become aware that the situation of a “there” has already opened up,






74 Agamben, “The Passion of Facticity”, Potentialities, 190.
75 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas
Walker (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 67-68.
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atmosphere – what does not “say” anything, yet nevertheless announces the there – reveals it
in the each time singular articulation of our situated lives – what pervades, ungrasped, yet
nevertheless sets the stage for everything. Indeed, Heidegger also speaks of Stimmung in
such atmospheric terms, playing on the other ambient connotations resonant within
Stimmung as climate, and capturing the nebulous quality of this “medium”:
Attunements are not side-effects, but are something which in advance determine our
being with one another. It seems as though an attunement is in each case already
there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each
case and which then attunes us through and through.76
What these musical and atmospheric connotations infer is how Stimmung is not
understandable as a “thing”. As Heidegger puts it, “Attunement is in a certain way there and
not there”,77 it is more of a medium that is an immediate midst, in the sense of what is closest
to hand, what we are immersed in, and yet, as with music or an atmosphere, is invisible –
what goes unspoken and yet is palpably there and is, as Heidegger notes, the tacit, implicit
way we are in relation to the world and to others, how we are always already in relation to
them – the sharing of the there, this outside as such and thus, the most primordial ethos and
the possibility for language as such. “When I am in a mood of sadness, then things address
me quite differently or not at all....Feeling...concerns my whole being-in-the-world as my
being a Self. Attunement is not something standing for itself but belongs to being-in-the-
world as being addressed by things. Attunement and being related are one and the same.”78
Heidegger poignantly captures this silent density of Dasein when he speaks of what it is like
to be with someone who has been bereaved, where, though there is no perceptible change in
the person, all has changed utterly in the shift of their attunement.
A human being we are with is overcome by grief. Is it simply that this person has
some state of lived experience that we do not have, while everything else remains as
before? If not, what is happening here? The person overcome by grief closes himself
off, becomes inaccessible, yet without showing any animosity towards us; it is
simply that he becomes inaccessible. And yet we may be with him as before, or
perhaps even more frequently, and may be more accommodating toward him. He
does not alter anything about his comportment toward things or toward us either.
Everything remains as before, and yet everything is different, not only in this or that
respect but – irrespective of the sameness of what we do and what we engage in –
the way in which we are together is different. Yet this is not some subsequent effect
of the attunement of grief being at hand in him, but belongs rather to his grief as part
of it. What does it mean to say that in such an attunement this human being is
76 Ibid., 67.
77 Ibid., 65.
78 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars: Protocols – Conversations – Letters, trans. Franz Mayr and
Richard Askay (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 203.
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inaccessible? The manner and way in which we can be with him, and in which he is
with us, has changed. It is the grief that constitutes this way (the way in which we
are together). He draws us into the manner in which he is, although we do not
necessarily feel any grief ourselves. Our being with one another, the being-there of
our Da-sein, is different, its attunement has shifted....Attunement is not some being
that appears in the soul as an experience, but the way of our being there with one
another.79
What Heidegger elucidates here is the manner in which Stimmung, our mood, is not an
interior experience of an individual, but is the way that a certain human’s world is opened in
its entirety – their whole being-in-the-world, which includes being with things, being with
others and being with one’s self. Attunement is not a “state” but a way of being indicative of
a relationality to world, self and others that is not static but how we encounter the facticity of
the everyday in its strange-familiar singularity – something to which Jean-Luc Nancy also
speaks when he notes:
‘People’ are silhouettes that are both imprecise and singularised, faint outlines of
voices, patterns of comportment, sketches of affects, not the anonymous chatter of
the ‘public domain’. But what is an affect, if not each time a sketch? A
comportment, if not each time a pattern? A voice, if not each time a faint outline?
What is a singularity, if not each time its ‘own’ clearing, its ‘own’
imminence…always touched upon, always lightly touched: revealing itself beside,
always beside.80
This opening of Stimmung is the structure of our questionability – the unpredictability of our
being-there being otherwise than expected, and what keeps those who are closest to us in
life, those who are most intimate, most familiar, ones who nevertheless always remain
strange; always play host to a guest appearance. “It is never the case that I have met Pierre or
Marie per se, but I have met him or her in such and such a ‘form’, in such and such a ‘state’,
in such and such a ‘mood’, and so on”.81 This is the singularity of a being who is not self-
identical but who is always a being-there; beside themselves, with, imparted, exposed – a
being who is first and foremost not-I.
In this sense, what Heidegger sketches with his understanding of Stimmung is a radical re-
inscription of mood from the realm of the psychological, to the realm of the ontological.
Rather than a subjective phenomenon, as the individualised and internalised “state-of-mind”
suggests, Stimmung highlights the facticity of being-there not as an encapsulated subject, an
“I”, but first and foremost, a not-I – a being who finds themselves already delivered over to
79 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 66.
80 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Richard D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 7.
81 Ibid., 8.
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the world, ex-tended, non-coincidental, submitted. Stimmung is a medium that does not
communicate “something” as such, but the very tone of our being – the subtle way of this
daily differential facticity – the very opening of an articulability, a communicability.
Attunement is not a “feeling” belonging to the subjective realm, but is the articulation of a
crossing, the accord of “self” and “world” – the X that marks the spot in a mute jointure and
separation. It can be understood as the resonance of being-there – a sense that can be latently
read in Being and Time and later explicitly gestured to by Heidegger himself when he says:
Hellen [to clear], along with hell [clear], mean the same as Hallen [to resound] in the
sense of “resounding”. In the sense of the [primordial] event of the self-
manifestation of being, Hellen [to clear] occurs originally as Hallen [sounding], as
tone.82
Simply, thus, the language of inquiry, the questionability of her very being, does not so
much begin, as is always already begun – opened up in the that-it-is of a there – an inquiry
initiated not by an “I”, by an assertive questioning, but by being-questioned, finding herself
delivered over to the suchness of the world, the thisness of the world in its opacity – which is
not the extraordinary, but the very ordinary everyday in its haecceity. An inquiry not
commenced from what is said, but by the silent address of the there, that on-going question
already opened up, the one the world throws at you every morning – Here you are, alive –




life lives out of its own ground and wells forth out of what is its own, thus it lives without why.
– Meister Eckhart, The Young Heidegger: Rumour of the Hidden King
From our birth, we find ourselves, situation, upon situation, never in the same day, though
this again is Friday today. There is both continuity and discontinuity to these situations – the
same desk, the same computer, the same bookcase, and yet; the notes scattered in a different
arrangement from yesterday; the glass daily drank from sits to the right of the computer,
shifted from its position to the left; the window opening is still there, but what it opens onto
is the most persistent reminder that this scene is shifting – the cherry blossom tree now
almost denuded of its leaves is the same cherry blossom tree that bloomed, only ever so
briefly, but beautifully, in April; the sky is grey-white today. Philosophy begins with the
simple wonder of this daily bread of the everyday, the enigma that, though closest to hand,
remains furthest from us, like the hands typing these words.
Days “come and wake us”, Phillip Larkin said, which is to say that we do not so much begin
them, as are begun by them – daybreak – cracking open another access, passing over, she is
turned into another day, for we wear days, inhabit their singular styles, their ways of saying;
days being the vernacular of time. Plotless, they have no reason, but simply are what seems
to be so, and being so, they are “to be happy in” – where else do we live but in days?
A language of inquiry begins in days and never gets out of them; each day turning the
previous day’s thoughts – it was like that, now it is like this; each day a wreckage of what
was – a language never cohering into a definite signified, what the world is about, but an
aboutness that is changing with each given day – an aboutness that is this given change of
each day – a transitory, transitional movement – not a thing, but what exists in the going
along, in the turning of each day – returning and repeating the same posture, the same
keyboard, the same notebook lying open on another page. Scene after scene the same
repeated differently. The day and her are one and this closeness is their distance – their
simultaneity the complication of existence.
In the macro and the micro, always a thrown-projection – the sketch of a life, the sketch of
each day – between breaking-open and closing, a language of inquiry always bound to an in-
between, to the limit of this situation. An inquiry intensely, simply alive in a shifting
impermanence, the permeability of each scene, each situation, never the same, though this
again is Friday, still.
Quotidian conditions are just around – like sound effects in movies, which one
hardly notices except if they are missing. In this sense, the quotidian consists not of
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things but of effects playing over the surface of things; it is not beings but a way of
being.83
*
To leave the region of consciousness and attain to that of Da-sein: and thus to see that,
understood as Da-sein (that is, from the ek-static), the human only exists in coming from
itself to that which is wholly other than itself.
– Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology
What is revealed in Stimmung is the way we are already passionately involved in the world,
in the sense of being given over to it, already opened onto it – what Thomas Carl Wall calls a
“radical passivity” – which is not a passivity opposed to an activity, but a passivity which is
“passive with regard to itself, and thus it submits to itself as though it were an exterior
power…it is always outside itself and is its own other. Passive with regard to itself, the
essential passivity of the subject must undergo itself, suffer itself, feel itself as other”.84 It is
a passivity as the constitution of a human being in the chiasm of being-there, in the xenos of
coexistence; both being and non-being; both “self” and “other”; one who is and is not. If the
human being has their own being as an issue, their project of “Care” can be considered an
assignment carried out not by an “I”, not by an assertive knowing, but by the pre-conceptual,
pre-reflective, expropriating understanding of being given over to a situation – sketching-out
a there. Not what “I” know, but what she knows – “this subject beneath me for whom a
world exists before I am here, and who marks out my place in it” – the X that marks the spot
of the “captive” subject which is, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty has tendered, the “body”.85
Something which Casey also gestures to in his reflection on Heidegger’s sense of Dasein’s
thrownness: “To be thrown into the world is to be placed there in a body and by a body. How
else could we experience the adversity and shock of thrownness except in bodily terms –
terms that are in turn the basis for the ‘moods’ that arise from the same action”.86 How else
could we be drawn-out from ourselves, given over to a situation, an attuned jointure, if not
through the tension of a bodily perceptibility? How else could we be bound to a there,
thrown, sketched, if not through this limit of a body, whilst simultaneously not being bound
to it, but all the while sketching-out, if not through a limit that is the beginning of
presencing? How else could a language of inquiry already be articulating itself if not through
83 Lyn Hejinian, “A Common Sense”, The Language of Inquiry, 358.
84 Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity (Albany: State University of New York, 1999), 1.
85 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Taylor and
Francis Group, 2005), 296.
86 Edward S. Casey, Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (California: University of California
Press, 1998), 260.
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the very arthros of this one beneath – she whose fingers, toes, eyes, ears, skin, are immersed
continuously in a questioning; she the expectant one, always anticipating.
‘What will happen next?’ –
the question hinged in your knees, your ankles,
in the in-breaths even of weeping.87
How else could her inquiry not be reduced to a thing, if not for her multifarious ways of
being? Now like this, now like that; form and content inseparable in the on-going twofold
structure of thrown-projection. How else could she be placed between, could this language
be an articulation of a chiasm of being-there, if not for her body as a “place of passage…a
hyphen connecting link between the things which act upon me and the things upon which I
act.”88
It is a question, of course, of just how we take this “body” – as a thing that we possess, or a
way of being we never have a proper handle on, and which more often than not, possesses us.
We speak of [the body] to others as of a thing that belongs to us; but for us it is not
entirely a thing; and it belongs to us a little less than we belong to it...This thing that
is so much mine and yet so mysteriously and sometimes always, in the end our most
redoubtable antagonist, is the most urgent, the most constant and the most variable
thing imaginable: for it carries with it all constancy and all variation.89
*
It would be fair to say that “the body” of Heidegger’s Dasein has proven to be a quibblesome
bone of contention amongst readers, many of whom argue that he fails to attend to “the
body” at all, that there is a palpable silence from him concerning the bodied nature of
“being-there”. But perhaps it is a question as to just what kind of body is being expected, just
what kind of body is indeed missing, for what may be needed is a reading that attends to a
tact of attempting to step outside the damaging dichotomising of the inheritance of
metaphysics in order to upturn the strangely disembodied creature of René Descartes’ cogito.
Perhaps what is needed is a self who is “embodied” in a way that undoes any notion of
simply being “in” a body, and proposes in its place the traction of a hyphenated “being-
there” through “Care”. Indeed, part of the strangeness of Heidegger’s depiction of Dasein
stems from his efforts to create a language that will help him to formulate the questionability
of Being and to speak about being-in-the-world in a way which will avoid re-inscribing the
87 Jane Hirshfield, “When Your Life Looks Back”, Come, Thief (Northumberland: Bloodaxe Books,
2012), 91.
88 Henri Bergson quoted in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 296.
89 Paul Valéry (1989, pp. 398-9), quoted in Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the
Corporeal (London: Routledge, 1997), 65.
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oversights, or plain assumptions of philosophical concepts as they have been formulated and
have remained unquestioned: “In so far as certain domains of being become visible in the
course of this history and henceforth chiefly dominated the range of problems (Descartes’
ego cogito, subject, the “I”, reason, spirit, person) the beings just cited remain unquestioned
with respect to the being and structure of their being, which indicates the thorough neglect of
the question of being”.90 These concepts are constructed upon a view of the world in its
dualistic object-subject distinction, a view from without, and have congealed into terms upon
which metaphysics can construct its world. The ability to disturb and place into question the
sense of what it means to be “in” the world through such inherited philosophical terms,
cannot be presupposed. Heidegger’s attempt must be read instead as one which, in its
seeking to awaken the questionability of “Being” anew, is a seeking as form – a sketching –
with no ground set out in advance to fall back on: “what is to be found out by asking – the
meaning of Being – also demands that it be conceived in a way of its own, fundamentally
contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification”.91 It is
such an approach which Jeff Malpas’s reading of Being and Time also indicates when he
argues: “the body cannot be simply assumed – what the body is must be acknowledged to be
itself in question here. Moreover, this is a point that Heidegger himself seems implicitly to
recognise – it may partly contribute to the uncertain treatment of the body in Being and
Time, and undoubtedly emerges as an element in Heidegger’s later thinking”.92 What is
needed is a reading which, as David Kleinberg-Levin argues in his own argument on the
implicitness of Dasein’s bodily being, takes a look not based on the “false impression”93
which stems from a “peculiarly restricted conception of the body – or, say, of that which
constitutes a discourse on the body”, but is a reading which attempts another way of
attending, which is open to another way of articulating our bodily being and which may
count, as Kleinberg-Levin argues, the “phenomenology of perception, the phenomenology of
lived space, and the phenomenology of practical activities”94, of Heidegger’s sketch of
Dasein, as constituting such another way – one which is based not on the presentable “body”
– an objectifiable, bound entity within a skin, an external form – but a presenting body as a
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, 21-22.
91 Ibid., 26.
92 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of Place (Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2012), 116.
93 David Kleinberg-Levin, “The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger’s Thinking of
Being”, revised essay published in Donn Welton, ed., The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings





lived, existential ecstasis – the means through which this conversing of self and world takes
place and how we orientate and make sense of this there we have been thrown into.
Perhaps “failure” then – a failure to determine once and for all, to set into a “determinant
signification”, is part and parcel of Heidegger’s attempt, part of any effort to dislocate the
philosophical body of discourse on “the body”. As Nancy has put it: “Of course, failure is
given at the outset, and intentionally so. And a double failure is given: a failure to produce a
discourse on the body, also the failure not to produce discourse on it. A double bind...”95
Perhaps this indeterminacy as to the presence or absence of a body in Heidegger’s
conception of “being-there”, speaks to the ambivalence of the kind of body he evokes – a
questionable body, neither fully present, nor fully absent, but an odd traction of being drawn-
out; not decidedly locatable in a “here”, not a sclerotic substance or essence, not an
“expression” of sense, but a presenting, an ex-tension here-there; a morphing, changing,
dynamic relating, characterised by possibility. If Heidegger’s effort is to bring us to a
different understanding of dwelling in the world, if, as he claims in the introduction to Being
and Time, that a pre-ontological understanding of Being needs to be reclaimed and
recognised, then it must be an understanding which is “carried and sustained by way of our
embodiment”96 – this pre-conscious, factical, everyday, manner of standing out in the open,
which we have to each time be.
95 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes et al (Stanford California: Stanford
University press, 1993), 190.
96 Kleinberg-Levin, “The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment”, 1.
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This drawing should only illustrate that human existing in its essential ground is
never just an object which is present-at-hand; it is certainly not a self-contained
object. Instead, this way of existing consists of “pure”, invisible, intangible
capacities for receiving-perceiving [Vernehmen] what it encounters and what
addresses it...all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche,
subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be
abandoned in favour of an entirely different understanding
– Martin Heidegger, Zollkion Seminars97
Whilst Heidegger’s sketch of Dasein was, as the title of Being and Time suggests, a temporal
conception of the human being, it was one which was, nonetheless, also inextricably linked
with space and, as Peter Sloterdijk highlights, movement:“very few commentators on
Heidegger have noted the nascent but revolutionary treatise on being and space that
underlies…Being and Time. Under the spell of Heidegger’s existential analytic of time, it has
mostly been overlooked that the former is grounded in a corresponding analytic of space and
that both are fundamentally rooted in an analysis of movement...”98 It is a dynamic, spatial
97 This “drawing” is indicative of the chalkboard drawing which Heidegger seemingly sketched during
one of the first Zollikon seminars, and opens the published collection itself. Whilst the “sketch”
quality of the demonstrated drawing is lost here in the repetition of exactly the same arrows, it
nevertheless shows how this tending towards a limit is an on-going effort.
98 Peter Sloterdijk, “Nearness & Spatiality”, Theory, Culture & Society 29, no. 4: 36-37. Whilst
Sloterdijk posits that there is a sketched sense of spatial being in Heidegger’s making-room, he argues
that it was not fulfilled in the text itself and that Heidegger proffers a weak sense of the human as
being isolated in their own existence, paving forth the path for his own project of spheres to
compensate for this lack of a being-with. I find Sloterdijk’s reading incongruous with my own and
find articulated in Being and Time a Dasein who is always already caught up with others and
inextricably so. My own reading dwells on the significance of the “structure of the as” which is, as I
will attempt to sketch-out, crucial to a spatial, or as I’d prefer, “roomy” or “placial” understanding of
the structure of Dasein, where it exists only in parting-with itself and is always only in co-existence,
being-with. In Being and Time Heidegger proffers that it is through the ecstatic structure of time that
Dasein breaks into space, and yet, in his later lecture On Time and Being, this is entirely retracted.
“The attempt in Being and Time…to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable”, On Time
and Being, trans, Joan Stambaugh (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 23. In this essay he
speaks of the time-space of the opening: “Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens
up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and
primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the
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understanding which would, as he admits in an interview, inspire his own spatial sketching
of subjectivity through his sphereological imagining:
I was also fascinated by a chalkboard drawing Martin Heidegger made around 1960,
in a seminar in Switzerland, in order to help psychiatrists better understand his
ontological theses... In the drawing, one can see five arrows, each of which is
rushing toward a singular semicircular horizon  a magnificently abstract
symbolisation of the term Dasein as the state of being cast in the direction of an
always receding world horizon (unfortunately, it's not known how the psychiatrists
reacted to it). But I still recall how my antennae began to buzz back then, and during
the following years a veritable archaeology of spatial thought emerged from this
impulse.99
What captures Sloterdijk’s attention in Heidegger’s sketch, is an ec-static sense of
subjectivity, of being a being not encapsulated but caught up with an outside – a sense of
being which is only through what they are not. "If humans are 'there', it is initially in spaces
that have opened for them because, by inhabiting them, humans have given them form,
content, extension and relative duration".100
*
When we
rearrange the rooms we end up living in,
we are looking for first light, the arrangement
of light, that time before we knew to call it light.
– Carol Ann Duffy, “Homesickness”
It is through a sense of inhabiting which perhaps another understanding of “embodiment”
can be read, one which is a re-configuration of that small preposition from which
conceptions of “the self” seem always to come – that is, of what it means to be “in” the
world. In proffering the human being as a questionable self, as an attuned being, non-
coincidental and “in” the midst of the world, Heidegger conceives of an “in” which speaks
not of enclosure, containment or a static position, but an “in” which is more of an
implicatory inhabiting – as he sketches when he notes:
opening up, of future, past and present is itself prespatial; only thus can it make room, that is, provide
space”, On Time and Being, 14. He directs the listener to his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking”.
Yet, it could be argued that what becomes explicit in the later lecture, was perhaps latently there in
Being and Time, and crucially in this sense of making-room that I will read here as articulating a time-
space. It must also be added here that both Malpas and Casey have offered readings of the spatiality of
Heidegger’s thought.
99 Peter Sloterdijk, “Against Gravity: Bettina Funcke Talks with Peter Sloterdijk”, interview by
Funcke, B. (2005): Book-forum February/March.
http://www.bookforum.com/archive/feb_05/funcke.html
100 Peter Sloterdijk, Spheres, Volume One: Bubbles, trans. Wieland Hoban (Los Angeles, CA:
Semiotext(e), 2011), 46.
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‘In’ is derived from “innan” – “to reside”, “habitare”, “to dwell”. ‘An’ signifies “I
am accustomed”, “I am familiar with”, “I look after something”. It has the
signification of “colo” in the senses of “habito” and “diligo”. The entity to which
Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterised as that
entity which in each case I myself am [bin]. The expression ‘bin’ is connected with
‘bei’, and so ‘ich bin’ [‘I am’] means in its turn “I reside” or “dwell alongside” the
world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way.101
As remarked upon in the footnotes to this page in the translation of Being and Time, “in”, in
this “innan” sense, was at first a verbal denotation and it is from such a sense that Heidegger
seems to be speaking to in his attempt to capture a dynamic “in” of Dasein’s being-in-the-
world as a living involvement, constituted through relationships of “Care”, where, as the
translators further point out: “the Latin ‘colo’ has the parallel meanings of ‘I take care of
something’ or ‘cherish it’ (‘diligo’) and ‘I dwell’ or ‘I inhabit’ (‘habito’)”.102 Dasein’s “in” is
not that of an abstractable, homogenised, universal space, but one which is always familiar,
always a project of “Care”, always something they are absorbed in, which is something he
further emphasises in the later essay “Building Dwelling Thinking”:
Where the word bauen still speaks in its original sense it also says how far the nature
of dwelling reaches. That is, bauen, buan, bhu, beo are our word bin in the versions:
ich bin, I am, du bist, you are, the imperative form bis, be. What then does ich bin
mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist,
mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which
we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on
the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word bauen, which says that man is
insofar as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same time to
cherish and protect, to preserve and care for”.103
In lieu of a “self” which can autonomously “be”, selfhood is here ascribed only as the
happening in and as a context, where this project of dwelling is not an indifferent building,
but an on-going project of “Care” through an inhabiting – an “in” which must be
temporalised.  As such, “the self” cannot be ascribed a nominative denotation, but manifests
through a verbal modality of dwelling within a situation – something Casey articulates as the
basic character of an “in” of being “in-between”, which cannot be “the strict ‘in’ of
containership”, but is an in which he understands through the extending hyphenation to
which it is joined, which “exhibits a visual link that is the topographical equivalent of a very
different idea of the ‘in’, that which is active in experiences of in-habitation or in-
101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 80.
102 Ibid., 80.
103 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, Poetry Language Thought, trans. Albert
Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 145.
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dwelling”.104 Here is an “in” which expresses the articulated jointure of being-there, an “in”
of connection and separation, rather than the smothering “in” of containment – one which
arises, as Casey notes, making reference to Heidegger’s innan, in experiences of coming to
know somewhere from “within”, that is, through knowing a place intimately, through the
“concrete acquaintance, by our bodily being there. When we say that we know a place ‘by
heart’, we are referring to this special sense of insider’s knowledge”.105 To be in the world
through an inhabiting necessarily involves a body which lends itself not simply to being
beside objects or people, but, as Casey notes, in a certain withness to them – something he
evokes through Heidegger’s sense of Dasein’s Mitdasein, their always already being-with
the world and others, as Heidegger articulates it: “the world is always the one that I share
with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others.
Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mit-Dasein]”.106 To be
inhabiting the world is to be bound to a locality of a there, a specific with-world, from which
we never step “outside” of but are intimately, caringly involved in.
…Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not
have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case
that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the
‘world’ – a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never
‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in”.107
To be “in” the world is not to be placed in a uniform space of abstraction, but to be with
others, to be with the world, in a dynamic of coming to inhabit, rather than inertly,
innocuously already set “in” a there. As a verbal “in”, this is a dwelling which, as Heidegger
emphasises in “Building Dwelling Thinking”, is an on-going attempt, rather than a one-off,
or completable accomplishment – it is a quest rather than a fixed abode or settlement, where
the real dwelling plight of human beings is that they must “ever search anew for the essence
of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell”.108 There is no secure stopping place for
Dasein; their being-in-the-world is a dwelling whose “ground” is only the on-going
sketching-out of a situated being-there, where their being is always still outstanding.
In this sense Dasein is always within the world, not standing outside it, or apart from it, but
bound up with inhabiting it through a bodily articulation of being-with. Rather than the
“there” of a site prepared once and for all, the “there” is an on-going conversing of self and
104 Edward S. Casey, “Edges and the in-between”, Phaenex: Journal of Existential and
Phenomenological theory and culture 3, no. 2 (2008): 5.
105 Ibid., 6.
106 Heidegger, Being and Time, 155.
107 Ibid., 84.
108 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, 159.
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world; is each time a local happening – something Heidegger gestures to in the following
rumination on the special resonance of the German “there” as the “Da”, which does not
signify a spot unto itself, but the ambivalence of a joined “here” and “there” – a play
evidently lost in the English rendering of “there” which does not have such a sense of
tension.109
The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every
case its ‘there’. According to the familiar signification of the word, the ‘there’ points
to a ‘here’ and a ‘yonder’”.... ‘Here’ and ‘yonder’ are possible only in a ‘there’ – that
is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the
Being of the ‘there’. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not
being closed off. In the expression ‘there’ we have in view this essential
disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the
Being-there of the world, is ‘there’ for itself.110
How else could Dasein “not be closed off” other than through a bodily disposition,
disclosing this “there” into its differentiation, where it is not separate from it but caught up in
it. Such a disclosure of the there where the human being is not in space, but inhabits it,
coming to take space in, and thus bound up with it, is what Heidegger comes to call the
localised, temporalised sense of making-room:
Dasein is never present-at-hand in space, not even proximally. Dasein does not fill
up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would, so that the boundaries
dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space
spatially. Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally. It is by no means
just present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up. In existing, it has
already made room [einraumen] for its own leeway [Spielraum].111
In this way, Dasein’s “space” [Raum], their “room”, is not something they simply enter into,
but is that which they make through their inhabiting the world in relations of concern
[Besörge], towards the things of the world, and solicitude [Fürsorge], towards others, and
towards their own being that is an issue. To be involved in inhabiting the world is to be
109 Lost too, it would seem, in the French, as Heidegger highlighted in his contention with the French
translation of Dasein: “In the philosophical tradition, the term “‘being-there’ means presence-at-hand,
existence. In this sense, one speaks, for instance, of proofs for God’s existence. However, Da-sein is
understood differently in Being and Time. To begin with, French existentialists also failed to pay
attention to it. That is why they translated Da-sein in Being and Time as etre-la, which means being
here and not there. The Da in Being and Time does not mean a statement of place [Ortsangabe] for a
being, but rather it should designate the openness where beings can be present for the human being,
and the human being also for himself. The Da of [Da-sein’s] being distinguishes the humanness of the
human being. The talk about human Da-sein is accordingly a pleonasm, avoidable in all contexts,
including Being and Time. The appropriate French translation of ‘being-there’ should be: Etre le la,
and the meaningful accentuation should be Da-sein in German instead of “being-there””, quoted in
Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2006), 48.
110 Heidegger, Being and Time, 171, (my italics).
111 Ibid., 419.
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caught up in an outside, to be attuned to a “there” by being not “in” space, but “spatial”,112 or
as it is rendered in German “Raumlich”, “roomy”. In the traction of being “here-there”,
Dasein “makes-room”, creating ‘Raumlichkeit’, the “roominess” of their existence; the
articulation of their being-there.
And even when Dasein explicitly addresses itself as “I here”, this locative personal
designation must be understood in terms of Dasein’s existential spatiality. In
Interpreting this we have already intimated that this “I-here” does not mean a certain
privileged point – that of an I-Thing – but is to be understood as Being-in in terms of
the “yonder” of the world that is ready-to-hand – the “yonder” which is the
dwelling-place of Dasein as concern.113
Dasein’s room, in this sense is the manner in which they receive themselves as the tension
between a there and a here, in the dehiscence of what has been and is not yet. Dasein exists
in the anaphora of this referral, from there to here. Room is made, in this sense, in the
turning of a re, in a folding, in the crossing of a passage between. Here Dasein exists in the
resonance, receiving themselves by being cast back to themselves and it is this tension which
is perceived in Stimmung – this attunement with the world.
As Steven Connor has noted, what characterises room, is the manner in which it is always a
singularised compound of body and space, a veritable "spatiofugal"114 making which is spun
from the inside out, and so comprised of space – an internally rather than externally
manifested form.
You can measure the distance between things precisely in space; but you can only
register the quality of closeness or coming-up-against in room. Room is closet space.
Space is defined from the outside in; room is formed from the inside out, like a
burrow or a nest. In space, there is a distinction between the space and the bodies
that occupy it; a room is already a compound body-space. A room, or room in
general is conjoined or co-penetrated with the things that inhabit it – hence ‘leg-
room’, ‘elbow-room’, ‘wriggle-room’.115
Dasein’s manner of coming to be placed in the world is akin to this measuring through a felt
bodily nearness, where it is not “in” space but inhabits it, desevers it, as Heidegger calls it,
coming into nearness with the world by this attuned tension, this shuttling of perception
from there to here. Dasein’s “there” is, in this sense, a space spun out from within, a
spatiofugal, always localised idiosyncratic compound of body and space, which is always,
112 Ibid., 146.
113 Ibid., 156.
114 Steven Connor, "Building Breathing Space", StevenConnor, 3 March 2004,
http://www.stevenconnor.com/bbs/
115 Steven Connor, “Ear Room”, Stevenconnor, 30 November 2008,
http://www.stevenconnor.com/earroom/
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significantly, “chronic or temporalised”. A spatiofugal making is on-going – room always in
need of “Care”.
The body is the means, in this sense, of the clearing, of the opening of being-there,
something implicitly readable here in Being and Time, and explicitly so in “Building
Dwelling Thinking”, when Heidegger references the manner in which the space in which he
is speaking, (this essay originally being a lecture delivered at a colloquium), is already
opened up through his body.
Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say that
mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their
stay among things and locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through,
spaces by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through
spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through spaces
in such a way that we already experience them by staying constantly with near and
remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am
already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am
never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already
pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it.116
Here is the movement of an inhabiting where the space has already opened up in the tension
between, from a there, to a here, making room [Einraumen] for the passage through it
within, as he would also emphasise in this essay, a boundary.
Raum means a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging. A space is
something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely
within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at which something stops
but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is that from which something begins its
presencing. That is why the concept is that of horismos, that is, the horizon, the
boundary. Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let
into its bounds. That for which room is made is always granted and hence is joined,
that is, gathered, by virtue of its location.117
What defines Dasein is not a bounded body but the limit of the there into which they are
thrown and from which room can be made – a point which Casey has also touched upon
when he notes: “Within a limit, room is made – and thus place. To lack limit is to lack place,
and conversely: not to be in place is to be unlimited. A limit is a positive power within which
place is made”.118
In another late essay Heidegger again returns to making-room, highlighting, on this occasion,
the two-fold manner of Dasein’s inhabiting:
116 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, 154-155.
117 Ibid., 153.
118 Casey, Fate of Place, 262.
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How does clearing-away happen? Is it not making-room (Einräumen), and this again
in a twofold manner as granting and arranging? First, making-room admits
something. It lets openness hold sway which, among other things, grants the
appearance of things present to which human dwelling sees itself consigned. On the
other hand, making-room prepares for things the possibility to belong to their
relevant whither and, out of this, to each other. In this two-fold making-room, the
yielding of places happens.119
Heidegger is here attuned to the resonance within the German Raum of Räumen, meaning to
clear-out, roden, to free-up. Making-room is contingent upon the two-fold thrown-
projection, where an initial openness grants the appearance of things, a certain field, from
which the arrangement of things is found. As noted in Being and Time: “Both ‘Raum-geben’
(our ‘giving space’) and ‘Einraumen’ (our ‘making room’) are often used in the metaphorical
sense of ‘yielding’, ‘granting’, or ‘making concessions’. ‘Einraumen’ may also be used for
‘arranging furniture’, ‘moving it in’, or ‘stowing it away’”.120 As emphasised here, this
action is not an intentional project of Dasein, but more of an allowance, a yielding – a letting
one’s self be cast – not a subject’s projection onto the world, a throwing of significance, but
how she is thrown – not bound within the limit of the skin, but extending beyond it. Rather
than a subjective disclosure of being, she is caught in a situation, thrown to the there as a
horizon of meaning from which something can show itself. The horizon of the there, in this
sense, is her limit, each time. The distinction as such is that between a lived body and a
corporeal body, a body as a way of being, an attunement with a there, and a body as a
present-at-hand thing. A distinction Heidegger demonstrates in his Zollikon Seminars when
he says:
One could understand the living body as a corporeal thing. I am seated here at the
table, and fill this space enclosed by my epidermis. But then we are not speaking
about my being-here, but only about the presence of a corporeal thing in this place.
Perhaps one comes closer to the phenomenon of the body by distinguishing between
the different limits of a corporeal thing [Körper] and those of the body [Leib].121
When pointing with my finger toward the crossbar of the window over there, I [as
body] do not end at my fingertips. Where then is the limit of the body?...each body,
that is, the body as body, is in each case my body. The bodying forth [Leiben] of the
body is determined by the way of my being. The bodying forth of the body,
therefore, is a way of Da-sein’s being…bodying forth is co-determined by my being
human in the sense of the ecstatic sojourn amidst the beings in the clearing. The
limit of bodying forth…is the horizon of being within which I sojourn. Therefore,
119 Martin Heidegger, “Art and Space”, trans. Charles Sietart, Man and World 6 (1973): 4.
120 Heidegger, Being and Time, 146, translator’s note.
121 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 86.
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the limit of my bodying forth changes constantly through the change in the reach of
my sojourn.122
In lieu of a bounded “body” Heidegger shifts to speaking of the lived body as a bodying-
forth, marking out what Judith Butler would later call for as an ontology of present
participles, in an attempt to undercut the sense of a body as a self-coincidental “thing”,
making it seem determinable as an enclosed interior of an “I” who does something, rather
than the complication of one who is, in and as the doing – one which is on-going and
historicised.
The body is not a self-identical or merely factic materiality; it is a materiality that
bears meaning, if nothing else, and the manner of this bearing is fundamentally
dramatic. By dramatic I mean only that the body is not merely matter but a continual
and incessant materialising possibilities. One is not simply of a body, but, in some
very key sense, one does one’s body and, indeed, one does one’s body differently
from one’s contemporaries and from one’s own embodied predecessors and
successors as well. It is, however, clearly unfortunate grammar to claim that there is
a ‘we’ or an ‘I’ that does its body, as if a disembodied agency preceded and directed
an embodied exterior. More appropriate, I suggest, would be a vocabulary that
resists the substance metaphysics of subject-verb formations and relies instead on an
ontology of present participles. The ‘I’ that is its body is, of necessity, a mode of
embodying, and the ‘what’ that it embodies is possibilities. But here again the
grammar of the formulation misleads, for the possibilities that are embodied are not
fundamentally exterior or antecedent to the process of embodying itself.123
What defines Dasein in their bodying is an outside that they share and make with others who
are there with them in the world; an outside which is never a tabula rasa to be projected upon
by a self, but an inherited, social and cultural realm. The projective understanding of Dasein
is never an innocuous or innocent perceiving, but is an understanding informed and inflected
by a particular historically situated bodying. To be a bodily being as a thrown-projection, is
to inherit a way of being out of which and against which one does one’s way of being, as
Butler would put it – now wearing the heavy workman’s boots her gait changes, and she
feels the difference of a seemingly innocuous choice – how the shape of the shoe makes for a
different expectancy of encounter, portage, rapport with the world, with others, with herself.
Projecting or sketching-out in this sense is more of an opening toward the world, a
“standing-open”, where the “significant features of what is encountered address the human
being”.124 Here is a being called into question prior to any questioning; a responsibility of
response before any “I” enters the scene. Something which Kleinberg-Levin has picked up
122 Ibid., 86-87.
123 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and
Feminist Theory”, Theatre Journal 4, no. 4 (1998): 521.
124 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 231.
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on in his reading of the latent “body” articulable in Heidegger’s sketch of Dasein: “It is a
bodily felt responsiveness that is called forth, solicited, in an immemorial time of origin prior
to all reflective awareness, all forms of intentionality that express the ego-logical will. It
is…the existential coordinates of our ontological disposition as beings bodily related to, and
called into question by, the pressing (unconcealment) of being”.125 This projective
understanding is a sketching carried out not through a present-at-hand body, a body defined
by being limited or bound by the skin, a body that is contained “in” a position, but is a body
which is an open stance towards the world, a responsive capacity; an availability; a way of
being attuned to the world; a tensional in-between.
As a pre-ontological, pre-subjective, pre-conceptual understanding this attuned bodily
projecting is not a special cognitive ability. As Kleinberg-Levin puts it, it does not belong to
an “ego-logical will”, but is how we carry-out an existence. The understanding which
belongs to Dasein is not an addendum to their existence, it is not an assertive knowing by a
subject, but is the co-formative conversing of a self and world as what makes for this being-
there – a dynamic, on-going, sketching-out.
In understanding as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not
a ‘what’, but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-
for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-
hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is
primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in
which it is its possibility.126
Projecting in this sense, has “nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has
been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being”, but is the
opening up to the horizon of the “there” as the boundary, the horos, of that situation’s limit,
where we are always already comporting ourselves towards what is unveiling itself, always
already (co)responding in such a way that we take what we encounter into our care – aiding
it in “unfolding its own essence as far as possible”.127
What we become aware of in Stimmung, in the mood of the situation we find ourselves in, is
an initial openness granting the appearance of a there to which we see our project of
dwelling consigned, simple things of the everyday, while our sketching-out, our projective
understanding, is the arrangement of this there in a way which allows things to belong to it,
to a region of “Care”, and from this, to each other – it is the freeing up which articulates this
125 David Kleinberg-Levin, “The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger’s Thinking of
Being”, 7.
126 Heidegger, Being and Time, 183.
127 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 231.
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there. Rather than two distinct actions, they are but a two-fold action of making-room – the
referral of a dehiscence from there, to here. In this way, she comes to herself, touches
herself, through her situation. From this there she comes back to herself – nothing but this
ecstatic passage – nothing but this resonance of a there. Each time she is this distance, this
yonder – making-room as a prolongation of her body, each time extending, each time not
herself but the bearer of the there – responding only to the that-it-is, to which she adds
nothing but such as it is.128 Two pigeons on November’s branches, sitting.
128 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston:




We never have closed significations; we, like the humans of the past, have only open significations
and situations whose sense is in genesis.
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity
The problem of the world, and, to begin with, that of one’s own body, consists in the fact that it is all
there.
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception
It is to the situation of his own facticity, his own questionable being-there of his scene of
living that Heidegger turns in his lectures Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity to sketch-out
an example of this making-room, this everyday, situated understanding of Dasein, which
makes for a roomy sense of self. “The purest everydayness can be called on: tarrying for a
while at home, being-in-a-room, where eventually ‘a table’ is encountered”.129 Through his
description of a table, Heidegger comes to sketch-out the implicit understanding through
which he is there, in a particular space and time, in the inhabiting of sense, which is not an
addendum to his existence, but constitutive of it – his way of dwelling in the world. Thus,
what follows is his example of the table:
What is there in the room there at home is the table (not "a" table among many other
tables in other rooms and other houses) at which one sits in order to write, have a
meal, sew, play. Everyone sees this right away, e.g., during a visit: it is a writing
table, a dining table, a sewing table – such is the primary way in which it is being
encountered in itself. This characteristic of "in order to do something" is not merely
imposed on the table by relating and assimilating it to something else which it is not.
Its standing there in the room means: Playing this role in such and such
characteristic use. This and that about it is "impractical", unsuitable. That part is
damaged. It now stands in a better spot in the room than before there's better lighting
for example...Here and there it shows lines – the boys like to busy themselves at the
table. Those lines are not just interruptions in the paint, but rather: it was the boys
and it still is. This side is not the east side, and this narrow side so many cm. shorter
than the other, but rather the one at which my wife sits in the evening when she
wants to stay up and read, there at the table we had such and such a discussion that
time, there that decision was made with a friend that time, there that work was
written that time, there that holiday celebrated that time. That is the table as such it is
there in the temporality of everydayness and as such it will perhaps happen to be
encountered again after many years when, having been taken apart and now
unusable, it is found lying on the floor somewhere, just like other “things”, e.g., a
plaything, worn out and almost unrecognisable – it is my youth. In a corner of the
basement stands an old pair of skis, the one is broken in half – what stands there are
not material things of different lengths, but rather the skis from that time, from that
daredevil trip with so and so. That book over there was a gift from X, that one there
was bound by such and such a bookbinder, this other one needs to be taken to him
soon, with that one I have been wrestling for a long time, that one there was an
unnecessary buy, a flop, I still need to read this one for the first time. My library is
not as good as A’s but far better than B’s, this matter is not something one would be
129 Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 68.
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able to derive pleasure from, what will the others say about this way of doing it, and
the like. These are characteristics of the world’s being-encountered.130
Rather than an understanding from without – an abstracted definition of the table according
to its measurable dimensions, the table Heidegger depicts finds its meaning only from within
a scene being inhabited for a while, at a particular time, where its sense is gathered in its
withnesses – its being with other things, and other Daseins. What is encountered is not an
isolated object in relation to a subject, but a scene of “Care”, where the table “shows up”
only in relation to particular modes of bodying-forth an inhabiting: writing, sewing, dining –
a living articulation of concern and solicitude. “The in-order-to and for-what (the daily
meals, the habits of writing and working, sewing from time to time, playing from time to
time) are not just arbitrary, free-floating modes of being-occupied at the table and tarrying
for a while at it, but rather ones which are defined in the awhileness of their temporal
particularity from out of a historical everydayness, defining and redefining themselves anew
from out of such everydayness and for it in ways cut to the measure of its temporality”.131
Rather than a static “there”, this scene is an on-going abode of “Care”, shifting and being
defined through these modes of bodying, which occur in a time which belongs to the
temporality of everydayness – through the concrete, lived situation as it is unfolding: “This
side is not the east side, and this narrow side so many cm. shorter than the other, but rather
the one at which my wife sits in the evening when she wants to stay up and read”. In lieu of
an autonomously understandable object, Heidegger’s description conjectures that we cannot
understand the table outwith its embeddedness in a “scene”, where it obtains its sense only
through its worldly character, that is, in the gathering of what might be understood as an
ecology of “Care”, given that ecology stems from the Greek οἶκος, meaning “house”,
“dwelling”, and captures the manner in which this “there” is not a static site, but an on-
going, inter-connected emerging environment, over which the human being does not rule,
but in which they are implicated.
Such an ecological sense can be seen too in the mode of inhabiting this “there” which most
occupies Heidegger in this scene, where room is made for the concern of writing – the only
element from this scene retained in Being and Time, which otherwise replaces this making-
room of his own facticity, with the example of the hammer.132 Heidegger notes how the “ink-
130 Ibid., 70.
131 Ibid., 75.
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stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room”, these
“Things”,
never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a
sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us...is the room;
and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial
sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges and it is
in this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a
totality of equipment has already been discovered.133
The things find their articulation from within a scene of “Care”, that is, they are internally
related, find their significance in their belonging together through the “Care” of the
inhabiting of writing. Each item “makes sense” in relation to the whole of the concernful
dealing. In a similar way, the books of this scene of writing, this study, are encountered from
within a scene of “Care”, and belong thus to a situated making-sense: “The beings-which-
are-there do not stand within the definiteness of definitions, but rather within that of
everydayness and its historicity, e.g., the books coming forth for a while at particular times
from out of the “intensity” of anxious concern and its apprehensions”.134 As with the table,
and the writing equipment, rather than the books being encountered as “things” of
determinant, isolated signification, they are given-room within a particular scene of writing
and signify in relation to this situated concern: “what has significance signifies itself and
points itself into the “there” of a particular tarrying-for-a-while and situation of
everydayness”.135 The sense that is made in this making-room is, thus, one of a veritable
vernacular, as it is through use, contingent upon a situated inhabiting – there for a while, at a
particular time – where meaning is determined. Rather than isolatable “items”, Dasein makes
sense of the “there” through the gathered internal relations, where things are articulated
through the scene as a whole – one which is contingent not only on concern but also
solicitude, where others are part of this scene of writing being disclosed. Things are not
understood or related extrinsically, nor is Dasein an atomised individual who then comes
into relation to others, but is always already comprised of otherness, is always already being-
with in receiving themselves from the outside. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is an ecology of
“Care”, understood not as a bounded system, but as a whole which is not the sum of its parts,
nor an enclosed environment, but a whole which is constantly being formed – “is” only as an
on-going working-out of an inter-relatedness, where the sense being made of any given
that of a ‘hammar’, and what survived of it was a cursory mention of a ‘table’ in a ‘room’ with
‘writing’ and ‘sewing’ equipment on it”, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 92.
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scene is one which is always implicatory and tending towards others: “what will others say
about this way of doing it”,136 “those Others for whom the ‘work’ is destined are
‘encountered too’”.137 These others, while not overtly what appear within the there, are
nevertheless entwined in the sense being disclosed: “Others – definite others who are defined
at particular times and for a while from out of temporality – are there in what is being
encountered in everydayness...Initially and for the most part, those with us in life and close
by, those-who-are-there-with-us in everydayness, do not turn up in an isolated explicitness,
but rather in advance come to appearance precisely in what one pursues, in what one is
occupied with”.138
In the projective understanding of a bodying, sense is made through the gathering of the
situation being inhabited, where something is seen only through its parenthetical being
alongside, where it is part of a scene of sense being revealed as this situation – “a definite
signifying and pointing” into the there. “Significance can only be understood on the basis of
the disclosedness which is found in it and from out of which what is being encountered
signifies itself through a pointing within the other things we encounter and in this way
presses forth into its there”.139 The sense of the table is given, in this way, not through an
articulation of what it “is” – substantially, and once and for all – but from within the play of
inhabiting – the unpredictable, incalculable, improbable concurrency of occurrence.
The significance of such an example, as Heidegger goes on to point out, is that the human
being is immediately given to themselves through their being involved in a situation –
through their disclosure of a here-there dynamic they understand themselves not as an “I-
thing” but as the very articulation of the “there”, where they dwell for a while, at a particular
time.
In the appearance of those who are being encountered in a with-world, one-self is
therewith what one pursues…In the there of the table and other such “things” which
are being encountered. And this not – and even less so than in the case of the others
– in the sense of something grasped theoretically or in some other explicit manner.
And above all one-self is there in this manner without any self-observation turning
back upon an ego, without reflection – on the contrary, one encounters one-self in
this being-occupied with the world in dealings.140
It is in describing a simple, everyday thing that Heidegger comes to articulate the ecology of







cogito, but exist only through what they are not – through the withnesses of the there: “in the
dealings of everyday life which are closest to us the environing world, the world round-about
is always there also as a with-world and a self-world”, where this does not mean regions
against each other but “definite modes of the world’s being-encountered – each displays the
specific character of the round-about”.141 Something he would further emphasis in Basic
Problems of Philosophy:
Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand
ourselves and our existence by way of activities we pursue and the things we take
care of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds
itself primarily in things. The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation,
nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self;
rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world, its
own self is reflected to it from things.142
It is in bodying-forth the there, immediately and passionately, that Dasein exists. She
encounters herself in the inhabiting of a vernacular signifying – a tense of the everyday –
localised, there for a while, at a particular time, and yet never locatably there, but shifting
onwards, being displaced in a time that is on-going, and marked by past and future, pressing
onto this scene. Being-there is not a “now” followed by another “now”, but is what
Heidegger would call in these lectures a kairological time: “What we are concerned about
and attend to is there as not yet, as to be…for the first time, as already, as approaching, as
until now, as for the time being, as finally. These may be designated as kairological
moments of being-there””.143
As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, this is a temporality, where “The future is not later
than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present”, but “Temporality
temporalises itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been”.144 The
temporality of Dasein as a kairological moment, is a time in which past and future are
involved in a chiasmatic interrelation, which gives to the “present” its dimensionality, its
room. As he would later put it, “Dimensionality consists in a reaching out that opens up, in
which futural approaching brings about what has been, what has been brings about the
opening up of openness. Thought in terms of this threefold giving, true time proves to be 3-
141 Ibid., 80.
142 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988), 159.
143 Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 78. Kairological time, in the ancient Greek
sense, contrasts with chronological time – the linear sense of time, abstracted from the lived situation.
Kairos pertains to the context and refers to the opening of an opportunity – the so called “right time” –
it fits the occasion.
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dimensional”.145 What has been does not simply vanish, a completed moment unto itself, this
morning is echoing through to her afternoon; similarly the future is not a point to be reached
ahead, but her afternoon anticipated this morning. In this sense, what characterises her no
longer and not yet is their reciprocal heterogeneity, where they mutually constitute each
other. In this late essay Heidegger speaks explicitly as to how this time is one that makes-
room, gives the “there” its specific locality:
Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-
extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and
primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The
self-extending, the opening up, of future, past and present is itself prespatial; only
thus can it make room, that is, provide space.146
In an extending and retention room is made – a kairological present in which a tone still
sounds opening onto the present arriving, what Nancy comes to call the melody of a time as a
sonorous present; a “unity of and in diversity”.147 It is this structure of time which allows for
the condition of the quotidian to be a certain way of being, a play, a modulation, in an
unfolding melody of her life.
Rather than this kairological time being understood only as the moment of an intense, eye-
opening experience, John Van Buren comes to read Heidegger’s sense of the kairological as
a moment “in the sense of the circular movement of the ‘context’ of the ‘whole situation’
that includes past and future…The kairos, ‘the time’, ‘its time’, is not a punctual instant, but
the temporal spacing of an intentional stretching along (Erstreckung), from the past through
the future and into the moment. At any particular time, Dasein is this stretch, tract, or
spacing of time and the circular being-on-the-way along it from the cradle to the grave”.148
The kairological time is circular, as Van Buren goes on to explicate, “because the past is not
only behind one, as it were, but also in front as something that has always already circled
back into the future in terms of the possibilities that are bound up with it. One’s having-been
is not a finished product for theoretical observation, but is rather still open, unfinished, on
the way, an energia ateles. Thus to retain and stretch along into the past is actually to stretch
beyond it into the horizon of its unfinished and unpredictable business, toward which one
145 Martin Heidegger, “On Time and Being”, trans. Joan Stambaugh (London: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1972), 11.
146 Ibid., 14.
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futurally lives”.149 The kairological time of a situation being inhabited is an anticipative
understanding where past, present, and future are not separated but are bound in a
topological stretching. Rather than a succession of moments of “now”, the kairological time
spirals, always tending towards itself, never coincidental.
What characterises the everyday present is its presentation of itself – what Samuel Weber
comes to understand as the strange, non-coincidental split time of the present participle – a
time that is only in parting-with itself, reaching towards itself, in an on-going emergence,
where its presence is “suspended” as the “interval linking and separating that which is
presented from the presentation ‘itself’”.150 It is a connection and division arising from the
convergence of its articulation with what it articulates, making for a redoubling which splits
and joins it – a repetition which makes for a present which is always “both ahead of and
behind itself, an ambiguity that in English is condensed in the preposition ‘after’. As present
participle the present is ‘after’ itself, in hopeless self-pursuit”.151 As demonstrated in
Heidegger’s example, Dasein exists in their parting-with themselves in a projective
understanding – they are in their hyphenated being-there – tending towards themselves. As
Weber notes: “In order to share or partake, there must...be a concomitant dividing or
divesting, a parting or, perhaps, more precisely, a de-parting, a taking leave, a partitioning in
order to im-part. All of this is uncannily condensed in the English phrase parting-with. The
‘with’ suggests that parting entails a departure, not simply as the dissolving of a relationship,
but rather as a singular way of (re)constituting one”.152 It is in this sense that the paradoxical
nature of Dasein’s issue of being comes to light, as it is only in parting-with themselves that
they have a relation towards themselves, and yet this very parting makes for their inability to
ever fully arrive at themselves – theirs is an assignment continuously in formation, arising in
an emergence that is neither here nor there but on the way. “This is the enigmatic mystery
and resource of the present participle: it is present only in departing, present only partially,
never fully, never completely present. It is present to the quick, right now, but in an ongoing
recurrence that is always also on the verge of taking leave, of departing”.153 The present
participle is an uncanny time, in this way, as it is only through being constantly altered; it is
only through what it is not. Presence is always, in this sense, a repetition, a duplicity, where
the two-fold of the present participle, as Weber notes, signals not “two folds, but rather the
crease of a singularly single fold, enfolding and exposing its constitutive difference from
149 Ibid., 281.





itself”.154 Heidegger’s two-fold structure of Dasein as a thrown-projection can be seen as
following this complication of time, where an initial opening has already opened up a there,
a field, a whole, from which the future comes back towards us here. It is a structure where
“meaning” resides not in a signified, not in a signifier, but in the singular event of signifying,
where meaning is beside itself. The kairological present is not, in this sense, ever identical to
itself, but inherently open and comprised of otherness. Such is the immediacy of her
everyday, where the day and her are one, in what simply seems to be so, where this scene
cannot be defined, but is the same by parting-with itself, as such – the books splayed in
another arrangement; the “s” key now slightly defunct from the accident yesterday; the sky
outside ink black. Today is Saturday.
What the present participle gives us is not what something “is” – the definiteness of
definition, but how it appears from within a situation – what it is like – a way of being. In this
sense, what is encountered by Dasein in their projective understanding gives rise to what
Heidegger comes to call the “structure of the as” – the logos. Indeed, in Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger directly relates the logos with this projective
understanding when he notes:
This primordial structure of world-formation, namely projection, also displays, in its
originary unity, that which Aristotle necessarily had recourse to in his question
concerning the possibility of logos. Aristotle says: The logos, in accordance with its
possibility, is grounded in the originary unity of joining and separating. For
projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes
apart as it were – in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in
such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of
whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which
binds and binds together. Projection is that originaryly simple occurrence
which…intrinsically unites contradictory things: binding together and
separating…this projecting is also that relating in which the ‘as’ springs forth. For
the ‘as’ expresses the fact that beings in general have become manifest in their
being, that that distinction has occurred. The ‘as’ designates the structural moment
of the originary irruptive ‘between’. We simply never first have ‘something’ and
then ‘something more’ and then the possibility of taking something as something,
but the complete reverse: something first gives itself to us only when we are already
moving within projection, within the ‘as’.155
What the logos indicates is a mode of signifying in which there is displacement and
difference as the occurrence of meaning. The parting-with of the present participle makes for
a binding through separation – a meaning which occurs in the irruptive hyphenation. Rather
than a seeing something as something, this “structure of the as” is what first gives us
154 Ibid., 20.
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something as such. What we see there is only seen from here – a certain perspective, a
certain direction, a certain disposition which reveals certain aspects more than others. What
is seen cannot be divorced from the seer, its being as-such is for this one who is involved in
a making-room – there for a while, at a particular time. This logos as discourse, as
Heidegger comes to read it in Plato and Aristotle, is not the sense later translated as:
“‘reason’, ‘judgement’, ‘concept’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’, or ‘relationship’”.156 Discourse is
not a “binding of something with something else”, but is what lets something be seen by
pointing it out – it is a “synthesis” that gathers not already constituted elements, but is the
movement that first allows things to be distinguished not definitively, but as a how of an
appearing. It is the singular attunement where something, someone, some situation, is
revealed as such, in the present of their presentation.
‘synthesis’ does not mean a binding and linking together of representations, a
manipulation of psychical occurrences where the ‘problem’ arises of how these
bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Here the ouv
has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its
togetherness with something – letting it be seen as something.157
The as refers to the situational disclosure of coming to see something from within the limit
of this there, in a time that is tending towards itself, and in this way it has an ambivalent
relationship to truth, for in its revealing it, at the same time conceals, in the manner in which
something cannot be revealed in its totality but as this, within the facticity of this day, this
week, this year. What the “as” articulates, in this sense, is what something is and is not;
Dasein is always simultaneously in the truth and untruth. “To exhibit anything is to take it
together and take it apart”.158 The as both binds and separates – it is the jointure which
articulates, as Heidegger puts it, not intelligence, not knowledge, but “Intelligibility”159 – that
which first makes any cognitive intelligence possible. This discourse can be understood as
the bodying-forth of a being-there for a while, where we respond to the world, and discuss it
– come to see it as something. In the inhabiting of this present which is always tending
towards itself, is only as this gap between, sense is made in the swinging and swaying of
concealment and unconcealment, in the difference and distance which this repetition creates,
where something is turned in this turbulent time of returning; a veritable conversing of sense.
The “as” signals, in this sense, what Heidegger characterises as definitive of this projective
understanding – its being an apprehension of possibility:





When one understands oneself projectively in an existentiell possibility, the future
underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-towards oneself out of that
current possibility as which one’s Dasein exists. The future makes ontologically
possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its
potentiality-for-Being. Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the
projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it
as a possibility.160
Yet this is an anticipative projecting which is always bound to a there – to how something
has been understood from within the historic and cultural milieu into which you have been
thrown, along with the particular thrownness of this attunement, in this situation:
Possibility, as an existential, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in
the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’ (libertas indifferentiae). In every case
Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite
possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being which is is, it has let such possibilities
pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its Being, or else it seizes upon
them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasien is Being-possible which has
been delivered over to itself – thrown possibility through and through. Dasein is the
possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is
transparent to itself in the different possible ways and degrees.161
In such an understanding characterised by possibility, of seeing something only within the
uncanny time of a present participle, nothing rests in a simple identity, but is opened to the
alterity of tending towards itself. Here, the encounter with things is never a defined event,
but what takes place within a horizon of possibilities, possible valences of sense, where, as
Clive Cazeaux notes, “‘it could be this’ or ‘it could be that’ – which is constitutive of
receptivity”.162 The projective understanding is the opening up to the opening of this speil-
raum disclosed in an attunement, where something is not yet defined, but is open to being
seen as something. As Cazeaux puts it, the as-structure is a “structure of anticipation” which
“on the one hand…confers unity upon the experience, while, on the other, allows the
experience to occur within a range of possibilities”.163 What it makes for is a “continuous
questioning of whether what we next encounter will be a ‘this’ or a ‘that’”.164 Our encounter
and understanding of the world remains open to a play of possibility, where it is open to
error – the possibility of taking something, or indeed someone, to be what they are not. To
see something as something, in this way, is not the comparison of an established something
160 Ibid., 385.
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with something else, but is the differential experience of non-coincidence in this time that is
always tending towards itself:
In trying to fathom just how something-as-something functions primordially, it is
important to remember that there is no clearly demarcated ‘something’ which
consciousness then likens to something else. Rather, something-as-something is the
structure of comparison per se whose bifocal outlook allows similarity and
difference to be recognised.165
What is under critique, it would seem, as Krzysztof Ziarek remarks, is “the road from the
specific to the generic, characteristic of perception and understanding”, where the emphasis
is shifted “as Heidegger’s analysis of a table makes evident, from the object to its worldly
context and from its essence to the character of its worldly being (that is, its temporal and
historical dimension)”.166 Rather than isolated identities of referential sense, the things we
encounter in the world are only ever significant from within a context of cross-references,
where, as in Heidegger’s example, the table is seen through its implications and
complications with. Its significance lies not in itself, but in this space beside itself where its
singular sense unfolds, where it is through what it is not.
Discourse belongs, in this way, not to a determinable sense, but to the play of difference
within a situation, the opening and closing, the disclosing and concealing of a there being
inhabited for a while, at a particular time. The “synthesis” of the logos is not a logical
judgement, it is not a dialectic of constituted statements, but a field of tension, which cannot
come to an internally rendered resolution, but can only be interrupted from without, given
that the present participle has no internal principle of closure. It is a synthesis, in this way,
which operates more as a configuration or constellation of sense, rather than a subordination
of elements to a logical synthesis – a sense that is made not by an “ego”, but by being given
over to the situation being inhabited, bearing it forth, which makes for a manifestation of a
“there”, the making of room, as both an event and the place where the event occurs. As
Malpas articulates it,
What is brought to salience in and through the situation, in and through the ‘there’, is
also what participates in the very happening of the there – myself, the others who are
there with me, the things that I find myself alongside. This structure of
situatedness...does not allow of any grounding of the structure as a whole by
reference to any one element within that structure nor by reference to anything apart
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from that structure, but rather through the already interconnected – the ‘gathered’ –
character of the structure as such.167
Discourse, in this way, is primarily a disclosure of a self-world conversing, where there can
only be an attunement, a jointure and separation, rather than a “logic” of assertion – what
Heidegger reads as the Western inheritance of the Greek understanding of logos, where “this
logic was based upon the ontology of the present-at-hand. The basic stock of ‘categories of
signification’, which passed over into the subsequent science of language, and which in
principle is still accepted as the standard today”.168 If the human being is understood not as a
present-at-hand entity, but as a being-there, an on-going event of a disclosure, discourse is
never the solidification of sense, but the articulation of an appearance, what gives to
something its being “as such” – the particular arrangement, its appearance, its singular
presentation, which is only momentarily suspended, rather than caught, or captured. The
world is open to making-sense but only ever in a finite way. Significance comes not from
what something is, but in how it is revealed, how it is disclosed, the singular way of its
showing itself as something, in a there being inhabited in the stretch of the kairos – of being
there for a while, at a particular time.
What characterises this projective understanding of Dasein is its inherent analogical nature,
where their articulation of the “there” is not completely different, nor entirely the same, but
similar. As Van Buren notes, this sense of an analogical understanding of the facticity of the
world is something that characterised Heidegger’s early work, in particular on Dun Scotus,
where being is not characterised by either “homogeneity, identity, univocity” nor “pure
heterogeneity, difference, equivocity”, but as a structure of analogy.169 It is this “as-
structure” which allows for both the multiplicity of the thisness of the world, the difference
of a singular apple, whilst also being an identity of apple; it allows for a continuity in
difference; a “unity-in-multiplicity and multiplicity-in-unity”;170 the recognition of a face,
and the trace of a flicker of otherness across it. Presence is always analogical – we come to
know someone through what they are like, which is never just a one-off impression, but an
on-going variation of their melody of being – sometimes like this, sometimes like that, and
sometimes so different we hardly know them at all. Their presence is their face, how they
inhabit their limit, how they show themselves – their style of being, which, though
recognisable, is entirely improbable, entirely unpredictable, and completely inappropriable.
When we phone someone we love, more than anything else, more than any of the chatter of
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what is said, the “news” they convey all at once is the song they are singing today – a
response to the implicit question of the call – how are you doing? The phone call is an
attempt to tune into their presence, to become attuned again to their way of being – a melody
which is always subtly different. And it is this presence that we miss most about those who
depart us, what cannot be summarised in any “biography” without reducing their life to a
banality. Their presence was their strange familiarity that opened up an aspect of the world
to you and you to them, an aspect that was in constant evolvement, up to the end – and goes
on beyond, even if the other now is the silent counterpart of the conversation.
In this way, Dasein is presented as neither a universality nor a particularity, neither a
“monism (univocity) nor a pluralism (equivocity), but rather an identity-in-difference and a
difference-in-identity (analogy)”.171 Dasein’s making-room is the way in which the world
comes to be articulated as such – through the situated being-there for a while, at a particular
time, through, that is, the individuation of space-time. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it:
The past, therefore, is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a
subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being in itself, to adumbrate a
perspective, and introduce non-being into it. A past and a future spring forth when I
reach out towards them. I am not, for myself, at this very moment, I am also at this
morning or at the night which soon will be here, and though my present is, if we
wish so to consider it, this instant, it is equally this day, this year or my whole life.
There is no need for a synthesis externally binding together the tempora into one
single time, because each one of the tempora was already inclusive, beyond itself, of
the whole open series of other tempora, being in internal communication with
them.172
The understanding that is formed through seeing something as something, in this way, is one
which is, as Merleau-Ponty calls it, a passive synthesis through the unfolding of time – a
time that is always situational.
it is indeed clear that I am not the creator of time any more than of my heart-beats. I
am not the initiator of the process of temporalisation; I did not choose to come into
the world, yet once I am born, time flows through me, whatever I do…What is
called passivity is not the acceptance by us of an alien reality, or a causal action
exerted upon us from outside: it is being encompassed, being in a situation – prior to
which we do not exist – which we are perpetually resuming and which is constitutive
of us. A spontaneity ‘acquired’ once and for all, and one which ‘perpetuates itself in
being in virtue of its being acquired’ is precisely time and subjectivity. It is time,
since a time without its roots in the present and thence a past would no longer be
time, but eternity.173
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We know the world and come to understand it, in this sense, because we are not divorced
from it, are not “in” it as the water is “in” the glass, but are ourselves worldly. It is in this
way that Merleau-Ponty would tender that our language of inquiry is not what “I” know, but
what she knows – it is a being known by the world, where we are already given over to a
there. “if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one
perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation carries within it the germ of a
dream or depersonalisation”.174 What philosophy in its assertions forgets is this non-knowing
of the beginning, this sojourn in the there, where you are only through what you are not. “It
is through the world first that I am seen or thought”.175 The language of inquiry of our bodies
is something which was perhaps the root of Merleau-Ponty’s perduring question – the
questionability which served as the crux of his phenomenological investigations, given that
the sensible, as he came to understand it, presents itself to the perceiver in the form of a
puzzlement, a query to be corresponded to, an address, where sense is always being resumed.
Take the following, for example, when he speaks about perceiving the colour blue:
a sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled problem
for my body to solve. I must find the attitude that will provide it with the means of
becoming determinate, of showing up as blue; I must find the reply to a question
which is obscurely expressed. And yet I do so only when I am invited by it, my
attitude is never sufficient to make me really see blue or really touch a hard surface.
The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in
the first place. As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an
acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of
blue such as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this
mystery, it ‘thinks itself within me’, I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and
unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my consciousness is saturated with this
limitless blue.176
As the sky begins to exist for itself – here is a very different sense of perceiving contrary to
the dichotomy of perceiver and perceived. What is proffered is not that the world is simply
“there” and we receive its sense, but that what is involved is a participation within
something. For the astronomer or geographer, as Merleau-Ponty notes, the sky does not
indeed exist for itself, but for the one experiencing it in their being-there, it provides “the
theatre of a certain living pulsation adopted by my body”.177 Perception is always a certain
way of being in the world – variations on modulations. It is in this way that we are in
communion with the world – we synchronise, as Merleau-Ponty articulates it, with a “certain
174 Ibid., 250.
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rhythm of existence”178 being put forward, a form of existence, where we open up to it, or
retract from it. We find the attitude of our bodies which will correspond with the blue.
Our relationship with the world is such that there is an innate kinship in which, as with the
chiasm of a crisscrossing of touching and being touched within our own bodily being, we
both sense and apprehend the world, and are sensed, and apprehended by the world – each
gives and coexists with the other, rather than being distinct, separate acts. As Merleau-Ponty
puts it, “he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he looks at…he who sees
cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it, unless by principle,
according to what is required by the articulation of the look with the things, he is one of the
visible, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them – he who is one of them”.179 In this
way, as Merleau-Ponty sketches, the body sensed and the body sensing are the two-fold of a
single movement, “two segments of one sole circular course which goes above from left to
right and below from right to left, but which is but one sole movement in its two phases. And
everything said about the sensed body pertains to the whole of the sensible of which it is a
part, and to the world”.180 Touching is inhabited by a not-touching, vision by an invisible –
all perception is organised around a not of which it is comprised – the other side; the
reverse; the presence of a certain absence.
It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty conceives of a fundamental narcissism in all perception
and understanding of the world. What is felt in being given over to the world is not an
invasion of an alien reality, but the sensing of our own otherness, our own non-being and
capacity to be passive with regards to ourselves, submitting to ourselves as if we were an
exterior power. “the body feels the world in feeling itself”.181 What is key with reversibility
is this incapacity which is part of capacity, where seeing is always a seeing with the absence
of seeing; touching, always a touching with the absence of touching.
The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an inert
setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a power that is born into, and
simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or is synchronised with it.
The relations of sentient to sensible are comparable with those of the sleeper to his
slumber: sleep comes when a certain voluntary attitude suddenly receives from
outside the confirmation for which it was waiting. I am breathing deeply and slowly
in order to summon sleep, and suddenly it is as if my mouth were connected to some
great lung outside myself which alternately calls forth and forces back my breath. A
certain rhythm of respiration, which a moment ago I voluntarily maintained, now
becomes my very being, and sleep, until now aimed as a significance, suddenly
178 Ibid., 248.




becomes a situation. In the same way I give ear, or look, in expectation of a
sensation, and suddenly the sensible takes possession of my ear or my gaze, and I
surrender a part of my body, even my whole body, to this particular manner of
vibrating and filling space known as blue or red.182
We experience the world, as in the sky that exists for itself, by allowing ourselves to
participate in the arrangement of a whole, where each part is “‘sensitive’ to what happens in
all the others, and ‘knows them dynamically’”.183 Such is the organisation of gestalts, as
Merleau-Ponty would proffer, were we come to perceive through the internal relations of a
particular configuration. This “gestalt” Merleau-Ponty refers to is not the sense of a static
form perceived and known by a subject, but the internal relations from within a field of
perception which the perceiver is an attuned part of. It is not a “completed form”, given that,
as Merleau-Ponty continuously emphasises, perception is never a complete or completable
act – we can only perceive from a given perspective, situated in a particular circumstance,
and so it is more like a form that is momentarily formed within a situation that is moving – a
form more akin to a singular configuration than a fixed, objectifiable form of a schema -
what allows the world not to be a static, definable sense, but ambiguous, always shifting, and
inherently formed in and as its context. Merleau-Ponty’s sense of gestalt is more akin to
Heidegger’s “as-structure”, where the meaning derives from the particular arrangement, the
joining and separation, where something is both seen and not seen. As with the table, what is
perceived is only the gathering from within a “there”, a certain constellation, where the table
is not “in” space, lodged there in a pre-existing site, nor is it a-spatial, but more organises
and articulates certain manners and ways of being-there. Its sense is constituted laterally,
spreading beside itself, in a time being inhabited.
The Gestalt is not a spatio-temporal individual, it is ready to integrate itself into a
constellation that spans space and time – but it is not free in regard to space and
time, it is not aspatial, atemporal, it only escapes the time and space conceived as a
series of events in themselves, it has a certain weight that doubtless fixes it not in an
objective site and in a point of objective time, but in a region, a domain, which it
dominates, where it reigns, where it is everywhere present without one ever being to
say: it is here.184
The gestalt, in this sense, is more of a structure of possibility than it is a fixed form, and yet
it is nonetheless a form that always articulates a certain arrangement of perceptibility. It is
not a form conceivable in advance, but more of a hinge, or pivot, which is open to
correspondence – an understanding modelled on this chiasm, this primordial as-structure of
182 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 245.
183 Ibid., 249.
184 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 205.
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the body which, through its dehiscence, through its enantiomorphic structure, is an openness
to dialogic possibility. The flesh is Merleau-Ponty’s way of conceiving the whole of which
we are a part – a whole which is formed asymmetrically, “is a mirror phenomenon”.185 “The
body” is a pivot point – the axis of a turning of self and world.
We have to reject the age old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer
in the body, or conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box...The world
seen is not "in" my body, and my body is not "in" the visible world ultimately: as
flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it...There
is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other. Or rather, if, as once
again we must, we eschew the thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two
circles, or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon
as I question myself, the one slightly decentered with respect to the other...186
*
“Flesh” is for Merleau-Ponty what Stimmung is for Heidegger – it is an “element” of being, a
“general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of
incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being”, it is
not a fact “or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to location and to the now. Much more: the
inauguration of the where and when, the possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word:
facticity, what makes the fact be a fact”.187 Indeed, as with the musical resonances of
Stimmung, what is known in this facticity of flesh is what Merleau-Ponty comes to call the
“musical ideas” – those which are proffered in this veiled mode of the as, telling us not
simply what something is but revealing whilst at the same time concealing; a visibility lined
with invisibility, one which is not waiting for the right light, the proper method to one day be
brought out of its obscurity, but is the simple facticity of a chiaroscuro of bodily
apprehension – what “I” do not grasp or understand, but what she is grasped by.
We do not possess the musical or sensible ideas, precisely because they possess us.
The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself,
and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings through
him or cries out so suddenly that he must ‘dash on his bow’ to follow it…There is a
strict ideality in experiences that are experiences of the flesh: the moments of the
sonata, the fragments of the luminous field, adhere to one another with a cohesion
without concept, which is of the same type as the cohesion of the parts of my body,






It is in this sense that it is a musical sensibility above all else that this one beneath me carries
with her and bears her through the world – her way of being-there for a while, at a particular
time another play modulating the melody of her life, like a fugue, constantly re-iterating the
same scene not entirely differently, but similarly, letting this aspect be revealed now, that
aspect be revealed then, without a full grasp, and so a language still tending towards, a




Beside one’s conceptual commerce with the world there remains a rhythmic participation.
– Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity
Being a body is being a certain 'tone', a certain tension. I'd also even say that a tension is also a
'tending'. Consequently, there are possibilities for ethical developments that we might not expect to
find here.
– Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus
For tenuity, tendency, tenderness and tension all derive from a Greek root teino, meaning stretched or
drawn out, with a paradoxical relation to words radiating out from tenire, which signify
transformations of touching or holding: content, intention, attention.
– Steven Connor, “Flat Life”
In her sketching-out of her conception of natality Hannah Arendt mentions how the ancient
Greek and Latin designate
two altogether different and yet interrelated words with which to designate the verb
‘to act’. To the two Greek verbs archein (‘to begin’, ‘to lead’, finally ‘to rule’) and
prattein (‘to pass through’, ‘to achieve’, ‘to finish’) correspond the two Latin verbs
agere (‘to set in motion’, ‘to lead) and gerere (whose original meaning is ‘to
bear’).189
It could be said that Dasein’s two-fold being as a thrown-projection follows this agere-
gerere structure, where they are thrown in a particular body not as contained within, but as a
limit from which they begin in their sketching-forth, bearing-out a sense, following through
having been set in motion – a structure which is continuously repeated in the thrownness into
each limited there, from which their presencing begins. The body then as a gesture of
existing – the on-going bodying-forth of a there. Indeed, it is to gesture that Heidegger would
later appeal as the gathering of a bearing of sense in and as an idio-local region:
What does the word ‘gesture’ mean? Etymologically, it comes from baren [cf. Latin
ferre: to carry, to bring]. To bear or to bring forth [gebaren] comes from the same
root. The German prefix Ge190- always refers to a gathering, to a collection of things,
as in Ge-birge [mountain range], which is a collection of mountains. From its human
189 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 189.
190 This sense of “gesture” as a gathering of internal relations is something which was perhaps
accommodated through the German language and its way of articulating a world in which there is an
easier expression of the “gathering” of internal relations rather than the delineation of external forms
and an understanding of relation as between distinct entities. Whilst English is a language which once
spoke to the more reflexive happening of subjectivity – “methinks”, “melikes”, it has historically
moved to a more atomistic self, the “I” of a separate self. As Franz Mayr highlights in his afterword to
the translation of the Zollikon Seminars, English is a language which “prefers contingent ‘external
relations’ between beings (entities), which can be formalised logically”, whilst German inclines more
towards “understanding and expressing ‘internal relations’, that is, the immanent interconnection of
things with things and the relations of part to whole or of whole to part”.190 Mayr goes on to specially
dwell on the prefix “Ge” which informs Heidegger’s articulation of gesture above: “Many German
words have the prefix “Ge-“ [together, “gathered”] indicating a completed action as in Geschenk [gift]
and Gestalt [completed figure] or community and interrelationship, as in Gemeinschaft [community],
Gesellschaft [society], Gebirge [mountains], Geschick [destiny], Gebarde [to bear, to bring forth],
Geschlecht [gender, sex], Geviert [the fourfold]”, Zollikon Seminars, 323.
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origins, ‘gesture’ means one’s gathered [gesammelt] bearing and comportment.
Within philosophy we must not limit the word ‘gesture’ merely to ‘expression’.
Instead, we must characterise all comportment of the human being as being-in-the-
world, determined by the bodying forth of the body. Each movement of my body as
a ‘gesture’ and, therefore, as such and such a comportment does not simply enter
into an indifferent space. Rather, comportment is always already in a certain region
[Gegend] which is open through the thing to which I am in a relationship, for
instance, when I take something into my hand.191
The body then, as the sub-jectum, as Michel Serres proffers, who in projecting “throws itself
underneath, sub-jects itself, knows suddenly what one must sub-ject, and how to do it,
recognises itself as thrown beneath – sub-jectus, subject. I carry therefore I am”.192 Not an
“object”, not an abode of an “I”, but a capacity, an “I can”.
the flesh, the Leib is not a sum of self-touchings…but not a sum of tactile sensations
plus ‘kinestheses’ either, it is an ‘I can’ - - The corporeal schema would not be a
schema if it were not this contact of self with self (which is rather non-difference)
(common presentation to…X).193
On balance, the body cannot be reduced to either a fixity or a reality: less real than
virtual, it aims at the potential, better, it lives in the modal…it moves; it doesn’t
merely travel the course from here to there, but forms, deforms, transforms, tightens
and stretches, figures, disfigures, transfigures, polymorphous, proteiform…you’ll
only stop these variations by defining it as capable. It can. This capacity sums up,
like an indefinite integral, the open set of postures and grimaces, bearings and
positions. I would even gladly define the body as a pre-position: precondition for
every position and preparing them all. We have just considered only vers.194
Bodying-forth meaning, in this sense, is an understanding marked by possibility, but at the
same time, always underscored by impossibility. The body is the bearer-forth, the originary
measure of time and space, their instrument of retention and protention which both gives her
her inquiry, and refuses all definitive answers, for her understanding only ever exists in-
between – this and that, here and there, earlier and later, near and far in an understanding
something as something. In this bodying-forth an understanding, the meaning is not “there”
as a present-at-hand “thing” but exists in the experiential tension between – like that between
her left hand and her right. Hers is always a subtle perception of similarity, that is, of the not
completely different, nor the completely same – it lies in neither one nor the other but in her
ability to hold together, to gather what is usually held apart – the contradictions the Western
world segregated into binaries. She wisely only ever understands them together, in a
synthesis that does not destroy their difference. Her understanding something as something
191 Ibid., 91.
192 Michel Serres, The Five Senses: a philosophy of mingled bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter
Cowley (New York: Continuum Int. 2008), 320.
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exists neither in one nor the other, it is neither here nor there, neither what has been, nor in
what is not yet, but in the on-going tension between. Anticipation can occur based only on
what has been, what has been makes no sense without its anticipation, for it is always
already imparting itself. Neither one comes before the other, but they are chiasmatically
construed.
There is a tact that links her, thus, to her past, an almost skin-like tegument that binds her to
what has been, one which is not separated from the tact that links her too to what is not yet,
stretching her into the time that is ahead. It is this sensed tension which Serres attends to in
the Latin tendere, meaning to stretch – a verb which belongs to the old measurement of toise,
equivalent to “six feet or around two meters”.195 To tendere is matched tendre, or tenir in the
Greek, meaning to hold, which was once, as Serres tells us, a “serious rival…as the source of
time”.196 A conflict thus, between time understood as discontinuous measurable elements,
and time as a stretched duration – one which is indissociable from space and characterised
by tension and continuity. “Contenance signifies capacity or volume and maintenant [now]
holds the present instant in the hollow of its palm more than it marks it”.197 The body as the
original tensor of space-time, not a definable entity, but a developmental capacity –
constantly carrying-out, bearing-forth, beginning and re-beginning in an opening that tests
and probes, plays out different variations in response to the living situation – changing,
transforming, altering, adapting, modifying, differencing, deviating.198 It is the spaces
between, the non-coincidence, which makes this bodily understanding possible. It is the
attuned jointure, rather than the simple mergence with the world, or complete separation,
which allows for her perception of similarity; the non-coincidence in the anticipative turning
of what has been that allows for her understanding to occur. Without this difference the
repetition produces the same, rather than the similar. Hers is an inquiry of a situated
articulation from where she is now, with her thrownness, her inheritance of a particular
socio-cultural history, being anticipatively turned and returned in an on-going projecting.
What she understands is not a present-at-hand thing, a cognised object, but a Stimmung, an




198 Kleinberg-Levin too gestures towards an understanding of “the body” as a capacity to be
developed, where the body is a “process” of dispositions and capacities that can be “taken up and
nurtured, unfolded, carried forward, metaphored, through Bildungsprozesse, processes of learning”,
“The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger’s Thinking of Being”, 5.
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Her sketching-out can be understood as a rhythm of making-sense, if rhythm can be re-
construed not as a metrics of time, but as a situated metron of a making-room – a space-time
not discernible from without, but a spatiofugal formation from within. Such a possible
understanding of rhythm is present in a re-reading the linguist Émile Benveniste presented in
a short essay entitled “The Notion of Rhythm”. In his sketching-out, Benveniste comes to
discern how rhythm, ruthmos, in its most ancient uses meant form, in the sense of the
configuration, the “arrangement of the parts in a whole”.199 This configuration was always
only the improvisatory, momentary arrangement of “what is moving, mobile and fluid” – the
form of what does not have “organic consistency” but “fits the pattern of a fluid element, of
a letter arbitrarily shaped, of a robe which one arranges at one’s will, of a particular state of
character or mood. It is the form as improvised, momentary, changeable”.200 Rhythm is here
understood as the singular attunement, which is indicated, as Benveniste notes, in the
particular suffix which forms ruthmos, one which always refers not to an accomplished
motion, but to its particular modality: “For example…the particular dance seen as it takes
place”.201 The very structure of the word itself indicates that rhythm is not to be objectivised,
to be made a concept of, but is a word which is evocative of the singularity of a way of
being, is a movement tied to a situation, to the jointure of a space-time. Ruthmos is tensile,
bespeaking its own finiteness – not a fastened form once and for all, but the momentary form
of what is in movement. It cannot, in this sense, be the form of a schema, another Greek
word for form as what is set, “realised and fixed in some way as an object”,202 but is a
configuration without “fixity or natural necessity and arising from an arrangement which is
always subject to change”.
What alters, as Benveniste traces it, with Plato, is the manner in which this configured form
becomes determined by “a ‘measure’ and numerically regulated”.203 Rhythm becomes the
flow which is “broken by metre into alternating intervals”204 – an ordered sequence of slow
and rapid movements – which shifts its sense from the improvised form of movement in a
particular situation, to the abstractable schema of a form. “We may then speak of the
‘rhythm’ of a dance, of a step, of a song, of a speech, of work, of everything which
presupposes a continuous activity broken by meter into alternating intervals”.205 Rhythm
199 Émile Benveniste, “The Notion of Rhythm”, Problems in General Linguistics”, trans. Mary








becomes a determinable something, a what, rather than the improvised, situated modality –
the how – the structure of seeing something as something. What Benveniste’s reading sets in
motion, thus, is the manner in which rhythm can be understood as a singular structure of
possibility. What perhaps Heidegger was attempting to indicate in Dasein as a being-there,
where the “form” of the human being’s existence is one which must be situationally
sketched-out, in a praxis of making not directed by an “I” but as a bearing-forth a making-
room. Rather than a form which is intentionally formed, this is a form that is the singular
rhythm of an emergence of sense from within a situation – her room only ever a momentary
configuration – a tensile, improvised form that is subject to change; an arrangement without
fixity or natural necessity; an ecological whole dynamically being articulated as-such. What
is at stake is a sketching-out of existence that cannot be conceived from without, but can only
ever be articulated from within, that is, through an idio-local bodying-forth an existence – a
qualitative versus a quantitative understanding of time, in and as a singular situation. Her
making-room is not something objectivisable, it is an inquiry which cannot be abstracted
from its situation of a bodying-forth a space-time, where something is not cognitively known,
but attunely sensed through the tactics of a tensional tending, through understanding
something as something.
Such a sense of rhythm resonates with what Raimon Panikkar picks up on in his own
proffering of rhythm as the structure of “Being”:
There is a fundamental difference between the series of time-beats (in German Takt)
and rhythm. The former is pure repetition, and it involves our conscious faculty of
reckoning perception. The latter is the return of the similar in a new way. Taktschlag
is repetition, rhythm is innovation. ‘Tact’ in English is not this time-beat, and yet it
is related to the (well-timed) opportune time of rhythm. A person who has tact is
aware of and respects the rhythms because that person is in ‘touch’ (tactus) with the
real situation of the particular circumstance.206
Again, here rhythm refers to the particular situation, and as such, as Panikkar attunes to,
cannot be a universal principle, it cannot be turned into a general concept, because it exists
not as a definable thing, but as a certain tact, a touch, producing not the same, but the similar
– holding within it enough diversity in order for it not to be the simple repetition of the same,
and yet enough similarity in order for us to perceive it. The “time” at play here is a more
“primordial sort of time”,207 as Panikkar puts it, something he illustrates through the famous
comment by St. Augustine: “What then is time? If nobody asks me, I know; if I want to
explain it to someone who asks me, I do not know”. St. Augustine struggles with
206 Raimon Panikkar, The Rhythm of Being: The Gifford Lectures (New York: Orbis Books, 2010), 41.
207 Ibid., 44.
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understanding time not because it is something he does not know, but because he knows it in
a different way, other than a conceptual understanding. The time here gestured towards is not
the objectifiable, quantifiable, chronological time, but the kairological, qualitative,
experiential, bodied-forth time – the time of “Care”, of a making-room. Indeed Panikkar
proffers how it is “not linear. If anything, it could be imagined as somewhat curved. Rhythm
is not possible on a plane surface. It needs the curvature of both space and ‘time’. It recoils,
but in a peculiar way. The ‘second’ movement is new and yet not new because it is not
disconnected, but second. It is the same only as an abstraction, abstracted from its…living
context”.208 Rhythm, as a structure of similarity, is perhaps conceivable as a spiral, which
indicates a movement both regular and irregular, both somewhat predictable and
unpredictable, an “interplay of pattern and variation”.209 This is the time we experience in
living – how the day itself is experienced as in part predictable and yet in other parts totally
wild. No day is the same, and yet no day is disconnected from the next, we expect what
tomorrow might bring, and yet cannot know what to expect. The time we live is a strange
jointure, perceptible only when things seem to come out of joint. “we discover rhythm when
we experience the subjective difference of an objective identity, but we could equally have
said: the objective difference of a subjective identity. Identity and difference, subjectivity
and objectivity, are overcome. In other words, the experience of rhythm is the experience of
the neither-identity-nor-difference of the real”.210 Rhythm, then, as the singular attunement
of what joins and separates; an enantiomorphic chiasm of connection and distinction, of
seeing the world as this, as that, in a relational understanding from which we are not
divorced.
The perception of rhythm, as Panikkar proffers, lies, as perhaps what Merleau-Ponty was
proffering with gestalt, in the apprehending of a whole comprised of internal relations, in the
momentary presentation of something as-such.
It has no real parts. Any partition would destroy the rhythm, which is not the sum of
its components. Each sound, if isolated, would make no rhythm, nor would it do so if
each sound were not ‘inside’ its neighbours, so to speak…rhythm demands a certain
type of perichoresis (a dancing interpretation…) being so intertwined that we are not
able to decompose the ‘units’ without destroying the true rhythm. If you do not






To say what rhythm is is impossible, it can only be sketched. It is what Panikkar calls a
“symbol”, in the sense that it necessitates a participation, a bodying-forth, in order to be and
to be understood. It is a structure of possibility, rather than an a defined thing – perhaps what
can only be configured mutely as an X that stands for something that is and is not, a
movement that is also a stillness, a drawing together and apart – an idiolocal marriage of
space and time that is always singular.
Rhythm is both temporal and spatial; it is the combination of different times in the
same (apparent) space and of diverse spaces in the same (apparently repeated) time.
Linear time is somewhat defeated; rhythmic time is all in the ‘timing’. Space is also
defeated; the situs changes but the locus remains the same. It seems as if you would
expand, and yet you are not displaced. Rhythm is the marriage of space and
time…time has become space and space, time. You can distinguish them, but cannot
separate them.212
Rhythm, then, is the time that presents itself, parting-with itself in a tending towards itself
that constitutes its localisation. Rhythm is not the “same”, nor simply a “pure difference”,
but the similar – an identity-in-difference and a difference-in-identity. Whilst metre or
schema is the return of the same, rhythm is the return of the same differently.
It is through rhythm that Dasein’s existence is begun, and which maintains them in an on-
going beginning, an on-going form in formation – their inquiry formed in the cohesion of an
“as”, that is, in a synthesis that is not logical but tensional, through the inhabiting of a
bodying-forth of sense. Her language of inquiry is articulated through the non-coincidence of
a rhythmical sense – the, as Jenny Wiskus highlights, “cohesion of temporal incompossibles
– of initiation and end, future and past – that creates, in music, the impression of
movement”.213 Her existence is formed in the tension between agere-gerere, where she does
not begin herself but is begun – rhythm being instituted, as Wiskus would have it, not by the
first note, but by the retrospective turning of the second note back.
Despite our common notion of rhythm as a series of definite, articulated sounds, the
musician knows rhythm in quite a different way: as the interval between articulated
sounds. It is the relationship of a second articulation to the first that creates a rhythm.
This is why a conductor who leads an orchestra never begins a piece of music from
the initial note; before the first sounded note, there must be a gesture (sometimes
only a breath) that, when placed in relation to the first note, will initiate rhythm or a
pulse for the entirety of the musical movement or phrase. Rhythmically, the first
gesture is never the beginning; it is the second gesture that initiates a beginning.
Rhythm can be instituted only retroactively; it turns back from the second note to the
first in order to recover the interval of silence between the two, even as it then lays
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forth a new structure that would support the articulation of an unfurling melody.
Rhythm promises an ongoing, dynamic process that works by looking both forward
and retrospectively, applying itself through the noncoincidence of each sound.214
The gap between her thrownness and projection, her being there-here is the retrospective
referral through which her rhythmical understanding is begun – an understanding which will
be her on-going melody of being, her analogical unity-in-difference and difference-in-unity.
The melody gives to us a particular consciousness of time. We think naturally that
the past secretes the future ahead of it. But this notion of time is refuted by the
melody. At the moment when the melody begins, the last note is there, in its own
manner. In a melody, a reciprocal influence between the first and the last note takes
place, and we have to say that the first note is possible only because of the last, and
vice verse.215
In this sense, her two-fold structure of thrown-projection is a structure of a form which is not
posed by a self, is not the making of an ego, but is a form which emerges from divergence,
where she becomes, as Merleau-Ponty describes the temporalising of musical ideality “the
form that has arrived at itself, that is itself, that poses itself by its own means, is the
equivalent of the cause of itself…auto-regulation, cohesion of self with self, identity in depth
(dynamic identity)”.216 Rather than a schema of identity, she is the compositional unfolding
through differentiation – her language of inquiry a continuous articulation of the world as-
such – a melody of being, which is never complete, but on-going, in a constant returning –
turning again what she thought she was. Her language existing only in the alterity of a trans
– in the movement of an inhabiting of possibility – a language of inquiry always on the way,
caught in the transformational transition of a transitive sense – this ecstatic existing in a
time that never simply “is” but is by parting with itself, making for an existence that cannot
be held in completion, but is only in the articulation of a transitioning – the tension between,
the seeing something as something.
Man is that inability to remain and yet is unable to leave his place. In projecting, the
Da-sein in him constantly throws him into possibilities and thereby keeps him
subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition
as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man.
Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore prevails as ‘absent’. Absent in a
fundamental sense – never simply at hand, but absent in the essence of his
prevailing, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and
future – prevailing in absence and never at hand, yet existent in his essential
absence… 217
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Her language of inquiry is a form in movement – always tending towards, searching toward
herself, never having reached a destination of self-coincidence, but scouting out possibilities.
What defines her existence is that it is not definable, it “is” only in the searching, only in this
mode of inquiry which never relents, this corresponding to having been addressed.
*
It is through an idiosyncrasy of rhythm, an ido-local making-room, scene by scene, that her
language of inquiry takes-place, where her form can only be the singular staging of a space
of time and a time of space, an eventmental happening of self and place, where inquirer and
situation are born together – a coexistence of an event and the place where the event occurs
– an eventmental happening as Casey comes to define the idiosyncrasy of place, where space
and time are enjoined, as such.
A place is more an event than a thing to be assimilated to known categories. As an
event, it is unique, idiolocal. Its peculiarity calls not for assumption into the already
known – that way lies site, which lends itself to predefined predications, uses, and
interpretations – but for the imaginative constitution of terms respecting its
idiolocality.218
place is not entiative as a foundation has to be but eventmental, something in
process, something unconfinable to a thing. Or to a simple location. Place is all over
the place.219
The ‘eventmental’ character of places, their capacity for co-locating space and time
(even as they deconstruct this very dyad), can be considered a final form of
gathering. This form is not the gathering-out of particular persons and things in a
configured place or region, or the in-gathering effected by the body as the crux of
nature and culture, but a still more general and pervasive gathering-with that occurs
by virtue of the very power of implacement to bring space and time together in the
event. Such comprehensive gathering is the turning point of space and time, the
pivot where space and time conjoin in place. Just as this most inclusive and
momentous gathering is the undermining of space and time construed as independent
and pre-existing dimensions, it is also the basis for any theory of space and time
taken as absolute or relative, simultaneous or successive, intuitive or conceptual. The
deconstruction of space and time by place clears the way for their conjoint
reconstruction. But the two dimensions remain, first and last, dimensions of place,
and they are experienced and expressed in place by the event of place.220
It is through an example of reflection on his own scene of thinking, from within his own
reading room that Casey shows how this making-room of a self as an entwinement of space
and time occurs:
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We realise the essential posteriority of space and time to place whenever we catch
ourselves apprehending spatial relations or temporal occurrences in a particular
place. Now I am in a room in Atlanta, and it is here that I am composing this essay.
Not only the punctiform here and now, but also relations and occurrences of much
more considerable scope collect around and in a single place. My quarters are an
integral part of a house in a certain neighbourhood and city, themselves set within an
entire region called ‘the South’, all of which have their own dense historicities as
well as geographies. Even these extensive geo-histories I grasp from within my
delimited room-place.221
Space and time are always experienced together in a certain room that is made through an
idio-local gathering. The space-time of implacement is an eventmental happening where the
spatial relations occur at a particular time, but this happening occurs in a space that is also
particular. The “event” of making-room, in this way, is the “spatiotemporalisation of a place,
and the way it happens as spatiotemporally specified”.222 Here is the rhythmical articulation
of a making-room – there for a while at a particular time – idio-local, where the horizon of
her being-there is not simply temporal, not simply spatial, but a spatio-temporal boundary –
the limit of her being from which she continuously begins, changing with the scene.
What characterises her inquiry is that it cannot be defined from without, it cannot be held
under a general concept, under a general way of proceeding, but is definable only through
the singular modality of its taking-place – the idio-local making-room from within, which is
a singular staging of rhythm. Indeed it is style through which Casey finally comes to define
place, where style is understood not as a marker of a homogeneous unity of identity, but as a
“unity-in-diversity”, where a “type or style admits of degrees”.223 Style as the singular
attunement of her analogical understanding – an identity-in-difference and a difference-in-
identity, where the there is understood as such. The “kind of” which Casey comes to define
as place, is an indefiniteness which paradoxically makes not for an indeterminacy, as he is
keen to emphasise, but is what allows for the idiosyncracy of an implacement, the inflection
of a there in its tensional, differential way of being: “I would even say that the open-
endedness of place, its typological status as morphologically vague, its de-finition, creates
the semantic space within which definite demonstrations and exact localisations can
arise”.224
It is the emptiness of her “there”, the manner in which it is indefinable apart from its taking-






in-formation. Hers is, in this way, an inherently theatrical inquiry – a bodying-forth
meaning, a materialising of possibilities not as an “expression” of a self, but as her
presentation. Indeed, the ontology of present participles Butler calls for is what Weber
comes to argue as the core of theatricality, where the present participle is the “theatrical
tense par excellence”225 – its sense-making a staging, an understanding which is not
grounded in advance but is contingent on the mode of its taking-place, on its singular
presenting as such. As a staging, this “there” can never be taken once and for all, and never
even fully, given that each making-sense is an incomplete scene of Dasein’s existence in
their tending towards, their always being on the way. Indeed, such an eventmentality is how
Weber comes to describe the theatricality of staging:
when an event or series of events take place without reducing the place it ‘takes’ to a
purely neutral site, then that place reveals itself to be a ‘stage’, and those events
become theatrical happenings. As the gerund here suggests…such happenings never
take place once and for all but are ongoing. This in turn suggests that they can
neither be contained within the place where they unfold nor entirely separated from
it. They can be said, then, in a quite literal sense, to come to pass. They take place,
which means in a particular place, and yet simultaneously also pass away – not
simply to disappear but to happen somewhere else. Out of the dislocations of its
repetitions emerges nothing more or less than the singularity of the theatrical event.
Such theatrical singularity haunts and taunts the Western dream of self-identity.226
In the implacement of sense, where there is a reciprocity, a co-functioning of Dasein and
world, the understanding never coheres into a simple present at hand representation, but is
the tension of a jointure and separation – a sense articulating a possibility from within the
inhabiting here-there – a sense which is always open to being set in movement once more. A
stage is never, as Weber emphasises, a spot enclosed onto itself, but is inherently split by
being open to an outside – split in being both here, where the action unfolds, and there, in
the space of the audience. It is a place defined by its parting-with itself in the relational
attunement of the as such.
A theatrical scenario thus never takes place ‘once and for all’ but rather ‘one scene at
a time’. It is singular and yet repetitive, ongoing and yet never complete. It is both
nearby and distant, familiar and strange, present and passing. It is marked not by acts
or even by actors, but rather by acting. Its tense and temporality is that of the present
participle. ‘Presenting’ rather than ‘present’, it entails a participation that never
comes full circle, never forms a whole. This is what distinguishes all theatrical
staging…from ‘art’ in the aesthetic sense: the former results not in a work, but (at
225 Weber, Theatricality as Medium, 212.
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most) in a ‘working through’. In its immediacy and elusiveness, such theatricality is
familiar and yet strange. Strange in its familiarity.227
Such is the ordinary strangeness of our existing not in the abode of identity but in the
uncanny differential of a thrown-projection, where we are continuously attempting,
unsuccessfully, to tend towards, to apprehend, what has apprehended us. The understanding
of possibility which comprises this being the there is an implacement of sense characterised
as the relational co-functioning of a both and rather than an either or – the gathered
collecting of a difference which effectively, as Casey argues in his reflections on the
idiosyncracy of place, deconstructs the binaries of dichotomous thinking which is the lot of
our philosophical inheritance in the West:
Place is not only compenetrative but also…deconstructive – deconstructive of
oppositions that it brings and holds together within its own ambience. These
oppositions include binary pairs of terms that have enjoyed hegemonic power in
Western epistemology and metaphysics. I am thinking of such dichotomies as
subject and object, self and other, formal and substantive, mind and body, inner and
outer, perception and imagination (or memory), and nature and culture themselves. It
is always from a particular place that a person, considered as a knowing ‘subject’,
seizes upon a world of things presumed to be ‘objects’. The reduction of persons to
subjects – and, still more extremely, to minds – and of things to objects could not
occur anywhere other than in place. Yet to be fully in a place is to know – to know
by direct acquaintance as well as by cultural habitus – that such a double reduction
delivers only the shadowy simulacrum of the experiences we have in that place.228
Her language of inquiry is always, in this sense, an eventmental taking-place, a certain
presentation, an on-going staging; each scene a making-room there for a while, at a
particular time, dwelling in its continuous unfolding, rather than in any shelter that could
buffer her against the pummelling buffets of time; her “there” both the place where the event
of her existence happens, and the happening of this event, neither one the ground of the
other. Indeed, Heidegger would invoke the theatrical in his essay “The Origin of the Work of
Art”, in speaking of the opening not as “a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on
which the play of beings runs its course. Rather…The unconcealedness of beings… is never
a merely existent state, but a happening. Unconcealedness (truth) is neither an attribute of
factual things in the sense of beings, nor one of propositions”.229 Being-there then, as an on-
going eventmental fictitious taking-place – a play of concealment and disclosure, where the
world presents itself as such in the time of an imparting, a tending towards. Dasein’s inquiry
is a veritable scenography of passage – each being-there a scene of sense where the total
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“plot”, or “drama”, is only carried out through the dynamics of its on-going manner of
unfolding, where though each scene is a gathered unity in itself, none are complete. The
“whole” is not the sum of the parts, but is what is constantly being worked-out through this
dynamic happening. It is in this sense that Dasein’s life is a form in-formation, where each
scene is a repeating of their originary assignment – their originary language of inquiry.
If we are ourselves in question in the very unfolding of our life…it is because we
ourselves are one sole continued question, a perpetual enterprise of taking our
bearings on the constellations of the world, and of taking the bearings of the things
on our dimensions.230
The questionability of her being is the definition of her movement form, her inquiry of
sketching-out – opposed to an externally imposed shape, hers is only the singular articulation
in and as the taking-place of a situation, the rhythmical space-time of the structure of the
“as”.
‘Self’ determines the ‘as’ of Being: if it is, it is as it is. It is ‘in itself’ prior to any
‘ego’, prior to any presentable ‘property’. It is the ‘as’ of all that is. This is not a
presentable property, since it is presentation itself. Presentation is neither a propriety
nor a state, but rather an event, the coming of something: of its coming into the
world, where the ‘world’ itself is the plane or the exposing of every coming.231
*
It is in this sense that the logos of discourse [Rede] is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the most
valuable witness to Being, that it does not interrupt an immediation that would be perfect
without it, that the vision itself, the thought itself, are, as has been said, ‘structured as a
language’, are articulation before the letter”.232 To perceive something as something is the
momentary configuration, an eventmental singular arrangement arising from the staging of
Dasein’s taking-place. The rhythm is the attuned jointure which brings us into nearness with
the world, and the others therein, whilst keeping them distinct, strange. Rhythm is the
immediate mediacy of the “there”, expressing not what something is, but that it is – the
tensional sense of a Stimmung, of being caught between here and there, one who is and is
not. Heidegger’s conception of language, in this sense, is one whereby mood, rhythm, a way
of saying, is what first opens up the sense of the world through this relational attunement of
the as. Rather than an addendum to meaning, the way is the ontological opening. Language
is first and foremost a form-of-life, that is, it gives the ruthmos of Dasein’s taking-place,
there for a while, at a particular time. It is a logos of which I am not the organiser but is her
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bodying-forth of sense, where meaning is the configuration, the singular constellation of an
articulation of the “there”, where what matters is not the significance of each thing but the
relations between, the articulated space of a making-room.
At certain moments in Being and Time, Heidegger gestures to this sense of language as first
and foremost an articulation of presence in space understood not as self-coincidence, but as
the attuned jointure of a roomy presence, through the Raumbedeutungen of its spatial
designations. At one point he rhetorically asks “Is it an accident that proximally and for the
most part significations are ‘worldly’, sketched out beforehand by the significance of the
world, that they are indeed often predominantly ‘spatial’?”233 And at another states: “both
Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to
language in general are dominated through and through by ‘spatial representations’. This
priority of the spatial in the Articulation of concepts and significations has its basis not in
some specific power which space possesses, but in Dasein’s kind of Being”.234 It is gestured
to too in Heidegger’s specific choice of Dasein, being-there, as the word expressive of the
human being where the “there” belongs in language to the deictic field of meaning,
corresponding to a situated bodying where the “here” and “there” change in relation to the
change of the situation.
W. Von Humboldt has alluded to certain languages which express the ‘I’ by ‘here’,
the ‘thou’ by ‘there’, the ‘he’ by ‘yonder’, thus rendering the personal pronouns by
locative adverbs, to put it grammatically. It is controversial whether indeed the
primordial signification of locative expressions is adverbial or pronominal. But this
dispute loses its basis if one notes that locative adverbs have a relationship to the “I”
qua Dasein. The ‘here’ and the ‘there’ and the ‘yonder’ are primarily not mere ways
of designating the location of entities present-at-hand within-the-world at positions
in space; they are rather characteristics of Dasein’s primordial spatiality. These
supposedly locative adverbs are Dasein-designations; they have a signification
which is primarily existential, not categorical. But they are not pronouns either; their
signification is prior to the differentiation of locative adverbs and personal pronouns:
these expressions have a Dasein-signification which is authentically spatial, and
which serves as evidence that when we interpret Dasein without any theoretical
distortions we can see it immediately as ‘Being-alongside’235 the world with which it
concerns itself, and as Being-alongside it spatially – that is to say, as desevering and
giving directionality. In the ‘here’, the Dasein which is absorbed in its world speaks
not towards itself but away from itself towards the ‘yonder’ of something
233 Heidegger, Being and Time, 209.
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circumspectively ready-to-hand; yet it still has itself in view in its existential
spatiality.236
It is perhaps in this sense of her language of inquiry as an idio-local rhythm of understanding
letting her dwell in the world in a way that preserves its strangeness, that Heidegger would
remark, towards the end of his lecture “Letter on Humanism”, “Aristotle’s words in the
Poetics, although they have scarcely been pondered, are still valid – that poetising is truer
than exploration of beings”.237 Her language of inquiry a poetic saying, if poetry is
understood not as a genre of literature, but what first allows us to dwell, to inhabit the world,
in an attuned jointure, singularly as such.
The reference in Being and Time (p.54) to ‘being-in’ as ‘dwelling’ is not some
etymological play. The same reference in the 1936 essay on Hölderlin’s word, ‘Full
of merit, yet poetically, man dwells upon this earth’, is not the adornment of a
thinking that rescues itself from science by means of poetry.238
Poetry then as perhaps more of a rhythm of sense – what first lets this there be perceived as
such in its very taking-place – the originary gathering of sense. As Heidegger underscores in
the elliptically titled “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, poetry should be understood not as a
flight of the imagination, a “frivolous mooning and vaporising into the unknown”, nor is it
simply a genre of literature, where it is subject to “the latest prevailing standard”239 of the
time; not an aesthetic addendum to our existence, “merely an ornament and bonus added
onto dwelling”,240 nor is it there in all dwelling, but is, as he articulates through attending to
Hölderlin’s phrase, “…poetically man dwells”…”, what “first causes dwelling to be
dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us dwell”.241
Incongruity is the mark of it – what Heidegger understands as the “same”, which is not the
“identical”, that eradicator of distinction which brings everything into a “common
denominator”, but the same understood as “the belonging together of what differs, through a
gathering by way of the difference”.242 Poetry as what articulates the chiasm of a jointure and
separation, gathering difference through tension – a “synthesis” which retains what is
“other”, bringing it not into agreement, but into accord, into a unity of difference through a
relational as. And so, as Heidegger himself performs in this essay, it is only through a
236 Ibid., 156.
237 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, trans. Frank A.
Capuzzi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 275.
238 Ibid., 272.





divergence from Hölderlin, dwelling in their non-coincidence and articulating this
difference, that what Hölderlin was attempting to capture in the phrase “…poetically man
dwells…”, can be brought to light: “we divine a path by which, through what is thought
differently, we come nearer to thinking the same as what the poet composes in his poem”.243
It is in allowing his own saying to differ from Hölderlin’s that he can come to read what he
was trying to say. Heidegger himself is thinking poetically in this sense, as it is only in the
crossing over of Hölderlin’s phrase in the trans of an as, that it remains the same – it is only
in being repeated differently, that is, where another rhythm is introduced, that a relation to
Hölderlin’s saying can be established. Poetry, in this sense, is not definable or confinable to
a genre, but is the generative capacity of a non-coincidence – it is characterisable only as a
rhythm of sense – the tensional tendency of a reading, of a situated understanding. It is in
becoming different that the “identity” of Hölderlin’s saying is preserved where identity is
here construed not as the identical, but as Heidegger argues, the ‘same’, where the same is
the simultaneous gathering of what differs and holding apart what differs, operating
according to a logic of “both and”, rather than “either/or”, in the tensional understanding of
the as. The identical cancels this movement between, this oscillation here-there, setting
things down into a this or that – the negation of this tensional difference – this carrying over,
this crossing between. The rhythm of a poetic saying, joins and separates, it gives and takes,
it is and is not; the moment of joining is also the moment of separating – it is a live relation,
that allows movement – allows for a seeing something as something, as a gathering of
similitude, in which difference is not eradicated, but allowed to be. It is an attuned measure –
a measure which spans the between of “earth” and “heaven”, where the human being is the
one who measures out their dimension on earth in relation to the heavens – to the unknown,
which is not a measure-taking of “science”, metting out the world according to a standard
metric, where the unknown is reduced to a known quantity, but the cohesion without concept
of an idio-local measuring, uniting the known and unknown, heaven and earth. The unknown
strangeness of the “gods” of heaven is not the measure of our dwelling, but the manner in
which the unknown does not appear, but is “revealed as such by the sky”.244 The appearance
of the unknown through the known lets us see what conceals itself “but lets us see it not by
seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the
concealed in its self-concealment”.245 As Agamben puts it, “facticity”, the that-it-is of
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that says this unsayability – that articulates the unarticulability of the there. It is a saying that
does not explain the wonder and perplexity of the there, but is in attunement with it, shows it
as such. This measure of poetry is, as Heidegger notes,
A strange measure for ordinary and in particular also for all merely scientific ideas,
certainly not a palpable stick or rod but in truth simpler to handle than they, provided
our hands do not abruptly grasp but are guided by gestures befitting the measure
here to be taken. This is done by a taking which at no time clutches the standard but
rather takes it in a concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, that remains a
listening.247
Rather than the reduction of what appears in the opening to what is known, through
measurements that can be “confined within a quantity and order”, this measuring is not a
quantum, a quantification, but an accord – a unity in and of diversity – what preserves not
only a revealing, but a concealing too. It is a measure as rhythm – as the span of a making-
room where we dwell within the world, rather than above or outside it. What characterises
this language of inquiry, this poetic saying, is the showing in something of that which is
other to itself – the analogical nature of an understanding that gathers sense in a gesture
where something is, only through what it is not.
In such a way, poetry is to be understood not from out of language, but as that language of
inquiry which first makes for language at all – the idio-local taking-place of a rhythm of
sense. As Heidegger notes in another essay on Hölderlin, “Poetizing thus never takes up
language as a present-at-hand material with which to work, rather, poetizing itself first
makes language possible”.248 Poetry is “that through which all those things first come into
the open that we then talk about and discuss in our everyday language”.249 This poetizing is
the originary rhythmical measure of the world, understood not as a metric but as the arising
of a bodying attunement, a span which cannot be known in advance, but which occurs in the
inhabiting of a there – in the opening up to an opening as such.
247 Ibid., “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, 221.






– Heraclitus, Fragment 119
I dwell in possibility -
A fairer House than Prose -
More numerous of Windows -
Superior - for Doors -
– Emily Dickinson, 466
The purpose of poetry is to remind us how difficult it is to remain just one person, for our house is
open, there are no keys in the doors, and invisible guests come in and out at will.
– Czesaw Milosz, “Ars Poetica?”
Wittgenstein says the following. The difficulty in which thinking stands compares with a man in a
room, from which he wants to get out. At first, he attempts to get out through the window, but it is too
high for him. Then he attempts to get out through the chimney, which is too narrow for him. If he
simply turned around, he would see that the door was open all along.
– Martin Heidegger, Heraclitus Seminar
What characterises her language, above all, is the way in which the world’s, (and thus her
own), questionability is left open – the strange facticity of her scene of thinking exhibiting
itself continuously, as such. She thinks she knows it completely, abides in its predictable
rigidity, only to be confronted one evening, mid-summer, by the inexplicable beauty of the
light striking the green bottle just so, illuminating it in a dazzling radiance hued with a
reticent tone. Even here, in the ordinary familiar, the unexpected breaks in – like the mouse
she hears hiding in this room now wintering itself. Her language of inquiry always a capacity
entwined with incapacity – an inability to see or show something entirely – all she knows is
this play of an aspect in passing, leaving open other possibilities of sense, a different light-in-
darkness; her inquiry always a not being able to grasp fully; her perplexity, questionability,
on-going. Yet this permanency of a question is her “Care” – her preservation of truth in its
dissimilitude – a tending to the tacit expressivity that avoids her clutch. Her question then,
not an absence waiting to be filled by an answer, but an empty capacity to resound,
continuously. What she understands is not a present-at-hand thing, a cognised object, but the
feeling of a tension between – an attuned jointure – a correspondence with the world which
is not static but constantly moving in a tending towards what it will have been.
Not an “I” who projects meaning onto the world, a subject as the measure of what is worthy
to know, she is only ever a correspondent to the situation in its limited boundedness. Her
truth, not what something “is”, but what it is like – the measure of a possibility from which
she is not divorced and to which she must be born. She the metron of this encircling sphere,
singularly such each time, as this, as that – the world towards which she tends – the world
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which tends towards her – not an authoritative measure for the standard of measures, but the
limited making-room in the access of its turning.
It is this poetic measure, her language of inquiry as an attuned jointure of a staging,
singularly such each time, that makes for the strangeness of her dwelling in the world – that
makes for her abiding as an ethos anthropos daimon. In “Letter on Humanism”, Heidegger
comes to translate Heraclitus’s phrase in the sense of “ethos” as “abode, dwelling place. The
word names the open region in which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode
allows what pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides in
nearness to him, to appear”.250 The rhythmic structure of her understanding, where she
perceives the world in an attuned-jointure, in understanding something as something, this
poetic measure, is what makes for the uncanniness of her existence as a self who is through
what she is not – disclosed to herself only in bearing-out this there, in opening up a relation
to the world, to others and thus, to herself, where her relations of concern and solicitude
brings this otherness only into the “Care” of a nearness that preserves distance, through the
logos of the as. The attunement of her language of inquiry, in this sense, is the most
primordial ethics, as it is what first opens up her being-in-relation. As William McNeill
notes,
the primary disclosure of the presencing of the world is, on Heidegger’s account,
accomplished not by contemplative or philosophical knowledge, but by a
fundamental pathos or attunement; and such pathos is fundamental in attuning, in
advance of any explicit deliberative or discursive understanding, the way in which
we are held in the presencing of the moment – in short, in attuning our entire
ethos.251
Her way of being-in-the-world is, thus, what might be called an etho-poesis, a language of
inquiry that poetically measures her being-there, singularly such each time – opening up the
world, others, and her own being, as such; a language of inquiry which is her abiding in the
xenos of coexistence, being-with, dwelling in the hyphenation of a between – what Agamben
calls the laceration of her ethos: “the verb daiomai, ‘to divide, lacerate’), daimon means ‘the
lacerator, he who divides and fractures’”.252 What is most proper to her being-in-the-world is
her separation, her division, her non-coincidence, her parting-with herself, which constitutes
her relationality. “For man, ethos, the dwelling in the ‘self” that is what is most proper and
habitual for him, is what lacerates and divides, the principle and place of a fracture”.253 Her
250 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, 269.
251 William McNeill, The Time of Life, 2.
252 Agamben, “*Se: Hegel’s Absolute and Heidegger’s Ereignis”, Potentialities, 118.
253 Ibid., 118.
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language of inquiry thus, the etho-poesis of an on-going sketching-out, an on-going
understanding through non-coincidence – each there a scene revealed as such by dwelling
there for a while, at a particular time – an on-going sketching-out of her ecology of care.
It is this relationality of the “as”, thus, which is the locus of a primordial ethics, where
language is the abode of an originary ethos, understood not as the conceptual rendering of
the world, but as the attunement, the understanding through a differential tension; the logos
as the gestural rhythm of sense, which joins us to the world, and separates us from it,
allowing us to be in relation to our lives, while maintaining them as inappropriable; the logos
as the language that never sheds its questionableness, inquires into being not in order to
explain it, but to enter into it; the logos as what enables Dasein to be, to dwell in possibility;
the logos as the active passivity of a bodying-forth; the logos as the situational
understanding inseparable from the issue of being – what is in each case mine; the logos as
the analogical identity-in-difference and difference-in-identity, a structure that allows an
openness to the otherwise; the logos of an uncertainty principle dwelling in possibility, in the
bodying-forth a sense that is a synthesis without concept, standing in the receptive –
vulnerable and exposed, and being claimed, being addressed, in an open availability to the
world; the logos as a poetic making not by a wilful subject, but a bearing-forth possibilities
through the tumult of an inquiry in a questioning that dwells in being-questioned.
Such is the “ethics” of her inquiry – not the rule-bound principles set out upon the ground of
identity, but this laceration where she must dwell in being a stranger to herself.
*
The riddle of life will never be found where the mystery of the living being has already been
abandoned
– Martin Heidegger, Parmenides
She is, most of all, a reader, not, that is, of the academic ilk, but a reader of facticity, reading
this everyday, scene by scene, by giving herself over to it, understanding through what is not
there; reading the differences, the space between, the presence of an absence – she a reader
of rhythm, characterised by attending to the between of an is and is not, to the unarticulated
in the articulated, in a space of time and a time of space, where something is taken together
and taken apart.
In his reflection on Heidegger’s references to the enigmatic in Being and Time, Simon
Critchley comes to define the enigma in both its perceptual and linguistic aspects, linking
enigma to the task of reading.
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Perceptually, an enigma is something one cannot see through. It is undurchsichtig,
obscure, opaque and not transparent. Linguistically, an enigma is a riddle, like that
solved by Oedipus. In Greek, ainigma is a dark saying, from the verb ainissomai, to
speak darkly or to riddle. The modern German Ratsel shares a common Germanic
root with the English riddle, and stems from the Old German raeden, which survives
in the modern German Rat, and raten, as well as being linked to the Rede of which
Heidegger speaks in Sein und Zeit. A riddle is therefore etymologically linked to the
notion of speech, specifically giving advice and counsel. But Ratsel is also linked
with guessing something unknown…such as guessing the solution to a riddle. In
English, riddle goes back to the Middle English redels, and interestingly, there is an
etymological link between a riddle and reading, namely that a riddle is something
that one has to learn to read in order to ascertain its meaning. In this sense,
hermeneutics would be the reading of riddles. There is also the sense of a person
being a riddle, of trying to read the riddle of oneself or another.254
She is thrown into the stance of reading the riddle of the there, a shadowy saying, the Rede
of a discourse as such, in which the riddle of her own existence is caught up. It is a riddling
not of the unusual, but of the strange questionability of the everyday. The world speaks to
her in a saying obscure, and it is into this darkness she looks, the open being, as Agamben
puts it, an opening to closedness: “and whoever looks into the open sees only a closing, only
a not-seeing”.255 Hers is a peering into the enigma of the opening, where what she perceives
is a not being able to see at the heart of what she sees – the dissimilitude of a surface that
can’t be seen through. Dwelling in the recalcitrant thereness she undergoes and suffers the
daimon of not something other, but the daimon of her own existence – the chiasm of her
being and non-being – the ethos anthropos daimon of being-there. In her reading she reads
only for herself, that is, for this being towards herself. The daimonic, then, as the abode of
her being is not a stranger as such – the “voice of the friend” as Heidegger calls it, is only
this stranger she is to herself, it is only her questionabilty – her inability to ever fully
coincide.
*
Yet this language of inquiry, this dwelling in nearness to the demonic, this riddling the
enigma of her being, is what is all too easily covered over and dissimulated in a mode of
dwelling that Heidegger comes to call “das Man” – a mode of understanding the world,
others and one’s self characterised by a “fleeing in the face of uncanniness” – a covering
over and turning away from the openness of which we are comprised. For the most part, the
“Care” with which we dwell in the world, this etho-poetic understanding, gets covered over,
254 Simon Critchley, “Enigma Variations: An Interpretation of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Ratio XV
(2002): 158.
255 Giorgio Agamben, The Open, trans. Kevin Attell (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 68.
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the relation to ourselves dissimulated, by the manner in which we come to dwell in the world
in a mode that is a general understanding, rather than a situated understanding as something,
a rhythmicity. We come to see and understand the world, as everyone else sees and
understands it, and thus loose sight of the singularity of our own situated understanding
through this ontological relation to ourselves that constitutes us – this questionability which
is, for each human being, an issue that is our own – no one else having the singularity of
your thrownness. Our unpoetic dwelling is not, in this sense, an event that befalls us, nor is it
that which happens to some more than others, but is simply what we fall into by being cast
into a particular “there” and inheriting a way of being which, for the most part, covers over
our own strangeness to ourselves. “This everyday way in which things have been interpreted
is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of
extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and
communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed”.256
The understanding of das Man is one in which the as gets covered over, in an understanding
which takes place in the definite time of a coincidental present and whose cognition is seen
to be completed in its determination, where something is named, conceptualised, i.e. reduced
to a homogenisation, rather than the radical alteration of a present presenting itself. What is
encountered is subordinated under the genus of a class, a type, is understood as a determinant
“what”. Here repetition is the re-iteration of the same, rather than the being exposed to the
breach of a non-coincidence between what is signified and its singular haecceity. In such a
way what comes to be understood is “cut off from that significance which, as such,
constitutes environmentally. The ‘as’ gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which
is merely present-at-hand”.257 In the assertive use of language, the ecology of “Care” gets
covered over, this environing of sense from within a situation being inhabited for a while, at
a particular time, where meaning occurs only in the enactment of a present that is tending
towards itself – one which is always still arriving, rather than having occurred once and for
all. The understanding of das Man is static, rather than having to traverse the strange alterity
of a transitional inquiry, in the tension of an attuned jointure, the opening of a here-there.
Being-there is always a differentiated there and then, through the opening and opening up of
a situation, where this situation always has its particular for a while – a sense of its own time.
And yet, for the most part, we live in a way which glosses over this situated sense of
inhabiting. We live in a time that becomes schematised, whittled down and measured out,
256 Heidegger, Being and Time, 213.
257 Ibid., 200-201.
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not in the stretches of intensities, of depth and dimensionality, but in the superficiality of a
time that is “managed”. “Thus it might be that our unpoetic dwelling, its incapacity to take
the measure, derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating”.258 This
language of inquiry is what is furthest from us in a time that reckons with life as a business
transaction and where language is utilised as a tool of manipulation by a subject who carves
up the world according to their own measure and where “poetic” language is confined to the
domain of subjective “expression”, whilst rigor remains the prevail of a rational, logical,
“clear”, scientific prose.
For the most part, we reduce ourselves and are reduced by the world, to the ego of an “I” –
get wrapped up in and consumed by the desire for the attainment of more in the securing and
preservation of this seeming entity we call a self. Children become acclimatised to a way of
being which closes off from the ec-stasis of their being-there. We forget, in the day-to-day
goings on, in the strife and carefreeness of everyday existence, that we are, still, beneath it
all, an opening onto otherness – a permeableness through and through – that we have been
cast into the strange role of allowing the world to come to light through us, in our response to
its claim. As Kleinberg-Levin puts it, “Long before we are old enough to realise it, we have
always already defensively closed off the ek-stasis, what Blake called the ‘doors of
perception’, shutting off the frightening solicitations, the immemorial and unfathomable
claims on our capacity for disclosiveness, unconcealing responsiveness, that come from the
presencing of being”.259 Those we call the “poets” are the ones, perhaps, who have kept this
capacity open – the ones who remain claimed by the world, and open, available to its
address. For the most part, we do not see the daimon amidst the ordinary. Through the “idle
chatter” of the familiar grid of meaning we copy and paste forms of existence – falling into
step with the general way of things. Our ethos is attuned in a manner that dissimulates its
thereness – its wonder and strangeness, and becomes whittled down to the taken for granted.
the evenly balanced lack of mood, which is often persistent and which is not to be
mistaken for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein
becomes satiated with itself.260
Our ethos becomes attuned to an objective certitude – a stimmung which Michel Haar
locates as replacing the fundamental mood of philosophy from the Ancient Greek world of
“thaumazein” –a scientific rationality taken to its apotheosis in technological determination:
258 Heidegger, “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, 226.
259 Kleinberg-Levin, “The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment”, 8.
260 Heidegger, Being and Time, 173.
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The fundamental attunement has changed: the surprise and wonder of the Greeks has
reversed itself to become Cartesian evidence and assurance. For us, the permanence
of forms has become the habitual. Technology goes beyond even certainty. The will
to will masters too well the essence of a world totally produced to be able to
experience its enigmatic emergence. How could it surprise itself?261
In the assertive assurance of a technocratic understanding, the world is viewed through the
ostensible “moodlessness” of “objectivity” – an attunement which dissembles the “as such”
of its understanding in exchange for a fixity and stasis of form. It is an attunement of a
certitude of knowledge, rather than a knowability, which Heidegger characterises as
“curiosity” – an understanding which does not hold out in an inhabiting, is closed off from
being amazed to the point of not understanding something, and is preoccupied with a
knowing just in order to have known: “Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle
talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein
which is in this manner) with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely
‘lively’”.262
What is needed in order to come back into the “Care” in which we are already inhabiting the
world, in this way, is a radical sloughing off of this veil of the habitual through which we
inhabit the world in a carefreeness, untroubled by our own innate questionability. What is
needed in order to come into what Heidegger calls an “authentic” mode of existence is a
“reattunement”, as “mood” can only be changed “by way of a counter-mood; we are never
free of moods”.263 What is needed is a reawakening, that is, an evocation of an attunement
we are already in, but which has fallen asleep – one which brings us to the thrownness of our
existence – the suchness and questionability of the “there”. For Heidegger, in Being and
Time, such an attunement is that of “angst”264 – what returns us to this mode of inhabiting we
are already involved in, this “Care” which comprises our being – a Stimmung akin to the
beginning of philosophy in wonder, and awe, not at the unusual, but the simple suchness that
there is anything at all.
261 Michel Haar, Heidegger and the Essence of Man, trans. William McNeill (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 170.
262 Heidegger, Being and Time, 217.
263 Ibid., 175.
264 “Angst” is translated as “anxiety” in the Macquarrie edition of Being and Time, yet as is remarked
in a footnote: “While this word has generally been translated as ‘anxiety’ in the post-Freudian
psychological literature, it appears as ‘dread’ in the translations of Kierkegaard and in a number of
discussions of Heidegger. In some ways ‘uneasiness’ or ‘malaise’ would be more appropriate still”,
Being and Time, 227.
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SKETCH: CARE OF THE SELF
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It is never too early or too late to take care of one’s soul. We should therefore practice philosophy
when we are young and when we are old.
– Seneca, Hermeneutics of the Subject
What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something that is related only to objects
and not to individuals or to life. That art is something which is specialised or done by experts who are
artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art
object but not our life?
– Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader
It has been said that spirituality is above all an awareness that the individuated being is not completely
individuated but still contains a certain nonindividual share of reality, which must be not only
preserved but also respected and, in a way, even honoured, as one honours one’s debts.
– Giorgio Agamben, Profanations
The “Care” which Heidegger comes to place at the core of what it means to be in the world,
this project of responding to our questionability which possesses us for as long as we live,
can be read as a re-articulation of the ancient practice of philosophy as “care of the self” – a
decision by Heidegger to repeat a possibility that has been, and in doing so, make it his own
by inflecting it from within his own being-there for a while, at a particular time – articulating
the same, differently. The questionability of our being is, as Michel Foucault would explore
in his later work, what lies at the core of this ancient practice of philosophy known in Greek
as epimeliea heautou, where it is precisely the ontological constitution of the self in a
relation to themselves which makes both for the necessity, and the means of a practice of
care for one’s self. As Foucault sketches it, this practice of caring for one’s self begins with
the figure of Socrates, one who has been, according to his own words, charged by the Gods
with calling people to care for themselves. As he famously says in his court defence: “If you
put me to death you will not easily find another man…attached to you by the will of the gods
in order to stimulate you like a horsefly stimulates a horse”.265 Socrates is the figure of the
philosopher who spends their life unsettling and disturbing the manner in which citizens
have become absorbed in a concern for worldly goods and power, caught up in a concern
with wealth, reputation and honour, at the cost of neglecting what should be the utmost
concern of their lives – that is, the constant “Care” for their own souls, a concern for their
own relation towards themselves. Socrates is the figure of the  philosopher whose aim is not
to teach something but to attempt to awaken in others this “Care” for themselves – to attempt
to incite others to return to their questionability.
What characterises this care of the self, as Foucault traces it in his focus mainly on the
Hellenistic period of this practice, is the manner in which it conceives knowledge, as
Foucault finds articulated in the Greek, as having an “ethopoetic”, transformative impact on
265 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador,
2005), 21.
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the subject’s way of being: “Ethopoiein means making ethos, producing ethos, changing,
transforming ethos, the individuals way of being, his mode of existence. Ethopoios is
something that possesses the quality of transforming an individual’s mode of being”.266 The
distinction in the field of knowledge is not, in this sense, on what is studied, but on whether
or not it “has a form and functions in such a way that it can produce ethos”,267 giving rise to
the “ethopoetic subject”. Rather than a knowledge with a purpose or end outside of itself,
such a knowledge is simply for the sake of itself, that is, for the sake of being towards one’s
self; for the sake of the cultivation of one’s self; the attempt to carry out and turn towards
one’s existence. Knowledge is used, in this sense, as a practice of freedom, through the
converting effect it has on the self, making them shift and move from their absorption in
Stultitia.268 In this way, the purpose of coming to know the world is not a means to an end,
but is a medium through which the self’s own being can come into play and can be
transformed. Here knowledge of the self is not, as Foucault highlights, “on the way to
becoming the decipherment of the mysteries of conscience and the exegesis of the self which
develops later in Christianity. Useful knowledge, knowledge in which human life is at stake,
is a relational mode of knowledge”.269 With the “ethopoetic” knowledge, the purpose of
philosophy is to engage in the constitutive relation of self, this tending towards one’s self
and to cultivate a form of living which will sustain the self in an authentic relation to the
world, others and ultimately themselves, making them ready for death,270 and producing the
wisdom that gives them the “boldness and courage”,271 to stand firmly against the
vicissitudes of life, where they can “be contenti (content with themselves, satisfied with
themselves)…they will need nothing other than themselves. However, at the same time, they
will find a number of resources within themselves, and the possibility in particular of
experiencing pleasure and delight in the full relationship they will have with themselves”.272
The purpose of an etho-poetic knowing is not towards the glory and gain of a “boastful
knowledge”,273 but is nothing less than a fuller relationship of being one’s self, it is, as the
ancients called it, a ripening of one’s self in preparation for death; living and cultivating a
266 Ibid., 237.
267 Ibid., 237.
268 Stultitia bears remarkable resemblance to Heidegger’s “das Man” – it is a way of being in which
we are neglectful of our relation towards ourselves, where we do not carry out an existence that is our
own, but get carried by the whims of the time and circumstance. Foucault calls this Stultitia the “raw







form of existence whereby you have carried out your existence, rather than endlessly
deferring or postponing it.
What is imperative with this form of knowledge is that it should be inflected in such a way
that “it takes on a certain form and a certain spiritual value for the subject, in the subject’s
experience, and for the subject’s salvation”274 – knowledge is used as a way of coming into
relation to one’s self and a way of binding one’s self to one’s self through the poesis of a
practice of freedom. “Know thyself”, the Delphic principle “gnothi seauton”, which has been
set as the founding pillar of Western philosophy, is re-situated here by Foucault within the
framework of the practice of care of the self. Knowledge of the self is not a self examination,
or self-knowledge, but is a “means” of addressing one’s self to one’s self – a means of
reaching the self still outstanding, still arriving. Of crucial importance to this practice is the
subjectivisation of knowledge, that is, making the philosophical inheritance one’s own, in
which there is not “an objectification of the self in a true discourse, but the subjectivation of
a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on oneself”.275 It is a practice of truth, a
way not of subjecting one’s self to the truth of the philosophical tradition, but of binding
one’s self to one’s self, a way of coming into relation to one’s self, by subjectivising the
inheritance of a tradition, that is, making this discourse one’s own – articulating the same
similarly – a practice inherently analogical of an identity in difference, a difference in
identity. Such is the art of this practice of knowledge formation, where, without this play of
difference there is no ethopoeisis – the discourse, and thus one’s life, one’s way of being, is
not made one’s own: “It is a style of life, a sort of form one gives to one’s life”.276 Through
the practice of undergoing an inquiry in which their own being is brought into play, the self
gives form to their existence, a form that is their own, rather than the generic schema of the
Stultitia. Something Foucault understands through analogy with the “good architect”, as one
who “uses enough liberty to give the temple a forma, a beautiful form. In the same way, the
person who wants to make his life a work, the person who wants to employ the tekhne tou
biou in the proper way, must have in his mind not so much the framework, fabric and thick
covering regulations which he follows constantly and to which he has to submit”.277 Life
achieves its ethopoetic form not by submitting to already established modes of practices, but
through making these practices one’s own, by bringing one’s own relation of self into play.
The distinction between the Christian model and the Hellenistic model pivots around this






but is a form in formation, where the “art of living and the art of oneself are identical”.278
Their knowledge is what effects and manifests their way of being-in-the-world as a
singularised way of being – what enables them to become themselves in the way in which it
frees them from a false dwelling in the cares of the world, and brings them back into the care
of the self, into this relation towards themselves, through a “spiritualisation” of knowledge –
the crucial aspect which seems to peak Foucault’s interest in this ancient practice of an art of
living, for this care of the self presents a subject who is not always already in a position of
having access to the truth, but is a subject who must be transformed through practices of the
self in order to come to understand and know – an understanding and knowing which is only
ever aimed, not towards some profit or gain, but towards the self – towards their being-in-
the-world, towards the cultivation of their “ethos”. It is through the practice itself that the
subject becomes one who can articulate truth.
As Foucault comes to understand, this care of the self is a deliberate practice of one’s
freedom, and what constitutes an ethical existence: “what is ethics if not the practice of
freedom, the deliberate practice of freedom”,279 which means, as he further elucidates, that
“Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberate form assumed by
freedom”.280 It is the ontological structure of the self as a relation towards themselves which
comprises this freedom to be otherwise, where the deliberate practice of this freedom
constitutes the ethical life. And it is here where we seem to get to the crux of Foucault’s
interest in this ancient practice, as it is precisely this relation of self to self, this freedom,
which makes it possible for any power to operate. As he puts it: “there cannot be relations of
power unless the subjects are free”.281 It is at this axis of being-towards ourselves where
power operates, in schemas of subjectivity. And yet it is precisely this axis which makes it
possible for this schema to change and for relations of power to shift. The dynamic
relationality always contains the possibility of being otherwise, of shifting. “It is like a
movement to articulate one’s existence to the point where there would be nothing else before
it but the possibility of death”.282
What is needed is a radical dispossession of the self from their sated state in Stultitia. This
art of existence, this originary task of coming into care for one’s self, of taking on one’s
278 Ibid., 206.
279 Michel Foucault, “the ethic of care of the self as a practice of freedom: an interview with Michel
Foucault”, by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Helmut Becker, Alfredo Gomez-Müller, trans. J.D. Gauthier,





relation towards one’s self, is a practice which cannot be managed and directed by the self, it
cannot be controlled, but is the very opening towards, where any coherent “self” is
displaced. The response to taking on the task of coming into care for the poesis of one’s
ethos cannot be accomplished, in this way, by a willing self, by an intentional self, for it is
any coherency of a solid self which is being called into question through the very attempt to
respond. It is precisely this dispossession of one’s self in the creation of one’s self that
Agamben emphasises in his understanding of Foucault’s work and interest in the care of the
self:
The idea that one should make his life a work of art is attributed mostly today to
Foucault and to his idea of the care of the self. Pierre Hadot, the great historian of
ancient philosophy, reproached Foucault that the care of the self of the ancient
philosophers did not mean the construction of life as a work of art, but on the
contrary a sort of dispossession of the self. What Hadot could not understand is that
for Foucault, the two things coincide. You must remember Foucault’s criticism of
the notion of the author, his radical dismissal of authorship. In this sense, a
philosophical life, a good and beautiful life, is something else: when your life
becomes a work of art, you are not the cause of it. I mean that at this point you feel
your own life and yourself as something “thought”, but the subject, the author, is no
longer there. The construction of life coincides with what Foucault referred to as “se
deprendre de soi”. And this is also Nietzsche’s idea of a work of art without the
artist.283
The “poesis” of this ethos is a “making”, in this way, which also always involves an
unmaking, and one which is always on-going. Care of the self is not a brief preparation for
life, it is not an education one passes through and can be done with, but is a “form of life”284
as Foucault notes, it is what can never be accomplished once and for all but belongs to the
continuous poesis of one’s ethos. One has never accomplished being free or ethical, even
though the attempt to do so has an accomplished effect on one’s self in the mode of being
content with one’s self, happy, despite the prevailing vicissitudes of life.
Such a dispossession as the way towards this happiness involves an inherent risk – the risk of
losing one’s way in any given inquiry, in the sense that, as there can be no defined path, as
there can be no set rules of conduct, each one must take on this task of being free, of working
out their own liberation, at the cost of getting lost, of being wrong, of making mistakes, and
of not knowing where they are going. As Arnold I. Davidson remarks in the introduction to
Foucault’s Hermeneutics of the Subject,
283 Giorgio Agamben, interview by Ulrich Raulff, German Law Journal 5, no. 5 (2004). 613
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614_special_issue_Raulff_Interview.pdf
284 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 494.
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We have to prepare ourselves to face events in thought, events in our own thought.
That is why Foucault’s relentless pursuit of knowledge revolves not around the mere
acquisition of knowledge, but around the value of losing one’s way for the subject of
knowledge, a losing one’s way which is the price of self-transformation. If we seal
ourselves off from this possibility, we will inevitably take up a posture that Foucault
found ridiculous – the strident voice of the philosopher-legislator who tells others
how to think and what to do...thought without risks is an etiolated substitute for what
philosophy can be.285
*
We should think of the action by which the archer launches his arrow towards his
target. We are much closer here to the famous archery exercise, which, as you know,
is so important for the Japanese, for example. We should think of this much more
than of something like a decipherment of the self of the kind found later in monastic
practice. Clear a space around the self and do not let yourself be carried away and
distracted by all the sounds, faces, and people around you. Clear a space around the
self, to think of the aim, or rather of the relation between yourself and the aim. Think
of the trajectory separating you from that towards which you wish to advance or
which you wish to reach. All your attention should be concentrated on this trajectory
from self to self. Presence of self to self, precisely on account of the distance still
remaining between self and self; presence of self to self in the distance of self from
self: this should be the object, the theme, of this turning back of the gaze which was
previously directed on others and must now be brought back, not to the self as an
object of knowledge, but precisely to this distance from your self insofar as you are
the subject of an action who has the means to reach your self, but above all whose
requirement is to reach it. And this something you must reach is the self.286
*
It is with Descartes that Foucault pin-points a significant change in this way of
understanding philosophy as a practice of a care of the self, of a subject who must undergo a
shift in themselves in order to come into a relation to truth, for it is with the “Cartesian
moment” that a subject is instated who does not need to form an ethos, but is an autonomous
Cogito whose access to truth becomes that of method: “to be capable of truth you only have
to open your eyes and to reason soundly and honestly, always holding to the line of self-
evidence and never letting it go. The subject, then, does not have to transform himself”.287
Whilst Foucualt calls this the “Cartesian moment”, this is not to say that it is Descartes
himself that caused this shift, but rather that the self he comes to depict is the articulation of
a whole bedrock of shifts which prepared the way for the institution of an autonomous
subject. Such shifts are linked to scientific practices, but also, Foucault highlights, theology,
which presented a rational subject that had access to God’s truth without spirituality, without





to the truth and becomes “knowledge of a domain of objects. So, if you like, the notion of
knowledge of the object is substituted for the notion of access to the truth”.288 In this way,
the “Cartesian moment”289 re-qualifies the ancient “know yourself”, where self-evidence
becomes the
point of departure of the philosophical approach – self-evidence as it appears, that is
to say as it is given, as it is actually given to consciousness without any possible
doubt...[and] by putting the self-evidence of the subject’s own existence at the very
source of access to being, this knowledge of oneself (no longer in the form of the test
of self-evidence, but in the form of the impossibility of doubting my existence as
subject) made the ‘know yourself’ into a fundamental access to truth.290
An ego-oriented pursuit of knowledge, rather than an “ethopoetic” truth. It is with the
Cartesian moment then, that Foucault highlights a shift in the subject’s access to the truth –
the point at which the practice of care of the self becomes excluded “from the field of
modern philosophical thought”,291 and the point at which philosophy can be practiced
without spirituality.
We will call philosophy the form of thought that asks what it is that enables the
subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions
and limits of the subject’s access to the truth. If we call this “philosophy”, then I
think we could call “spirituality” the search, practice, and experience through which
the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have
access to the truth. We will call spirituality then the set of these researches, practices,
and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations,
conversions of looking, modifications of existing, etc, which are, not for knowledge
but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the
truth.292
There is a need for a spiritual practice of philosophy then, when there is a conception of the
self as one who does not already have access to the truth, who cannot, as they are, be capable
of truth but whose being must be brought into play through certain practices in order to go
through a process of self-transformation: “for the subject to have right of access to the truth
he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become...other than himself”.293
288 Ibid., 191.
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Knowledge becomes the purpose of philosophy rather than a means through which the
subject’s being is brought into play in order to transform themselves – in order to tend
towards their self. It shifts from a medium through which the self’s finitude is brought into
play, to tumour into the “indefinite development of knowledge”,294 where “Knowledge will
simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress, the end of which is unknown and
the advantage of which will only ever be realised in the course of history by the institutional
accumulation of bodies of knowledge, or the psychological or social benefits to be had from
having discovered the truth after having taken such pains to do so”.295 Philosophy shifts from
its link to a spiritual practice which can bring the subject into relation to themselves and
transform their whole being-in-the-world, to a method divorced from the subject’s own issue
of being – a shift from a finite to an infinite thinking. There is, as Foucault reads it, a “slow
transformation of an apparatus (dispositive) of subjectivity defined by the spirituality of
knowledge (savoir) and the subject’s practice of truth, into this other apparatus of
subjectivity which is our own and which is, I think, governed by the question of the subject’s
knowledge of himself and of the subject’s obedience to the law”.296
This shift in the mode of philosophising from a spiritual practice to an assertive knowing,
coincides with a new sense of what it means to be in the world, through the Cartesian
conceptualisation of a “there” as ascertainable through abstract measurement – the
instigation of “site”, as Casey understands it, in lieu of “place”. Rather than a dynamic in of
inhabiting in the two-fold thrown-projecting, rather than a reversibility of a bodying, the
Cartesian knowing subject is one who belongs to a static, bodiless, homogeneous in which
sets it in a position of knowing. As Malpas notes:
the modern ‘Cartesian’ ontology of the world in which things are understood in
terms of present-at-hand ‘objects’ of knowledge is itself based on an essentially
spatialised mode of understanding. Inasmuch as Heidegger claims that modern
science is itself driven by a technological imperative – a consequence of Heidegger’s
view of technology as indeed a mode of world-disclosure…so the development of
this understanding of space can be seen as driven by a technological ordering that
aims to bring things within a single, uniform framework within which they can be
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The understanding which characterises the “Cartesian moment” is one which is a veritable
site rather than place-making – a disclosure of the world in which the idio-local taking-place
of a “there” is exchanged for a homogeneous “there”.
With the instalment of an agental, knowing subject, truth can be ascertained without the
engagement in one’s own questionability. The singularity of an event of a disclosure of
understanding, which involves a finite being in their issue of being, is replaced by the
inconsequential anyone – a “das Man” – where truth is not the formation or articulation of an
ethos. As William McNeill puts it,
what is always and necessarily excluded in the scientific worldview are the worlds
from which science itself originates (worlds that are intrinsically differential and
which do not first need to be constructed): the finite action and activity of the
scientist never enters the scientific “picture” as such; as a finitely acting being, the
living individual is a matter of indifference to the force of scientific truth. Every
scientist can in principle be substituted by another who can verify the same
results.298
298 McNeill, Time of Life, 34.
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*
The self-concern appears easy and convenient, interesting and superior as ‘egoism’...Really: self-
concern is precisely the most difficult, taking oneself to be less and less important by engaging oneself
all the more.
– Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
The hard thing is to accomplish existence.
– Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Man’s perfectio – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost
possibilies (projection) – is ‘accomplished’ by ‘care’.
– Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
That by which this entity is essentially cleared – in other words, that which makes it both
‘open’ for itself and ‘bright’ for itself – is what we have defined as ‘care’.
– Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Heidegger’s sketch of Dasein, as a being whose very existence is constructed through
“Care”, can be seen as a critique of the inheritance of thinking as based on the taken for
granted ground of an ego and a recollecting of this ancient practice of “Care of the self”,
setting it into movement again from within his own situation, rather than repeating it
precisely in the form in which it existed. For Heidegger, care of the self is something that
we’re already in, it is something that cuts to the heart of what it is to be human. In his re-
iteration of the practice, what is proffered as an authentic practice of philosophy, or as he
preffered, thinking, is simply a reawakening to this “Care” – what he otherwise calls a
resolute being-there – an inquiry as an engagement in our own questionability, our own
language of inquiry we are already dwelling in. It is an effort of what he calls  “the choosing
to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self”299 – a deciding to take on and live out the singularity
of one’s existence – taking a stand out in the strange and radical openness of being-there.
“because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being,
‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also loose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to
do so”.300 Such a “choosing” one’s self speaks not to deciding upon a given selection of
“identities” already carved up, but is a choosing to live this openness towards ourselves, of
which we are comprised; it is a choosing to inhabit the gap of being in relation to ourselves
in the differential of a transitional projective understanding; it is a choosing to take on one’s
undecidedness, one’s questionability; to take on the ability of being otherwise, in the sense
of being one’s self, rather than a generic copy of an existence. It is an attempt to hold out in a
thinking of possibility belonging to the situated happening:
299 Heidegger, Being and Time, 314.
300 Ibid., 68.
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One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should
want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been
proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely
the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the
time.301
To “decide” to be the there is an inquiry open to the undecidability of the gathering of a
happening of sense – it is a taking on the anticipative understanding of participating in a
present of possible sense – this seeing something as something, from within the limit of
being-there for a while, at a particular time.
Thinking, as Heidegger comes to sketch it, is not a special activity, it is not an academic
pursuit, but a comportment towards the world – an openness to alterity which we are already
in. The effort of any attempt at an etho-poetic thinking is simply to come back into relation
with ourselves, it is simply a wakefulness for our questionability as he puts it, where we are
not divorced from the inquiry, but our own being is the issue within the issue, where, in
understanding the world, we come to understand ourselves: “Hermeneutics has the task of
making the Dasein which is in each case our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard
to the character of its being, communicating Dasein to itself in this regard, hunting down the
alienation from itself with which it is smitten. In hermeneutics what is developed for Dasein
is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an understanding of
itself”.302 This is not, as he goes on to emphasise, an understanding directed by intentionality,
but “a how of Dasein itself. Terminologically, it may be defined in advance as the
wakefulness of Dasein for itself”.303 Interpreting is not something added onto our existence,
but belongs to it, all that is called for in a resolute inquiry is to come back to her sketching-
out, to be awake to the strangeness of our existence, to be alert to the address of the world.
The resolute practice of thinking, this care of the self, is simply, then, an awakening of
Dasein to their own strangeness – a strangeness which is not extraordinary, but the ordinary
itself awoken to itself – the world’s being encountered as such – the questionability of the
there – its always being otherwise than expected. We are returned to the “Care” of our being
in relation to our existence – our being an opening unto the world, rather than a strict
identity.
The word Heidegger uses for interpretation in Being and Time is “Auslegung”, which
literally means an explicitation304 – a making explicit what was implicitly there, in the sense
301 Ibid., 345.
302 Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 11.
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of a folding out, where “the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is
understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It
becomes itself. Interpretation is grounded in understanding, not the other way around and nor
is interpretation the gaining of information about what is understood but is instead the
working-out of possibilities projected in understanding”.305 The attempt is to come back to
this inquiry we are already involved in and perceive again anticipatively what has been, in
such a way where you, as Heidegger puts it, become who you are:
Only because the Being of the ‘there’ receives its Constitution through
understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only
because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself
become ‘what you are’ and say this with understanding.306
This “self-interpretation” of Hermeneutics is a reflective knowing, thus, though not of the
solipsistic ilk, through an inspection of one’s thought, but by allowing oneself to be taken up
in a questionability – that is, by being-questioned, opening up to the opening, in the event of
a questioning as the sketching-out of a there – where a “discussion”, interpretation, is
sketched-out through the non-coincidental tending towards – the stretch of a time of
making-room, which makes sense in the revealing-concealing play of discourse, tending
towards what it will have been. It is an effort of “engaging-oneself”, where engagement
[Sicheinlassen], literally means “letting oneself into, to allow, to let, permit”.307 This
engagement is not a special activity of the self, but is that which we’re already involved in,
in understanding the world through a bodying-forth – the extending spacing of being-there.
To engage one’s self is to open up to the opening, it is an active passivity – the gathering
comportment in its singularity – a gesture. To engage oneself is letting oneself into relation –
the absorption of concern and solicitude for the world, in a resolute disclosure: “To be
absorbed in beholding the palm tree in front of our window is letting the palm tree come to
presence. This letting the palm tree come to presence, its swaying in the wind, is the
absorption of my being-in-the-world and of my comportment in the palm tree”.308 Such an
engagement is proffered by Heidegger as an alternative to objective understanding where the
knowing self is instituted in advance, is always already in a position of knowing how to
proceed and can be determined in advance. In contrast, “engaging oneself” is an approach, a
way towards, a “methodus” which can only be figured out by being on the way, that is, in
adherence to the unfolding of a situation in its singularity, where the “knowing” self is not
305 Ibid., 189.
306 Heidegger, Being and Time, 186.
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established in advance but is part of the disclosing situation, part of what is opened up in the
sketching-out. Rather than a subject already in a position of knowing and directing the way
of proceeding, as self-engagement, one’s own possibility of being is part of the
understanding. The “method” is incumbent upon an openness of response to the singular
situation, to the dawning of sense from within.
Philosophy then, or as Heidegger exchanged it for, thinking, is nothing more than an attempt
to make explicit this implicit language of inquiry she is already in – the reading she is
already carrying-out. Not, that is, in an attempt to finally bring it to light, or explain it, to
“solve” it, or find the meaning “behind” it, but simply to enter more fully into its enigma, to
dwell for a while in its questionability, and doing so for no other purpose than to come into
relation with one’s self – coming back to the reading we’ve all along been involved in, whilst
knowing all along the impossibility of corresponding with her, of coinciding with her.
Heidegger transforms the beginning point of phenomenology, from the self-evidence
of the natural attitude to the enigma of a Faktum, the fact that one is…Philosophy
begins with the riddle of the completely obvious.309
this experience of facticity, of a constitutive non-originarity, is precisely the original
experience of philosophy, the only legitimate point of departure for thinking.310
As such, the practice of thinking is not a special activity or method, but rather an
engagement in this way of disclosing the world we are already in – this chiasmatic bodying
there for a while, at a particular time, which involves us in an on-going transformation of
being – in giving ourselves over to a there, in an uncanny, non-coincidental time of an
inhabiting, where the true question lies not in a posing or proffering, but in radically being-
questioned.
“Resoluteness”,311 in this way, is not a special practice we have to take on as an addition to
our existence, but is an engagement in the way of being which forms this staging, this
background of our everyday being – the pre-understanding of all understanding which gets
covered over in the reduction of the self to a subject and the world to its object of sense.
Being-resolute is a modified version of how we are already making sense of the world, it is,
as Heidegger notes a “distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness”,312 where
309 Critchley, Enigma Variations, 163.
310 Agamben, “The Passion of Facticity”, Potentialities, 189.
311 This “resoluteness” of Dasein is rendered by Heidegger in the German as Entschlossenheit, a word
which is a modification of that which Heidegger uses for the disclosive understanding of the world we
are already involved in as Erschlossenheit.
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The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’,
nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s Being
towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one’s solicitous
Being with Others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost
possibility-for-Being-their-Selves.313
The resolute thinking, in this way, repeats the making-room, the disclosure of possibilities
and in doing so, makes an inquiry for itself that is, as he calls it, a singularised “Situation”314
– the formation of a “there” in a “definite character”.315 It is a relation to living-thinking
which does not represent a “there”, but creates a relation to it – is a fictitious making which
makes for an art of living, coming to see the world, others, and one’s self through the
structure of the “as”, in an analogical identity-in-difference and difference-in-identity. Life,
in this sense, in order to mean, requires not a transformation of becoming something
different, but a transformation which allows you to become what you already are – the
singular language of inquiry being subtly, quietly carried out by the one beneath you. In such
a way, thinking becomes a repeating this language in such a way that it gives form to your
existence, making this “there” you are abiding in a singularised way of being, a situation of
thinking, which is cut off in the general understanding of das Man, where “The ‘they’ knows
only the ‘general situation’, loses itself in those ‘opportunities’ which are closest to it”.316
The practice of thinking as a return to care, as a return to an etho-poetic understanding, is, in
this sense, an attempt at a deepening one’s engagement in the world, in an openness towards
the strange, the different, of the familiar situation. As Miguel de Beistegui puts it, this
resoluteness
is only a matter of intensification, a matter of letting Dasein’s own power of
disclosedness bear on itself as disclosedness. It is, therefore, a matter of repeating
that which already is, of circling back onto that which is from the very start and
necessarily, but in such a way that the ‘thing’ in question (i.e., Dasein) is more
intensely, in such a way that its very being is now brought to its full disclosure.317
As an intensification of a “there”, it is an intensification too of one’s whole ecology of care,
of relations both of concern and solicitude, as de Besitegui also points out:
But to exist more authentically naturally means to be in the world more
authentically, to be turned back into the world, returned to the world on the basis of
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anew; it is a repetition of that which always and already is, but which, through this
repetition, always already comes to be differently.318
Being resolute is a doubling of one’s self, “a relation to one’s relation to being.319
The inquiry of a resolute thinking, a practice of care of the self, is an attempt to re-perceive
again from within the inquiry. Truth in antiquity, as Foucault frames it, was distinct from
knowledge because the essential part of the experience of truth was the active transformation
of the self. To philosophise, as Socrates had it, was to learn how to die – to undergo an
experience of thinking as an etho-poesis, is to let go of the straits of ego.
What is critical about care of the self is that it is emphatically not about an “I”, but about
tending to, inhabiting, and realising the extent to which you are not “I” – the extent to which
you are only an articulating correspondent of the world, where you belong to an ecology of
care. The effort is to undergo a dispossession of the self, undergoing an otherness to one’s
self in conversing with this stranger, this daimon. As such, what is to be taken care of is the
opening of which we are comprised – our being-in-relation, rather than being a self enclosed
onto themselves. Thinking as an attempt to return to where we have never left – coming back
to the stranger who is our greatest familiar.
It is only by plunging into conversion with one’s impossibility, into conversion with that one
who has been bearing-out your existence, this one beneath you who carries you through, that
a thinking as a practice of “care of the self” can be carried out, a thinking as a radical
depropriation in an inhabiting an understanding that is not projected by “me” but in which
“I” am projected, thrown, cast outside my habitual comfort zone into the alterative
temporality of a living passage, occupying the gap between a presence and absence, a has
been and not yet, a strange hyphenation, an attuned jointure. It is by opening up to this
opening that a “resolute” existence can be sketched-out. As Heidegger puts it in “The Origin
of the Work of Art”, “The resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate
action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to
the openness of Being”.320 It is simply an engagement in this capacity to resonate with the
world, to be the bearer of a there that is this call of “care”, to allow one’s self to be thrown,
to be cast into a situation of perplexity where a sense is made in the singular happening of a
making-room, of a sketching-out. “Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and
318 Ibid., 33.
319 Ibid., 35.
320 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Poetry Language Thought, 65.
117
ordinary. Rather, the opening up of the Open, and the clearing of what is, happens only as
the openness is projected, sketched out, that makes its advent in thrownness”.321
It is, above all, an attempt at thinking which is, echoing the ancient practice, one of freedom
– a taking a stand in relation to the “there” into which you have been thrown – the
groundlessness of one’s existence – in such a way that a false ground is not proffered in its
stead, but only the “ground” of this being-towards one’s self. To be committed to one’s self,
the care of one’s being-there, is to be responsible to where and how one already is, “that
potentiality-for-Being which in each case I as Dasein am already”.322 Freedom in this sense
is not a freedom from some power or authority, but is a freedom for – it is an availability –
being-towards what is still out-standing, still arriving. In this sense, freedom is not so much
something that we possess, or “have”, as what posseses us, given that it is only the openness
of an ecstasis of being-there – the originary depropriation. Freedom is something that
constitutes the human being ontologically, as a being who is characterised not as a present at
hand entity, but as a being who dwells in possibility. Rather than an addendum to their
existence, freedom is what they’re already in in being cast into having to tend towards
themselves. In this sense, the freedom of care of the self is an ethics that cannot be based on
the “rights” of an “individual”, but only on the ethos of this daimonic dwelling in non-
coincidence.
What the resolute project proffers is that the only approach to an authentic community is for
each individual to attempt to be themselves, that is, to engage in their own possibility of
being – this relation towards themselves always and ever still outstanding. The world comes
to expression through the singularity of each voice.
The practice of a resolute care of the self is not a solipsistic rumination as its name may
suggest, but the originary wakefulness of Dasein to itself which constitutes the “origin” of
philosophy in the West.
The practice and art of philosophising (which is therefore something other than
teaching theories of existence)…seems to us to be nothing other than the attempt to
be attentive to this wonder, to nurture its awakening, in oneself and in others, as
one’s access to a world. For to experience wonder in one’s existence is to pause, to
hesitate before something unknown, it is to have time, to be given or granted time. A
time for what? A time to dwell for a moment in the presence of other beings, a time
to deliberate, a time to think…To cultivate, perhaps, a sense of time.323
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By engaging in philosophical problems, in trying to understand the world, we grapple with
our own questionability by allowing ourselves not to be the active subjects of those who
know, but the begun beginners who must be born to sense, who must be transformed within
the engagement. We do not engage in the enigma of the world to explain it, but to enter more
fully into the enigma of our own being – to have an intenser relation with ourselves and in
doing so, with our whole ecology of care – with the world and with others. As an art of
living, thinking enhances and enriches our experience of being human – this brief dash of a
passage between birth and death.
To dwell etho-poetically is not to consolidate one’s self into the coherence and regularity of
an identity, but to be the continuous beginner – one who is towards a self, is on the way, in
being extended from themselves. Etho-poetic dwelling is an inhabiting of the gap, the
caesura of our being towards our existence – it is an opening up to this cleft of our being – a
dwelling in possibility, where sense is always to be made – the non-coincidental character of
poetic saying. What poetry recovers, as Merleau-ponty would have it, is the non-
coincidence, the split of our being-there, and brings it to expression. “To criticize the ‘little
man inside the man’ – perception as cognition of an object – to rediscover man finally face
to face with the world itself, to rediscover the preintentional present – is to rediscover that
vision of the origins, which sees itself within us, as poetry rediscovers what articulates itself
within us, unbeknown to us”.324
To come back to an etho-poetic understanding, a seeing the world as such, is an art of
thinking that does not belong to a separate domain of aesthetics, but pertains to one’s very
being-in-the-world. In attempting to articulate a language of inquiry which is one’s own, the
necessary alterity of truth shines forth. What marks the language of inquiry of “care of the
self” is what Foucault calls the parrhesia, the ability of the philosophy to tell the truth in a
way which is altogether other, has a quality of strangeness – it is etho-poetic in the extent to
which it stands out, the extent to which it is not identical – with itself, or with what has come
before. “The philosopher thus becomes someone who, through the courage of his truth-
telling, makes the lightening flash of an otherness vibrate through his life and speech”.325 In
this way, their language of inquiry is a presentation – that which shows itself not as
something but shows itself as something. “What I would like to stress in conclusion is this:
324 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 208.
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there is no embellishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness; the truth is
never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life.326
The hallmark of the etho-poetic thinking, in this respect, is its difference – its through-
otherness – its divergent rhythm. Truth is marked not by a repetition which inscribes it
within a domain of knowledge, but in a repetition that allows the uncanny to enter – a
thinking that is an encounter.
In inhabiting an inquiry which cannot be determined in advance we stand exposed, open to
the otherness of our own being. An etho-poetic thinking is an inhabiting the gap of the
kairological moment, our tending towards ourselves, where it can never get a final grasp or
come to full coherence – it is always a failure and it is this incapacity to fully understand or
grasp which retains the world in its enigmatic wonder. Failure and incapacity belong to all
accomplishment and capacity. The inhabiting a gap makes for a thinking which can only
ever be on the way, towards, a becoming of sense tending towards what it will have been.
The sense made is not willed by a subject, but constituted by the gesture of searching in the
time of a present presenting itself, where every unfolding of sense is also its undoing – each
return the destruction of what was in its renewal as alterative – time gathering and
dispersing, taking together and taking apart, point and counterpoint. It is an inhabiting of
sense which preserves the instability, openness and incompleteness of sense – an inquiry not
seeking to explain the world, but to deepen our encounter with it, allowing us to shift
between perceiving and being perceived in a chiasmatic fold which makes for our
complicational being, our questionability.
The effort is to return to a thinking which does not wish to simply appropriate the world to
our own ends. By returning thinking to the moment, to the kairological making-room,
thinking is taken away from its systematisation of knowing, in lieu of an engagement in the
situation. As Kathrine Frose notes,
By associating philosophy more closely with the moment, Heidegger suggests that it
cannot produce a definitive outline of what Being is, nor should this be its intent.
This is why he refers repeatedly to the ‘other beginning’, which is not a kind of
primordial beginning that antecedes all subsequent beginnings, but is a constant
beginning. If being does not have a single essence, then there are infinite ways of
returning to it, and also countless ways of beginning the beginning again. The return
326 Ibid., 356.
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to origins therefore signals a constant rebirth. Rather than distilling things into
timeless concepts, philosophy must encourage a flowering of multiplicity.327
An etho-poetic thinking is a way not of carving up the world, but of entering it more fully, it
is a “medium through which things are encouraged to reveal themselves”.328
we cannot relate to something that we can capture in its entirety. Only limited beings
can reach out to each other and create the eternal flux of life in the process.
Constantly changing horizons and possibilities are not impediments to knowledge
but rather enhance its vitality. In short, absolute certainty would make living life
impossible. If philosophy is to be an exercise in life, it must necessarily be fallible.
Knowledge is virtue only because of its limited nature.329
Such an inquiry is not a seeking which supposes an end, but is a greater engagement in
being. As Froese so elegantly puts it:
Instead of conceptually grasping the cosmos, one task of philosophy is to achieve a
sense of unity by affirming and establishing our connection to it. Heidegger insists
that the activity of bringing something from the shadows into the light is pleasurable
and therefore the shadows should not be branded as enemies of philosophy. Without
obscurity or darkness, our life would be devoid of wonder and pathos. If we attempt
to pin everything down armed with concepts and logic, then we will not be open to
the multiple voices that speak to us. For Heidegger, the relationship with Being can
be likened to a conversation, where the joy is not gleaned in arriving at some kind of
conclusion but in the act of talking itself.330
The effort is not to be done with thinking, but to hold out for as long as possible in a
questioning – in a language of inquiry, a rhythm of meaning, where sense is opened by being
attuned. Haar notes how in his lecture “What is Philosophy”, Heidegger “reaffirms, by
playing on the root word stimmen, that all conceptual determination depends upon a certain
mood. It is only from Gestimmtheit (being disposed, disposition, mood) that the
philosophical utterance receives its Bestimmtheit, which is to say its determined, precise,
situated character”.331
327 Kathrine Frose, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought: Crossing paths in-between (Albany:







The writer’s home he salvages from little pieces
along the roads, from distinctions he remembers,
from what by chance he sees – his grabbed heritage;
and from people fading from his road, from history.
He reaches far out, being a desperate man;
he comprehends by fistfuls with both hands.
But what can bring in enough to save the tame
or be home for them who even with roofs are shelterless?
We give them scenes like this:
a tree that blooms in a gale, a stone
the gale can’t move, a breath song
against the pane from outside,
breathing, ‘Some day, tame (therefore lost) men, the wild
will come over the highest wall, waving
its banner voice, beating its gifted first:
Begin again, you tame ones; listen – the roads are your homes again’.
William Stafford332
332 William Stafford, “The Gift”, Stories That Could Be True (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 164.
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OPENING-UP
And now to begin as if to begin.
– Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation”
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What if poetry belonged elsewhere – otherwise than the forms we take it to be – fixed and
set in subsections of books, of bookshops, of societies – locatable, containable, consumable –
something to talk about at festivals, or to be studied  in periods, “movements”,
schools – accumulating the thick accretion of arguments and agreements of
encasements –
What if poetry was something else entirely – not housed or instituted, say, but wandering,
absconding – pitching the briefest of shelters thrown up against the night – each casting a
ritual conversation of circumstance – damp soil, hard clay, deep grooves.
“Bayt”, Arabic says – the word for “verse” and the word for “tent”.
“Stanza” Italian says – making room.
A form of moving attention, say – different speeds in changeable weather – the gathering
collected by feet traversing an endless expanse – surveying an unfolding landscape – or the
passage of a wanderer at sea, charting the unknown – not in the name of anything – purpose,
prestige, or wealth – the colonial drive to claim – but simply to measure, to notice, to see –
to say – that – there – this – is
which is a speaking that was not needed, but becomes a necessary conversation all the same
– one which sketches outlines, patterns of orientation from the play of a certain angle of
reflection – a measuring of a moment exposed, from here to there – from this I to you.
What if poetry were an art of fugue? The crucial passage-out, the breaking-open flight from
identity into multiplicity – the splitting of voice – the splintering of being. What if poetry
measured the distance taken from an “I” – extending –
the voice of a con-version of a self – a turning, or an Atemwende –
a word that makes it obvious I have been speaking with Paul Celan and his “perhaps” –
Perhaps – I am only speculating – perhaps poetry, like art, moves with the oblivious
self into the uncanny and strange to free itself. Though where? in which place? as
what? This would mean art is the distance poetry must cover, no less and no more. I
know there are other, shorter routes. But poetry, too, can be ahead.333
Poetry as desperate conversation – the improbable crossing of an impossible expanse – a
venture far out – a searching towards – the ab-esse of presencing –
poems are en route: they are headed toward. Toward what? Toward something open,
inhabitable, an approachable you, perhaps, an approachable reality.334
the journeying elsewhere to arrive here – and know the place for the first time –
333 Paul Celan, “The Meridian”, Collected Prose, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Manchester: Carcanet
Press Limited, 2003), 45.
334 Ibid., 35.
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And are these paths only detours, detours from you to you? But they are, among how
many others, the paths on which language becomes voice. They are encounters,
paths from a voice to a listening You, natural paths, outlines of existence perhaps,




What is the condition of a problem if you are the problem?
You move into the distributive texture of an experimental protocol.
A bunch of uncanniness emerges.
At 20 hertz it becomes touch.
A concomitant gate.
At the middle of your life on a Sunday.
A dove, a crowned warbler in redwood, an alarm, it stops.
You set out from consciousness carrying only a small valise.
A downtown tree, the old sky, and still you want an inventory.
You were an intuition without a concept.
A gallery, a hospital, an hypothesis.
Pure gesture.
– Lisa Roberton, Cinema of the present
You wonder if it is the condition of this thinking to be a continuous collecting
You wonder if it is the condition of this thinking to be only a recollecting.
You gather these fragmented pieces in the gaping stupor of their explicit inexplicability.
You arrange, you find a fit
that does not say, but shows and in showing says what can’t be said.
“here”, you say –
bearing witness to an inheritance you were not here for, but for which you are responsible
nonetheless.
You seek a way of correspondence.
You are the aperture of a scene – the emptiness of an unfolding staging.
And what has been gathered?
Some scenes, some passages, reading rooms.
That is all you have gathered – a series of citations you are re-collecting – examples merely,




Collectors are people with a tactical instinct.
– Walter Benjamin “Unpacking my Library. A Talk about Book Collecting”
Collectors are beings with tactile instincts.
– Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
Collecting is a primal phenomena of study: the student collects knowledge.
– Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
It is rare for collectors to present themselves to the public. They hope to be regarded as scholars,
connoisseurs, if needs be as owners too, but very rarely as that what they above all are: lovers.
– Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin’s Archive
Walter Benjamin is unpacking his library and he asks us to join him in a room covered in
torn paper, the “air saturated with the dust of wood”.336 He asks us to join him in the midst of
the mess of crates where books are “seeing daylight again after two years of darkness”. We
are asked to join him in this suspended state of his collection, before he places the books
onto shelves, before they are allocated an order, and after they have been exposed to light
again; this passage between boxes and shelves, chaos and order, darkness and light, memory
and anticipation, confusion and clarity, old and new. We are asked to join him in an act of re-
collecting in the now.
I am unpacking my library. Yes, I am. The books are not yet on the shelves, not yet
touched by the mild boredom of order. I cannot march up and down their ranks to
pass them in review before a friendly audience. You need not fear any of that.
Instead, I must ask you to join me in the disorder of crates that have been wrenched
open, the air saturated with the dust of wood, the floor covered with torn paper, to
join me among piles of volumes that are seeing daylight again after two years of
darkness, so that you may be ready to share with me a bit of the mood – it is
certainly not an elegiac mood, but, rather, one of anticipation – which these books
arouse in a genuine collector.337
This mess, this confusion into which we are invited, this passage between, belongs to any
collector facing their collection in which a “spring tide of memories” comes rolling in.338 But
this chaos belongs too, paradoxically, to the “familiar muddle” of the collector’s library in
which any semblance of order is merely that of “habit having made itself so much at home
among them, that disorder can seem like its opposite”.339 The collection is always a
collecting, a passage in which “order is nothing but a state of uncertainty, a hovering above
the abyss”,340 in which all that can be known for certain are the publication dates and the
336Benjamin, “Unpacking my Library. A Talk about Book Collecting, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn
(London: Pimlico, 1999), 61.
337 Ibid., 61.
338 Walter Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library. A Talk about Collecting”, One Way Street and Other




formats of the books – the “regularity of its catalogue”.341 We are plunged, thus, into a scene
in which there are no simple dichotomies but revolving tensions “between the poles of
disorder and order”;342 between certainty and uncertainty, which is the lot of the collector.
Thus, Benjamin eschews a literary or critical evaluation of his library, proffering instead the
palpability of his relation to his collection – that is, he adumbrates, in this strange
atmosphere, a gesture of collecting; the affectivity of a living involvement in movement, not
the settled state of a collection – one which lives in the passage of a threshold.
A Schwelle <threshold> is a zone. Transformation, passage, wave action are in the
work schwellen, swell, and etymology ought not to overlook these senses.343
The gesture of book collecting relies, in this way, not on strategies of acquisition, but more
on a certain play of an improvisatory tactics – collecting in transit, in the chance encounters
made in movement: “My most memorable purchases were made on holiday – when I
happened to be passing. Possession, ownership, are tactical matters”.344 Here the collector
resembles that other figure of the transitory in Benjamin’s oeuvre – the flâneur – one who is
suddenly stopped in their tracks by having been struck by something, who finds what they
weren’t looking for in the midst of their wandering:
Collectors are people with a tactical instinct; their experience teaches them that
when they capture a strange city, the smallest antique shop can be a fortress, the
most remote stationary store a key position. How many cities have revealed
themselves to me in the marches I undertook in the pursuit of books!345
Their tactics belong too to the gambler, to the risk involved in purchasing books via
catalogues, where “even though the purchaser may be thoroughly acquainted with the book
ordered from a catalogue, the individual copy always remains a surprise and the order always
a bit of a gamble”.346 The copy can disappoint or prove to be a happy find – it is based not on
the logics of a rationality but on following a hunch, tracking a trace, adhering to the logic of
oddity that Ernst Bloch depicts in “The Mark!”: “One should observe precisely the little
341 Ibid., 162.
342 Ibid., 162.
343 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 494. As implied in the translator’s note to this etymological
rumination by Benjamin, it is, to all intents and purposes, an invented one – or at least a creative
licence in the resemblance of these words to each other: “Schwelle, cognate with the English word
‘still’, has the root sense of ‘board’, ‘structural support’, ‘foundation beam’. According to current
information, it is etymologically unrelated to schwellen”, The Arcades Project, 991.
344 Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library. A Talk about Collecting”, One Way Street and Other Writings,
165.
345 Benjamin, “Unpacking my Library. A Talk about Book Collecting”, Illuminations,  64.
346 Ibid., 65.
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things, go after them. What is slight and odd often leads the furthest”.347 This is the tactics of
a tactile sensibility, an almost musical sensitivity to details – to fine points not as atomistic
units of sense, but as the potential indicators of a whole: “Year numbers, place names,
formats, previous owners, bindings, and so on, all these things must speak to him – and not
just to convey dry information, either; they need to sound in concert, and depending on the
harmony and clarity of that sound he has to be able to recognise whether such and such a
book is his or not”.348 A para-tactic which might also be termed that of the para-textual – an
attunement to what otherwise might be considered merely peripheral – as Benjamin
demonstrates in his efforts to procure Posthumous Fragments of a Young Physicist, whose
preface, he argues, is the “most important personal prose text of German Romanticism”,
where the parenthetical punctum lies, as Benjamin himself notes parenthetically, in the way
“(in which the writer, by way of delivering an obituary of his allegedly deceased anonymous
friend, who is in fact none other than himself, describes his own life)”.349
The collector’s sensitivity to glimpses of a whole aligns him too, in Benjamin’s sketch, with
the figure of the magician where “The period, the region, the craftsmanship, the former
ownership – for a true collector the whole background of an item adds up to a magic
encyclopedia whose quintessence is the fate of his object”.350 The details form the staged
order for the unknown to be perceived, for the collector’s divinatory power to operate; in
whose hands the objects of the world turn into the scenes of fate which they interpret: “one
glimpses how great physiognomists (and collectors are physiognomists of things) become
fortune tellers. One need only watch a collector handling objects taken from his cabinet. No
sooner does he have one in his hand than he appears inspired by it; his eyes take on a remote
look”.351 The book collector “sees through them into their distant past”352 – in their hands,
books, and in particular, copies of books, meet their fate – in colliding with the collector they
are reborn: “for the true collector, acquiring an ancient book is its rebirth”.353 Here the image
of the magician, that of the “old man” combines, or rather overlaps with another figure of the
collector – that of the child. The collector’s gesture is marked by the “childlike element” that
347 Ernst Bloch, “The Mark!”, Traces, trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2006), 5.
348 Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library. A Talk about Collecting”, One Way Street and Other Writings,
166.
349 Ibid., 168.
350 Benjamin, “Unpacking my Library. A Talk about Book Collecting”, Illuminations, 62.
351 Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library. A Talk about Collecting”, One Way Street and Other Writings,
163.
352 Benjamin, “Unpacking my Library. A Talk about Book Collecting”, Illuminations, 62.
353 Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library. A Talk about Collecting”, 163.
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allows books to begin again – an impulse of renewal and transformation which belongs to a
range of puerile tactics:
painting things, another cutting out, yet another copying, and so on through the
whole gamut of the child’s methods of appropriation from grabbing things right up
to naming them. Making the world new again – that is the deepest drive in the
collector’s desire to acquire new things, and that is why the collector of older books
is closer to the fount of collecting than the person interested in reprints for
bibliophiles.354
This impulse of the collector is one that replenishes and revitalises a stultified world – re-
enchants a disenchanted world of modernity. Here, the collector relates to the books outside
the logic of commodification or professionalization. As Benjamin depicts the collector in his
The Arcades Project, their gesture releases items from a commercial or use-oriented
direction, lending them “only connoisseur value”.355 In removing the book from its use
value, its signification is transferred to the internal relations of the on-going collection
whose meaning is held paratactically – in the unity of the gathering – a unity in and of
diversity. Here each book obtains its significance not in their reduction to a broader category,
but through their singular way of sharing a similitude:
What is decisive in collecting is that the object is detached from all its original
functions in order to enter into the closest conceivable relation to things of the same
kind. This relation is the diametric opposite of any utility, and falls into the peculiar
category of completeness. What is this ‘completeness’? It is a grand attempt to
overcome the wholly irrational character of the object’s mere presence at hand
through its integration into a new, expressly devised historical system; the
collection.356
The collector’s gesture undermines a consumerist and historicist value of the book,
alienating it from its use value and historical meaning. As Agamben has noted in relation to
this figure of the collector in Benjamin’s work: “Whether it is a work of art or any simple
commodity that he, with an arbitrary gesture, elevates to the object of his passion, the
collector takes on the task of transfiguring things, suddenly depriving them both of their use
value and of the ethical-social significance with which tradition had endowed them”.357 What
the collector collects they do so not through the reception of a past which is disseminated
chronologically, through tradition, through the categorical and systematic, which, as Arendt
notes in her introduction to the collection of essays gathered under the title “Illuminations”,
354 Ibid., 163.
355 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 19.
356 Ibid., 205.
357 Giorgio Agamben, “Melancholy Angel”, Man Without Content, trans. Giorgia Albert (California:
Stanford University Press, 1999), 105.
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“separates the positive from the negative, the orthodox from the heretical, and which is
obligatory and relevant from the mass of irrelevant or merely interesting opinions and
data”.358 In contrast, the gesture of collecting is “inflamed”, as Arendt puts it, by the
encounter with a book’s singularity. The collector is interested in the book for itself – its
being as such – the relation of it to itself, rather than its being commodiously definable.
What defines the collection is this irreducible singularity of what is gathered together. Rather
than being subordinated under pre-defined categories, the collector arranges a diaspora of
their interest.  The collecting is fuelled by the logics of a passion which comes across,
stumbles upon, and tears a book from its received position and alienating it, that is, citing
and tearing it from its context and giving it a new life within the collection.  This capacity of
renewal is one which can never be exhausted, or accomplished, “renewing existence is
something that can be done a hundred times over; the ability is never lost”.359
Such a gesture of replenishment is, at the same time, obviously destructive and disturbing –
in citing the object, taking it from its commercial place within the marketplace and from its
sedimentation within historical progress, the collector interrupts its context – a move which
is evocative of Michel Serres’s parasite – the one who, in creating a certain order here,
creates disorder and chaos there. Agamben likens them to the revolutionary, “for whom the
new can appear only through the destruction of the old”.360 (melancholy). The collector, as a
parasite, works on the relation. In occupying the trans they transform, re-arrange, re-position
– their collecting is a parenthetical pocket. Indeed, as Agamben notes, it is at times of
immense cultural shifts when the figure of the collector seems to flourish the most, as it is
only in this breaking point from tradition that it is conceivable to have a collection, to
collapse the chain of transmission and to be able to cite, to gather a collection of citations.
This breaking is not a loss of a past but rather what enables a relation to form with it, where
another way of reading the past is opened up. In this distance that is opened up a relating is
established in which what the collector gathers, what their grouping “says”, is less a message
than the impossibility of transmission; a gesture of collecting. The collector’s space is
precisely that of Benjamin’s cluttered and disordered library on the way towards order – this
space of tension between – this interstitial interval of collecting.
358 Benjamin, “Introduction”, Illuminations, 48.
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Such a mark of de-commodification, the stamp of a “real library”,361 relies on a certain
excess – the preservation of an under-mined repleteness – a surplus of books which have
never been read. The collection only truly becomes one in relation to a certain practice of
non-reading – a natality which marks it as the site of on-going possibilities, of puerile
(im)potential, something also indicated by the inclusion of the “fringe items” of “two albums
with stick-in-pictures which my mother pasted in as a child and which I inherited. They are
the seeds of a collection of children’s books which is growing steadily even today”.362
What characterises the book collector most of all, though, is the overlap between their life
and their collection – the inability to separate the study of their collection from their own
being.  For the books don’t so much come alive in the collector, as it is the collector who
lives in them, by studying them, loving them, as the stage of their own fate. As Benjamin
warns at the beginning of his essay, “such a man [a book collector] is speaking to you, and
on closer scrutiny he proves to be speaking only about himself”.363 What the book collector
is really collecting, what they are really searching for, is nothing less than themselves – their
searching is a search for possibility. For Benjamin the collector, the books are the scene of
his fate – they are a stage of inexhaustible potentiality. Reading and non-reading are
configured here as a site of one’s own possibility of being otherwise – the site of
transformation itself. Indeed, it is this con-fusion of the collector with the collection which
signals the close of the essay, where Benjamin literally merges with the collection in his
disappearance. “So I have erected one of his dwellings, with books as the building stones,
before you, and now he is going to disappear inside, as is only fitting”.364 The room
Benjamin has been constructing is now complete, his unpacking undone at a late hour, “it is
already past midnight”. And yet the space is not hermetically sealed, or contained. The place
he has “erected” before us, characterised, as it is, as a passage, is not enclosed but exposed, is
more of a scene, a stage – a place not fully present to itself but open to an outside – what
takes-place from scene to scene, is, only in this passing. Something which is indicated by the
breaking in upon this scene of previous scenes of collecting, other reading rooms:
Memories of the cities in which I found so many things: Riga, Naples, Munich,
Danzig, Moscow, Florence, Basel, Paris; memories of Rosenthal’s sumptuous rooms
in Munich, of the Danzig Stockturm where the late Hans Rhaue was domiciled, of
Sussengut’s musty book cellar in North Berlin; memories of the rooms where these
books had been housed, of my student’s den in Munich, of my room in Bern, of the
solitude of Iseltwald on the Lake of Brienz, and finally of my boyhood room, the





former location of only four or five of the several thousand volumes that are piled up
around me.365
The collector we encounter in the vise of Benjamin, or Benjamin in the vise of his “Spitzweg
mask”, is not so much an identity then, as a gesture of collecting. Rather than a collector and
what is collected, there is instead only a collecting – one that takes-place from scene to
scene, as passage, as reading room.
Addendum – a parenthetical remark
Two rather strange footnotes are to be found, side by side, in an English translation of this
essay by Benjamin, first given as a radio talk in 1931.
2. [Benjamin’s paragraphs tend to be unnecessarily long; in the interest of
readability, this translation introduces more breaks].
3. [The original line – by the North-African Latin poet Terentianus Maurus (fl. c. AD
200) – is ‘Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli’ (‘The fate of books depends on
the capacity of the reader’), but the quotation usually appears in English in this
truncated form, translated as ‘books have their fate’.]366
Whilst both footnotes are indicative of a certain readability, they suggest rather different
notions of what this might mean. Whereas footnote two implies a readability as the
disambiguation of the text, that is, towards the actualisation of its definite possibility,
footnote three shifts the possibility onto a different plane, where readability belongs more to
the gesture of collecting the text has been speaking to – to the situated capacity of the reader
– a possibility which is, as Benjamin so palpably displays in his essay, rather less
exhaustible. What Benjamin’s staging of collecting and the happenstantial parenthetical find
of these footnotes opens onto is, thus, a readability which might be defined as reading room
– a staging of (re)collecting. To come to know what this might mean, or involve, necessitates
a by-way through Benjamin’s concern with language, which lies at the heart of all his
critical endeavours.
365 Ibid., 69.




The primary problem of language is its magic.
– Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”
Benjamin was concerned with articulating an idea of language based not on a “bourgeois”
instrumentality, as a means serviceable towards an end, nor indeed as an end in itself, but as
he would sketch in his short and dense essay “Language as such and the Language of Man”,
as what first and foremost communicates a “communicability”, Mitteilbarkeit – that in which
all communication takes place: “all language communicates itself in itself; it is in the purest
sense the ‘medium’ of the communication”.367 What characterises language is not its
communicating something, but itself, immediately. This “itself” is what Benjamin calls the
“mental being” of language, (or otherwise translated as its “spiritual being”)368 – the
“capacity for communication”, as he puts it.369 Such “mental” or “spiritual” being is what is
found not simply in verbal language, but in the expression of all the languages in the world,
in the understanding that language is not restricted to the human domain, but extended to the
world at large. “There is no event or thing in either animate or inanimate nature that does not
in some way partake of language, for it is in the nature of each one to communicate its
mental contents”.370 Something demonstrated in this essay, in Benjamin’s speaking of the
“language of the lamp”, which communicates not the lamp, but the “language-lamp, the
lamp in expression, the lamp in communication”.371 Such language is directed towards the
human being, in whom their magical immediacy comes to be called. This expression of the
world to the human being, requires the naming of the “language of man”, in order to be
brought forth. The things of the world are mute in their expression, communicating through
an immediate communication, a magic “material community”, but lacking what is the “pure
formal principle of language – namely sound”.372 Through this incorporating of the mute
language into sound, the human being directs their communication to God – something
Benjamin fleshes out in turning to the Talmudic story of Genesis, not as an object to be
367 Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”, Selected Writings Volume
1 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press, 1996), 64. Benjamin’s essay was only published posthumously, it was, in all intents and
purposes a sketch and yet it has nonetheless become the most cited source on Benjamin’s conception
of language. It began life as a letter, first written in 1916 to a friend and was a text he shared only with
close friends.
368 Samuel Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 116.





interpreted, nor as an authority of truth, but as the “discovery of what emerges of itself from
the biblical text with regard to the nature of language”.373
The creative word of God names things in a way which is coincidental with what it names –
a perfect communion of name and thing, which is nameless. “Language is therefore both
creative and the finished creation; it is word and name”.374 Here language is structured as a
two-fold action, where knowing and naming correspond absolutely; creating and
understanding are equal. “In God, name is both creative and the finished creation; it is word
and name”.375 By contrast to the naming of things, God does not create the human being
from the word, nor name them, but rather creates them in its image and gifts them the same
language in which it has created and named the world: “Man is the knower in the same
language in which God is the creator”.376 Their capacity for naming comes from their having
not being named, and their “mental” or “spiritual” essence lies in that in which the creation
of the world took place – their language is a reflection of the creative word of God, and is a
limited and analytic language “in comparison to the absolutely unlimited and creative
infinity of the divine word”.377 “Man is the knower in which God is the creator”.378 And yet,
in naming the things of the world, this limited language confronts the limitlessness of the
creative word. In this way, the naming of the human being involves a particular capacity on
their behalf not simply to call things as they like, but since things have already been made
through the creative word of God, to respond to the language of the world in its soundless
expressivity – a response which must be receptive to “how language is communicated to
him”379, where, in the “mute magic of nature, the word of God shines forth”.380 Theirs is a
calling which seeks to touch upon this creative word of God, the “germ of the cognising
name”.381 The human being is instituted, in this way, into a responsibility to “give birth to
the language of things themselves”, that is, to carry out what has been incepted – what lies
not expressionless, but nameless. Here the relation between object and name is not simply
accidental, language is not, as Benjamin would have it, the giving of “mere signs”.382 Rather,
the working of language is more of a dynamic reciprocal movement of both creating and












internal dynamic, this relation of language, that of translation – a concept which lies at the
crux of this essay by Benjamin, where he emphatically underscores that the core of language
rests in this translatability: “the translation of the language of things into the language of
man”.383
It is necessary to found the concept of translation at the deepest level of linguistic
theory, for it is much too far-reaching and powerful to be treated in any way as an
afterthought, as has happened occasionally. Translation attains its fullest meaning in
the realisation that every evolved language…can be considered a translation of all
the others. By the fact that…languages relate to one another as do media of varying
densities, the translatability of languages into one another is established. Translation
is removal from one language into another through a continuum of
transformations.384
The human being is gifted language as a translatability, where it must listen to the call of the
mute and bear it forth in the sonic; the nameless into the name. This carrying happens within
language itself, for the nameless expressivity of things and the naming language of the
human being are related in the medium God has bestowed to the human being. The human
being comes to express their “mental” or “spiritual” essence in this completion of their
language, that is, through naming the world. The communicability of the human being occurs
in such naming. The world in its mute expressivity is a magic communication – the human
being’s is knowledge. In naming, thus, the twofold action of language is carried out – the
dynamic of God’s language is replicated not through the human being’s language alone, but
only in correspondence with the mute language of the world. “It would be insoluble, were
not the name-language of man and the nameless language of things related in God and
released from the same creative word, which in things became the communication of matter
in magic communication, and in man the language of knowledge and name in blissful
mind”.385 Theirs is always a collaboration – one which unites both the mute thisness of the
world, beauty, with knowing. For the human being they must contemplate the world and
name it, allowing the mute language of things to pass into their language.  In this way, in
naming in the same medium of God’s creative word, “man communicates himself to God”.
The human being is summoned to respond to the world through language. As Benjamin
quotes Friedrich Muller, “Man of the earth, step near; in gazing, grow more perfect, more
perfect through the word”.386 The human being and the things of the world are the






that of translatability – a term to be found here in this essay and later taken up and fleshed
out in “The Task of the Translator”. Through the correspondence of the language of things
into the “language of man” the human being expresses its own expressivity, that is, not a
subjective identity, but a through-otherness – the receptive germ that has called them and is
borne out. Here, “to express oneself and to address everything else amounts to the same
thing”.387 The task of the human is to receive in their language this mute language of things
which is tending towards them.
With “The Fall” however, there is a break in this communion between the language of things
and the language of the human being – what gives rise to the human word, “in which name
no longer lives intact and which has stepped out of the name-language, the language of
knowledge, from what we might call its own imminent magic, in order to become expressly,
as it were externally, magic”.388 Now language expresses something other than itself – it
ceases to be a pure language, and becomes judgement rather than correspondence. “man
abandoned immediacy in the communication of the concrete – that is, name – and fell into
the abyss of the mediateness of all communication, of the word as means, of the empty word,
into the abyss of prattle”.389 Here there is a turning away from the contemplative naming,
from language and its knowing as a collaborative, concrete communion with the world,
towards abstraction and an objective judgement.
*
In his acute attention to the nuances of Benjamin’s writing, Samuel Weber proffers that the
“communicability”, Mitteilbarkeit, Benjamin speaks of, might be better translated as
“impart-ability”,390 and an “even more literal translation would be the ability to part-
with”.391 Weber’s focus in his book, Benjamin’s –abilities, as the title suggests, is on the
manner in which he notices and highlights the significance of the “virtual” mode Benjamin
chose to render his philosophical concepts in, where nouns are formed with the suffix
“barkeit”, ability/ibility, which refer to a possibility, a capacity, rather than a simple
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involves an “ongoing, ever-unfinished, and unpredictable process”392 – one which
necessarily involves alterity.
The mark of this virtualisation of the concept is Benjamin’s distinctive use of the
German suffix –bar, which in English would have to be translated either as –able (or
–ible). This tendency first emerges in this essay, [Language of Man] and as we have
noted, it will persist throughout Benjamin’s entire, although abbreviated, career. To
recapitulate, what results is a series of concepts that are all construed around this
suffix: ‘Criticizability’, ‘Translatability’, ‘Citability’, ‘Reproducibility’, and
‘Recognizability’ in the Arcades Project; and ‘impart-ability’ in the essay on
language.393
As Weber emphasises, the possibility of impartability refers not to a “potential act of
communication”, one that has not happened but that could happen – a possibility which is
annulled in its actualisation. Instead, what is at stake is a possibility which “is immediately
effective qua possibility itself”.394 Weber locates the philosophical precedence of such
virtualisation of concepts with Kant, and in particular his use of the suffix in the Critique of
the Power to Judge, which articulates, as Weber reads it, “a type of judgement that provides
no actual knowledge, determines nothing, and is therefore not cognitive, precisely to the
extent that it remains tied to a certain singularity. Kant designates this non-conceptual, non-
cognitive judgement as ‘reflective’, since it merely reflects the movement of the mind
judging, rather than executing an act of judgement itself”.395 What is communicated in this
communicability, this reflective judgement, is not a determined cognised something, but “a
certain state of mind that is felt to be indissolubly linked to a singular representation”,396
which is experienced as being potentially communicable. What is significant here, as Weber
highlights, is that this is an affectivity which involves a “feeling” or “state of mind” not as a
subjective interiority, but as what is produced in the singular encounter from without. This
Bestimmbarkeit and communicability are shifted in Benjamin’s writings, as Weber notes,
into language itself. As Weber puts it elsewhere in his understanding of the singularity of
literary cognition, “It is a thinking that feels possibilities rather than cognising actual
objects”.397 The singular encounter with the world demands to be shared, but it is a demand
which cannot be realised for it is tied to the situation. The attempt is an understanding where
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but the singularity of the situation is, whilst never capturable, somehow evoked in the
manner of saying otherwise.
It is in this sense that the possibility involved, rather than being antithetical to an
impossibility, is inclusive of it, for the communicating as possibility entails a process which
presents itself in the joining-distance of imparting, and thus cannot be fully present to itself.
The impossibility of communicating is contained in this structure of possibility. As Benjamin
puts it, “For language is in every case not only communication of the communicable but
also, at the same time, a symbol of the noncommunicable”.398 This parting-with is the
structure of translatability already at work within language, where the “ability” involved,
structured as it is only in separation from itself, means that it can both never be fully realised,
but also that it remains open to the on-going transformation which Benjamin characterises
for language. In rendering his concepts through this mode of ability, Benjamin conceives of
any origin as not what is identical with itself, but is itself through a splitting, an imparting, a
through-otherness, in being in relation to itself as Weber notes:
In thus refusing the instrumentalist conception of language as a medium through
which something is communicated by someone to someone else, Benjamin does not
introduce an alternative version of immanence or identity – for instance, the medium
itself as the message, or as end in itself. Rather, he opens a highly volatile space in
which all ‘spiritual being’ – which is to say, all identity, whether of subjects, objects,
things, or meanings – appears only in and through the process of parting company
with itself, and in so doing, imparting itself to others.399
Benjamin proffers, in this way, a very different sense of the medium of language. Rather
than an “instrument”, it is more of a mode – the “possibility of a particular way of being”,400
as Weber puts it. The communication which is manifested in it cannot be a stable act, but is
one which exists only as movement, as the trans of an (im)possibility. Rather than a
definitive or determinant communication, it is the (im)possibility of being said, other than in
the other language towards which it tends – as in the mute language of things into the
language of the human being. Rather than a determinable thing to be understood by another,
it is a possibility which must be corresponded to, participated in. As Werner Hamacher puts
it, there is “the experience of the demand for its correspondence. This is the experience of
the demand for an experience”.401 Such is the reciprocity of the structure of language as a
translatability. “Only with respect to its translation, its status as translatable, does a text
become an original; and only with respect to the language of the translation does the
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language of the original become language. The linguisticality of a language is defined not by
what that language means, but by the other language toward which it points the way”.402 The
sense to be made lies not “in” the text awaiting to be uncovered as a containable object, but
lies in its way of parting-with itself, its immediate communicability imparting. What is given
is a proffering, a suggestion, a sketch, which must be borne-out, and in this movement of
carrying, sense is “made” only in par-taking in the impartability of one’s own language. In
the parting-with of the world’s expressivity, the world is itself constituted only in its tending
towards another language – that of the human being, and the sense of their language lies only
in its imparting. Every language is only because it originally gestures beyond itself, has
always already abandoned itself at its origin, in its parting-with. It is only through what it is
not. Here “essence” lies in the trans of all origins, its constitution as relation – the structure
of (im)possible communicability, translatability. Language is language only in its calling, its
demand for another language. This is a call which does not say anything, but announces
itself. The translatability of language, in this way, is the always tending towards of language,
where it is already not itself but is parting-with itself, not that is, to become something else,
but to become itself.
The original…is original solely because in originally gesturing beyond itself, it had
already abandoned itself. It is original and thus originary [ursprunglich] only
because it is leaping [auf dem Sprung] into its translation.403
The parting-with is the simultaneous jointure and separation which allows for something to
appear as it is – what both gives us access to it and yet denies us ever fully realising it. The
“sense” of language so construed tenders not a known sense, but a sense that is tending
towards a knowing – one which exists in the more ambiguous, never complete, partial mode
of knowability. This is a sense that is in its anticipation, “the tentative assumption of
something to come” which “searches, attempts, hints at, and realises the grounds of
possibility of experience only ‘germinally or intensively’, that is, in such a manner that it
reaches out beyond itself toward an other that it is not and that it cannot present other than
through its own striving”.404 Rather than producing an external object it is instead the
“intensive relation of presentation”.405 It is in this way that language proffers not categorical






The translatability of the text refers not, in this sense, to whether a text can be translated or
not – the actualisation of its possibility, but to the structure of possibility within it, whether
or not the text is ever translated. In Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” this
translatability is configured as what lies in “certain works”, where “a specific significance
manifests itself”406 through what he calls a “vital connection”407 – the life of the original
work – a life which lives on in the translation, yet only in the mode it originally lived, that is,
in this anticipatory tending towards, in the movement of a trans, where it was already
gesturing beyond itself. “Life” in this sense, is not that of “organic corporeality”, but is the
life of history, where “The life of the originals attains in them to its ever-renewed latest and
most abundant flowering”.408 The task of the translator is not to attempt to replicate a
“likeness to the original”, but as its life, its translatability is structured by alterity, the text is
rendered the same, or similar, by becoming something different, and thus pertaining to the
singular situation of the translation’s history.
For in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were not a transformation and
a renewal of something living – the original undergoes a change. Even words with
fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process. The obvious tendency of a writer’s
literary style may in time wither away, only to give rise to immanent tendencies in
the literary creation. What sounded fresh once may sound hackneyed later; what was
once current may someday sound quaint.409
The tendency, the way of saying as possibility, is what must be continuously transformed
and renewed in order to translate its anticipative tending towards. The task of the translator
is to attune themselves to the difference of articulation from within a particular moment of
time, attending, like the collector, to the re-birthing of the old world, which regenerates not
just the original work, but the language of the translator. “Translation is so far removed from
being the sterile equation of two dead languages that of all literary forms it is the one
charged with the special mission of watching over the maturing process of the original
language and the birth pangs of its own”.410 What is thus shared between an original and a
translation is a certain kinship, one which does not necessarily involve likeness, an “identity
of origin”,411 but in a shared intention towards pure language – a language that, like the
language before “The Fall”, would communicate nothing but itself. Here the intention of the
translator, as Weber notes, “does not aim at an object, much less a visual one. Rather, it
addresses something that cannot be seen as such, but only read: a difference. The intention of







the translator aims at the difference between languages, not in general, but in their
specifically different ways of meaning the same things”.412 Such a difference involves both
the dissimilarity and similarity under which certain words can be chosen over others.
Beyond the reproduction of the same, the translator’s task is likened instead, as with the
“language of man”, to a certain receptive capacity, in their listening to the resonance of the
text and attempting to replicate in their own language this echo: “aiming at that single spot
where the echo is able to give, in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien
one”.413 This single spot is also repeated by Benjamin in an example towards the end of the
essay, where he likens it to the touch of a tangent upon a circle:
Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this touch rather
than with the point setting the law according to which it is to continue on its straight
path to infinity, a translation touches the original lightly and only at the infinitely
small point of the sense, thereupon pursuing its own course according to the laws of
fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux.414
This small point of the sense occurs not through what is said, but how – this is what
configures the encounter. As with the expressivity of the language of things, this is the germ
of the original – its parting-with itself, as what must be borne out, carried through, in the
naming of the other language. The crossing is the reception of an expressivity, a connotative
sense, a mode, which cannot be fully apprehended as such, given that it is not a thing, but the
possibility of a tending towards. The fidelity of translation is to this sense rather than a direct
transpositioning of the meaning of the words. “Fidelity in the translation of individual words
can almost never fully reproduce the meaning they have in the original. For sense in its
poetic significance is not limited to meaning, but derives from the connotations conveyed by
the word chosen to express it. We say of words that they have emotional connotations”.415 It
is this poetic connotative sense, the “affective tone”,416 as Weber renders it, which is the
gesture of the original – the tending towards of an impartability, and in order for the
translation to itself incorporate this element, it must “let itself go, so that it gives voice to the
intentio of the original not as reproduction but as harmony, as a supplement to the language
in which it expresses itself, as its own kind of intentio”.417 The translation must listen to the
call of the text in order for it itself to be a call – one that needs to be listened to in turn,
412 Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, 71.
413 Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator”, 77.
414 Ibid., 81.
415 Ibid., 78.
416 Ibid., Benjamin’s -abilities, 73.
417 Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator”, 79.
143
where the “work reflects the great longing for linguistic complementation”.418 Such an
element is not what can be communicated but the additional “something that cannot be
communicated”,419 the impossibility of a sense intending – one which touches sense only
“the way an Aeolian harp is touched by the wind”.420
This affective tone as the tendency of the text is not held within the individual words, but in
their jointure – the manner in which they are bound together, the articulated spaces between
– the way the text breaks apart from itself in its imparting. Benjamin likens the work of
translating, in this respect, to a broken vessel in which the fragments to be glued must
correspond to each other, but they need not be like each other. In attempting to replicate this
distinct articulation of the text, the translation need not resemble the original but must
“lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification”.421 It is the specific
fragmentation which is to be incorporated into the translation and re-articulated – joined and
separated in a harmony, through its mode of parting-with. The attention is to the precise
para-tactics of the text. It is in their “re-creation of that work”422 that the translator liberates
the possibility of the work. In allowing their own language to be, as Benjamin quotes from
Rudolf Pannwitz, (who as Benjamin would have it, has characterised the true freedom of
translation), “powerfully affected by the foreign tongue”,423 returning to the “primal elements
of language itself” in order to “penetrate to the point where work, image, and tone
converge”.424 In a rather more practical moment of the essay, a certain concrete dimension of
this argument breaks through in Benjamin’s proffering that such harmony, such imparting, is
achieved “by a literal rendering of the syntax”.425 Here the sense is articulated in the jointure
of the text – its manner of parting-with itself in a spacing that binds its singular mode of
saying. As Weber puts it, “binding the way of meaning to particular words…For what is
decisive is how an object or concept is bound to an individual word, and through it, to a
particular way of being-meant. And this idea of being bound to or up with individual words
depends on a spatial arrangement that can be designated both as syntactical and as
singular”.426 In this case, the translatability of the text is contingent upon the extent to which
the original has articulated their text – the extent to which the original is a gesture towards, a
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a singular binding of sense. “The lower the quality and distinction of its language, the larger
the extent to which it is information, the less fertile a field it is for translation, until the utter
preponderance of content, far from being the lever for a translation of distinctive mode,
renders it impossible. The higher the level of a work, the more does it remain translatable
even if its meaning is touched upon only fleetingly”.427 The poetic connotative sense is what
allows language to not only be word but name – that which corresponds with the world in its
expressivity. It is not, of course, incidental that this essay by Benjamin existed originally as a
paratext, serving as the introduction to his translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens –
an essay which was written, thus, from the struggle of being involved in translating itself and
the attempt to render in another form the singularity of a poetic sense.
Translation is always a recollecting, which is not the restoration of what was, but the making
it possible once more. In translation, the effort is not to repeat but to reiterate, that is, to re-
call, where the calling of a name is called again from within another language. It is to inhabit
not what the language is communicating, but its communicability, what imparts itself
immediately. In this way, the translated text retains its quality of possibility, rather than the
simple actualised communication of what the text says. The task of the translator, in this
sense, is to find a way of suspending the work in the milieu of their own language, where it
continues to exist, lives-on, in its tending towards, its impartability – suspended between
possibility and impossibility – inhabiting the trans of a pure relation which might be
symbolised as a hyphenation – a sign which says nothing but the parting-with of a gesturing
ahead of itself, in order to be itself. What is shared between the original and the translation is
this relation to itself.
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*
Eyes staring at one’s back
Meeting of glances
Glance up, answering a glance.
– Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin’s Archives
Another “ability” casts a further light on this path towards readability that this essay is
searching towards – that of the concept of criticisability, to be found in Benjamin’s doctoral
thesis, The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism. As Benjamin draws out from his
reading encounters, predominantly with the mystics Baron Friendrich Von Hardenberg
Novalis and Friedrich Von Schlegel, the work of criticism becomes a critical act not through
any criteria of judgement pre-established in advance, but in the unfolding of the singularity
of the work’s own structure of criticisability; unfolding the germ of the work of art, of its
possibility. Criticism, as Benjamin comes to sketch it, is not something which happens after
the work, but is already operative within it, if, as he comes to understand from the German
Romantic perspective, the work of art is viewed as a medium of reflection, issuing not from
an “I”, but from the tendency of the work towards itself. “Criticism of the work is…its
reflection, which can only, as is self-evident, unfold the germ of the reflection that is
imminent to the work”.428 As with the naming of language, what is to be unfolded in
criticism, borne out, carried through, is the germ of a creative word. Criticism is not the
objective or subjective judgement of an “I”, but a movement which occurs in the work itself
and which is to be participated in. There is, in this sense, no criteria of judgement pre-
established in advance, it exists, rather, “in the fact of critique itself, because there is no
other standard, no other criterion for the presence of a reflection than the possibility of its
fruitful unfolding”.429 As with the translatability of the text, the criticisability of a work is
not reliant upon the skills of a given critic, but is a structure of possibility intrinsic to the
work, whether or not it is ever brought to fruition. And as with the translatability of the text,
this is based on the singularity of its articulation – on the manner in which it parts-with
itself, tending towards, anticipating itself. “the critique of the work is not meant to do
anything other than discover the secret tendencies of the work itself – that is, in its reflection
that the criticism should go beyond the work and make it absolute”.430 As with the
translatable text, here the criticisable work or text is not a content of meaning, but something
that is tending towards sense, and in this way, not simply there, but on the way. In inhabiting
the tendency of the work or text, the critic sets it in motion again, inhabits its movement




towards, its gesture, where there is an inherent incompletion which is not accidental but
integral to it – the impossibility of its possibility. In such a way, criticism is not so much an
objective or subjective judgement of the work, as it is a “method of its consumption”,431
where the critic, like the translator, must, in their own work, repeat this movement of tending
towards which necessarily alters it – makes it the same by making it different. Criticism is an
intensification of the work, taking the work and the critic beyond themselves, into a
movement towards. This calls for what the Romantics coined as a “poetic criticism” which,
as Benjamin notes, suspends “the difference between criticism and poetry”, quoting Novalis:
“‘Poetry can be criticised only through poetry. An aesthetic it is one of those books that
judges themselves’”.432 The germ of the work calls another work of art into being – its poetic
tendency, another poetry. The critic must find in their own language an articulation of the
work’s expressivity – the work’s articulation, its parting-with itself. It is an inquiry as
Schegel puts it, as an “historical experiment”, and
with a view to the critical activity in which he was himself employed in 1800, he
said: ‘I shall not forgo experimentation with works of poetic and philosophical art –
as before, so also in the future, for myself and for the sake of knowledge’. The
subject of reflection is, at bottom, the artistic entity itself, and the experiment
consists not in any reflecting on an entity, which could not essentially alter it as
Romantic criticism intends, but in the unfolding of reflection – that is, for the
Romantics, the unfolding of spirit – in an entity.433
Whilst Benjamin emphasises that this criticisability is not contingent upon the skill of a
critic, it does nonetheless necessitate a certain comportment, a certain disposition on their
behalf, which is a skill in itself – the ability to give themselves over to the work and allow
themselves to be occupied by, and participate in, its reflective movement – a disposition of
what Benjamin calls “magical observation”,434 where perception and method of research are
one. This is an observation which involves an engagement in the not-knowing of the
perceiver whose “observation fixes in its view only the self-knowledge nascent in the object;
or rather it, the observation, is the nascent consciousness of the object itself”.435 Rather than
a knowing “I”, there is instead an altogether other activity in operation here, where, “in its
not-knowing – in its attending – observation knows better, being identical with the
object”.436 In this reflective activity the thing which is perceived comes to be known as such,








perceiving. In participating in it and anticipating it, it is given as such. “Simultaneous with
any cognition of an object is the actual coming-into-being of this object itself. For
knowledge, according to the basic principle of knowledge of objects, is a process that first
makes what is to be known into that as which it is known”.437 It is an engagement in our
capacity for attention – something which Novalis also gestures to, as Benjamin notes:
Novalis never tired of affirming this dependence of any knowledge of an object on
self-knowledge by the object. He puts this in the most paradoxical and at the same
time clearest form with the short proposition: ‘Perceptibility [is] an attentiveness’. It
does not matter whether in this sentence, over and above the attentiveness of the
object to itself, its attentiveness to the one perceiving is also meant; for even when
Novalis clearly enunciates this thought – ‘In all predicates in which we see the fossil,
it sees us’ – that attentiveness to the one seeing can still be rightly understood only
as a symptom of the thing’s capacity to see itself.438
And as a structure of perceptibility it indicates that rather than an object that knows itself, or
knows us, or that we come to know by being known, once and for all, the hinge is left open
for other perceptible events of perceiving.
This idea of the work’s movement, the critical reflection operative in it, is based, as
Benjamin sketches it at the beginning of this text on criticism, on an understanding of
reflection as this operation of self-knowledge. Objects are seen in this sense not as self-
identical but as holding within them a movement of relation towards themselves, that is, a
relation manifested through separation from itself – an immediacy of impartability. As
Benjamin notes, “All knowledge is self-knowledge of a thinking being, which does not need
to be an ‘I’”.439 This does not mean, as Benjamin emphasises, that reality is formed by “an
aggregate of monads locked up in themselves”,440 but “on the contrary, all unities in
reality…are only relative unities. They are so far from being shut up in themselves and free
from relations that through the intensification of their reflection (potentiation,
romanticization) they can incorporate other beings, other centers of reflection, more and
more into their self-knowledge”.441 The task of one who wishes to know this object is to
participate in this movement of self-knowledge, this immediate impartability. Rather than
thinking about it, the task is to enter into this intensification of reflection, this perceptibility.
the thing, to the extent that it intensifies reflection within itself and includes other
beings in its self-knowledge, radiates its original self-knowledge onto these other







other beings; this way will coincide with the first in the case of the knowledge of
two beings through each other, a knowledge that is at bottom the self-knowledge of
their reflectively produced synthesis. Accordingly, everything that presents itself to
man as his knowledge of a being is the reflex in him of the self-knowledge of the
thinking in that very being. Thus, there exists no mere being-known of a thing; just
as little, however, is the thing or being limited to a mere being-known through itself.
Rather, the intensification of reflection in it suspends the boundary that separates its
being-known by itself from its being-known by another; in the medium of reflection,
moreover, the thing and the knowing being merge into each other. Both are only
relative unities of reflection.442
The magical observation, like the collector, merges with the collection, there is simply
observing, simply collecting, as the scene of an intensification. Rather than a knower and
what is known, there is the immediacy, the absorption of a knowing. “the being-known of
one being by another coincides with the self-knowledge of that being which is being known,
coincides with self-knowledge of the knowing being and with the being-known of the
knowing being by the being it knows”.443 There is a critical chiasmus, a xenos crossing,
where the one who is attempting to know can only know through the self-knowledge of that
which it is attempting to know, which occurs only in their being known, which comprises
their own self-knowledge. Thus is the self-affectivity of a thinking that does not think
something, but thinking itself: “the very thing that is reflected, that is thought, is the only
thing which can reflect: thinking itself. Thus, it is self-actively thought. And because it is
thought as reflecting itself, it is thought as immediately knowing itself”.444
This form of thinking, of a not-knowing participation and absorption in the world, is, as
Benjamin quotes from Schegel, a poetic thinking: “There is a kind of thinking that produces
something and therefore has a great similarity of form to the creative capacity which we
ascribe to the ‘I’ of nature and to the ‘world-I’. This form of thinking is, namely, poetry,
which in a way creates its own material”.445 Poetry is here the capacity to engage in and
augment the perceptibility of attentiveness: “‘Poetry is, indeed, only the more resolute, more
active, more productive use of our organs, and thinking and poetry therefore are one and the
same’”.446 As a faculty of perception it is observation attuned, it is “‘critical germ’”447 as
Novalis puts it, of what is “at the same time thought and observation”. Here we are in the
realm of the expressivity of nature Benjamin depicts in the “language of man” essay. The








to inhabit the manner in which it is not there but tending towards itself, parting-with itself.
This attention cannot be willed as such, given that it comes not from an “I”, but from being
drawn away and absorbed, taken up by something, being seen by it, in an attunement with it.
As Novalis puts it, the world “reveals itself all the more completely through him, the more
his constitution is in harmony with it”.448 And it is here perhaps where the anticipation of
Benjamin’s later thinking can be felt, both on the mimetic faculty, first sketched out in
“Doctrine of the Similar”, and his thinking on the aura.
Indeed, in Benjamin’s 1939 essay, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Benjamin repeats
Novalis’s sense of perception as a perceptibility of attentiveness in relation to aura:
‘Perceptibility’, as Novalis puts it, ‘is a kind of attentiveness’. The perceptibility he
has in mind is none other than that of the aura. Experience of the aura thus rests on
the transposition of a response common in human relationships to the relationship
between the inanimate or natural object and man. The person we look at, or who
feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the aura of an object we
look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return.449
What it is contingent upon is a desubjectivisation – not knowing, but being known – what is
described in the footnote to this passage by Benjamin as the “wellspring of poetry”:
Wherever a human being, an animal, or an inanimate object thus endowed by the
poet lifts up its eyes, it draws him into the distance. The gaze of nature thus lifts up
its eyes, it draws him into the distance. The gaze of nature thus awakened dreams
and pulls the poet after its dream. Words, too, can have an aura of their own. This is
how Karl Kraus described it: ‘The closer the look one takes at a word, the greater the
distance from which it looks back.450
In the experience of being looked at in perceiving, the perceiver is drawn out from
themselves in an encounter, enfugued by a not-knowing. The closest, most familiar things
can take on a distance in this meeting. The crossing of this meeting of glances is captured in
a note in The Arcades Project, structured as it is chiasmatically:
Trace and aura. Trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing
that left it behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close the
thing that calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession of the thing; in the aura, it
takes possession of us.451
In the magical observation, the world takes on a face, where it is a life-force and self-
knowledge that matches our glance – a glance without which we cannot ourselves have self-
448 Ibid., 148.
449 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Illuminations, 184.
450 Ibid., 196.
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knowledge. It is this perceptibility of face-to-face knowing which Benjamin would speak to
as the mimetic faculty of the human being – a faculty of perceiving similarity which is, as
Benjamin describes it, “nothing but a weak remnant of the formally powerful compulsion to
become similar and to behave mimetically”.452 It allows a magical relation to the world – an
ability to know it through absorption – a reading its physiognomy in the way the astrologer
reads the night sky – making connections in the flash of insight in the space between two
stars.
The moment of birth, which here decides everything, is but an instant. This directs
our attention to another peculiarity in the area of similarity. The perception of
similarity is in every case bound to an instantaneous flash. It slips past, can possibly
be regained, but really cannot be held fast, unlike other perceptions. It offers itself as
fleetingly and transitorily as a constellation of stars. The perception of similarities
thus seems to be bound to a time-moment (Zeitmoment). It is like the addition of a
third element, namely the astrologer, to the conjunction of two stars which must be
grasped in an instant.453
It is language which has come to, as Benjamin notes, adopt and absorb this mimetic
correspondence which at one time had a more pervasive presence in human life. Language,
in this sense, as he sketched it in “The Language of Man”, is a correspondence to the world,
an unfolding of its expressivity. This magical side of language is borne out not in what is
said, but in its mode, its tendency. It is not housed within the semiotic element, but is
nonetheless in relation to it: “the nexus of meaning implicit in the sounds of the sentence is
the basis from which something similar can become apparent instantaneously, in a flash”.454
The semiotic carries and bears forth something which can only be evoked rather than
ascertained. The work of the word is not to represent the object but to provoke a
participation in the similarity between what is said and the object – to become involved in its
self-knowledge, its impartability. In the perceiver’s participation in the object, they know
only through similarity – by being known by the object itself, becoming like it. In a similar
way, language participates in the object through a correspondence of similarity.
This perceiving of similarity is, as Benjamin spells out, synonymous with a certain gesture of
reading:
If, in the dawn of humanity, this reading from stars, entrails, and coincidences
represented reading per se, and further, if there were mediating links to a newer kind
of reading, as represented by the runes, then one might well assume that the mimetic
faculty, which was earlier the basis of clairvoyance, quite gradually found its way




into language and writing in the course of a development over thousands of years,
thus creating for itself in language and writing the most perfect archive of non-
sensuous similarity. Language is the highest application of the mimetic faculty.455
This reading is a participation in “that measure of time in which similarities flash up
fleetingly out of the stream of things only in order to become immediately engulfed again.
Thus even profane reading, if it is not to forsake understanding altogether, shares this with
magical reading: that it is subject to a necessary speed, or rather a critical moment, which the
reader must not forget at any cost unless he wishes to go away empty-handed”.456
As with the translator, the namer, the collector, this is an encounter with the germ – the
chiasmus of a crossing in which you are seen, and a distance opens up. Rather than a reading
as the decipherment of what is said, this magical, mimetic element is a reading for the
nameless in the name – the mute expressivity – what retains the mystery of appearance – that
aspect of language which does not judge, but bears forth the self-knowledge of the thing. It
is the inclusion of the tending towards of the things of the world which need a
correspondence. As such, this reading is, as Benjamin puts it in “The Mimetic Faculty”, a
reading what was never written. It is not what is said about something which matters, but
how it is evoked, how its relation to itself, its parting-with itself, is imitated. In this sense, the
most “accurate” or “factual” description may tell us what something is, but it cannot tell us
what it is like. The element missing, it would seem, is the passion of the collector, the
passion of a correspondent who carries and bears out an element foreign to themselves,
through an engagement in their own reversibility; in being cast into their own
questionability. What, as Jane Hirshfield puts it, lives in words as “what words were needed
to learn”.457 Indeed, in an essay where Hirshfield addresses Novalis’s aphorism on
perceptibility, she reads in it the work of how poetry perceives precisely as this chiasm of the
face to face, the glances meeting, that point “where perceiver and perceiver join, where inner
and outer worlds meet; and what the poet attempts to discover, in his or her collaboration
with language, is how best to let these joined worlds come forward and realise themselves. In
the long process of hide and seek which the universe plays with itself, the poem will hold
both hiding and seeking, for both are the point”.458
In a gesture not very far removed from Benjamin’s attempt to capture a different sense of the
concept other than abstraction, Hirshfield notes how, “the etymology of ‘idea’”, bears the
455 Ibid., 68.
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457 Jane Hirshfield, “To Speech”, After (Northumberland: Bloodaxe Books Ltd, 2006), 78.
458 Jane Hirshfield, “Entering the Bird Cage: Poetry and Perceptibility”, New England Review 16, no.
1 (1994): 114.
152
“same word in English as the Greek one meaning ‘concept’, which itself derives from idein,
a form of the verb ‘to see’. The seen travels towards conceptualisation when it is transformed
into a newly expanded, two-fold meaning, by means of attention to the qualities of primary
experience”.459 To invoke the concept, the sensuous dimensions of the experience must enter
into language, this mimetic, magical immediacy. In doing so, the reader themselves becomes
a correspondent, as Hirshfield depicts:
Most of the time, though, the source of an idea in the physical world eventually
vanishes, and we are left wholly in the one-sided realm of the abstract. One of the
gifts of the lyric poem of sensory image is its ability to keep alive the process
contained in idea’s derivation: the poem built on the witness of the senses is thought
kept close to the data of initial perception, rather than abstracted into language that,
at least on the surface, leaves out the body. One of the great pleasures of such poetry
is the way that perception travelling into understanding completes itself in the
reader, rather than being determined and spelled out beforehand by the writer. In
such poetry, light on its feet and deft in its strategies, the reader is given not an
answer, but a journey.460
The reader is the third element of the text – one who must read what was never written. Like
the astrologer, theirs is a moment of seeing, in the flash of insight, the non-sensuous
connection between, the “idea”, which cannot be held or grasped, but its elements only
reconfigured for another. The task of the reader is not to cast an objective or subjective
judgement upon the text, but to participate in the movement operative within it – to unfold
the tendencies of the work – something facilitated by the singularity of the form rendered
which allows the reader to “play out their fate”, to have an encounter with an idea. It is a
reading which reads the sense sensed by the words – a reading guided by the self-knowing of
the text that lets them know themselves. The text is readable, in this sense, to the extent that
it is a demand of an experience. As Benjamin quotes Novalis, “The true reader must be the
extended author…In the course of reading, it is feeling…that decides in turn the crudeness of
the culture of the book, and if the reader should adapt the book according to his own idea,
then a second reader would refine it still more.”461 Readability, as such, is the awakening of
the text’s own reflecting – a setting it into movement again in its tending towards. It is an
intensification of what the text already knows about itself. In this way it is carried-out,
brought to knowledge of itself, as the completing motion of the two-fold movement of
language. The text that is readable is the text that reads itself.
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Readability, in this sense, refers not so much to whether a text can or cannot be read, but to a
structure of possibility contained within it. Rather than an actuality that can be
algorithmically measured, the “sense” is something that must be sensed by an embodied
other down the line – one who can attend to what is not there, who can listen to the tending
towards of an anticipatory sense and one who can respond to the text in their own language
– sketch-out what has been sketched in the draft of the text’s meaning – the otherness of its
imparting. This is a reading what was never written, for it lies not in what the words say, but
in the tension of their relating, their parting-with each other and in this way recalling what
the text was tending towards, not what it expressly says. It is an inhabiting its way of saying,
its movement. Which is perhaps what Merleau-Ponty meant when he said “we could not
define a philosopher’s thought solely in terms of what he had achieved; we would have to
take account of what until the very end his thought was trying to think.” What is needed is a





A reader is a beginner.
– Lisa Robertson, “Time in the Codex”
What reader emerges from her study simplified? She has exchanged the propriety of an
assigned identity for these charitably promiscuous folds.
– Lisa Robertson, “Time in the Codex”
Nor need you be troubled to pin me down in my room
Since the room and I will escape for I tell you flat:
One cannot live in the same room twice.
– Louis MacNeice, “Variation on Heraclitus”
I
You are begun into the stance of beginning – of having to read, to undergo an experience of
thinking that is not so much a willing. Lisa Robertson calls it a nilling. The will of not not-
willing. Here is an undertaking, a passage, a bearing forth. Here is study as the interminable
passion of suffering where you are not – subject to the one beneath you who carries you
through; she the namelessness behind your name; she the silence behind your words; she the
originary translator of your existence; she the aperture of perception.
You slip into the depth of an unknowing.
You are and are not there – the passage of a hyphenation “suspended between form and
perception”,462 in a generative non-coincidence.
*
“reading opens a proposition. It receives in me the rhythm I didn’t know I missed”.463
*
Reading’s beginning to the darkened white of an opacity; an opening as the words withdraw
– a distance articulated – the dissimulated significance that draws her out.
*
Reading turning back to set in motion what was never fully there. She a folding, inhabiting a
time within time; a figural making.




“Always for you the present is a wreckage, or it is the part of a science that does not yet
exist”.464
“the dark demon of an unnamed science whose contours we are only today beginning to
glimpse”.465
*
Robertson (re)cites for reading and its thinking space, Hannah Arendt, for whom thinking is
characterised most of all in its hiding countenance of invisibility: “to the invisible which
manifests itself to thinking there corresponds a human faculty that is not only…invisible so
long as it is latent, a mere potentiality, but remains non-manifest in full actuality”.466
*
Reading, inhabiting the text as retreat and withdrawal – the study where invisibility cloaks
and preserves a site of necessary inactivity, in a world ever more defined through the
incessant production of marketable output. “The Epicurean lathe biosas, ‘live in hiding’, may
have been a counsel of prudence; it is also an at least negatively exact description of the
topos, the locality of the man who thinks; in fact, it is the very opposite of John Adam’s
‘spectemur agendo’ (let us be seen in action)”.467
*
“A large part of attention is patience. Rhythm is maybe composed of an open practice of
patience, one that makes a space also for fear”.468
*
Reading as interruption which is interrupted too by its other side – the place of lastingness
where ungraspable, unappropriable encounters are re-collected. “For a while the book splays
on my chest as I gaze at the window, rather than through it, reach for my pencil, scrawl some
words that are meant to later return me to a site, a temporality I have never quite
464 Lisa Robertson, Cinema of the Present (Toronto: Coach House Books, 2014), 86.
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experienced. And they won’t return me, except to that invisible no-place of the mind I have
contrived to inhabit. They return me only to the inconspicuousness I crave”.469
*
Hans Gumbrecht calls it reading for Stimmung – what the book lover, the connoisseur, rather
than the professional academic “reader”, has been doing all along in their dwelling in the
articulated atmosphere; in their losing themselves in the mood of the text. He speaks, of
course, of literature – the beautiful word that does not know. An experience akin to the one
Benjamin recounts to Theodor Adorno in a letter, speaking of the encounter with Louis
Aragon’s novel Le Payson de Paris, as the inspiration for his Arcades project.
I could never read more than two or three pages in bed at night before my heart
started to beat so strongly that I had to lay the book aside. What a warning! What an
indication of the many years which had to be spent between myself and such a
reading.470
A study begun by an opening – an eros akin to the force Agamben would later speak to in
relation to the shock of his collision with the “non-literary” writing of Benjamin.
Agamben relates that when he first read Benjamin in the summer of 1968 ‘it had the
most immediate and astonishing effect on me’, to which he added, ‘with no author
have I experienced such an uncanny affinity’. In characteristic fashion, Agamben
paid tribute to this experience by drawing a parallel to Benjamin’s life and works: ‘I
seem to have experienced precisely what Benjamin himself did upon first reading
Aragon’s Payson de Paris, where, after a few moments, he was forced to close the
book because his heart had begun to beat so fast’.471
The latent sense which is encountered, Gumbrecht says, because it is found not in a
systematic search, but is come across, in moments of idle searching perhaps, of a
happenstantial collecting.
*
Gernot Böhme: “The basic function of language is the articulation of presence in space. How
could we forget that?”472 Examining poetry, Böhme presents this presence as mood, as
469 Robertson, “Lastingness”, 27.
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atmosphere – the emotional tonality of felt bodily presence. Böhme reads a poem by
Gottfried Benn, “A Shadow on the Wall”
A shadow on the wall
of branches moved in the midday wind,
that is enough of the earth
and with regard to the eyes
enough partaking
in the play of the sky.
The hour is midday – a time in-between, the body is at rest, idle you might say, which is not
doing nothing, but perhaps a different economy of doing. The scene is rendered sparsely – an
indirect experience of space, “spread out between the wall and the moving branches, and
further still the sun which shines on them”.473 This is the span of earth and sky – the between
in which the human being articulates an existence as a metric-less, participative space of
simultaneous closeness and distance; the space of e-motion, of opening, of perceptibility of
attentiveness, of chiasmic synchronisation. It is a poem which bears an uncanny resemblance
to Benjamin’s description of aura. “If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with
your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you
experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch”.474 Not the direct experience of a
something, but an indirect experience of something’s shadow, noticeable only in an engaged
self-forgetfulness – the “idleness” Benjamin captures in his convolute “m” of The Arcades
Project, as a sense of being given over to a charged inactivity. “‘Empathy’ comes into being
through a déclic, a kind of gearing action. With it, the inner life derives a pendant to the
element of shock in sense perception. (Empathy is a synchronisation, in the intimate
sense)”.475
In another essay in which he speaks about this atmosphere as a fundamental concept for a
new aesthetics based not on judgement, but on embodied perception, Böhme seeks out
Benjamin’s articulation of aura. The atmosphere is the sense of a work which cannot be
reduced to a mere sign, but exists for itself.
Aura precedes from them, if the observer lets them and himself be, that is, refrains
from an active intervention in the world. And aura is clearly something which flows
forth spatially, almost something like a breath or a haze – precisely an atmosphere.
Benjamin says one ‘breathes’ the aura. This breathing means that it is absorbed
473 Ibid., 66.
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bodily, that it enters the bodily economy of tension and expansion, that one allows
this atmosphere to permeate the self.476
The text as a place of turning breath – reading taking her breath away, as a way of receiving
it again.
*
“I embrace the line that I am gazing at or the musical movement that I hear. Their desire is
reborn in me and for me – or rather, in a withdrawn body that is not ‘me’ but the other ‘self’
in me that harmonises with this motion and emotion”477 – what thinks itself in me – a sense
to be sensed.
*
“I submit to ink. I go into the elsewhere of chiaroscuro…the technique of the uncanny. I am
etched with unknowing as I continue. I have crossed into a material reserve that permits a
maximum of intuition, the ‘as if’ of a speculative thinking, which is outside of
knowledge”.478
*
Reading, an abandonment of the claim that the text be immediately intelligible; what is given
is, at the same time, refused.
“Let me give a little hint…The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to
follow the movement of showing”.479
Reading, a seeking possibility through “the failure of transparency” – the inaccessible as the
singular access to what is truly being sought – reading the enigma of her own being, the
riddle of her own existence; seeking an access to the “I” by leaving it; being thrown, being
begun.
*
“The inchoate state I crave dissolves and reshapes itself in the codex; reading feels like a
discontinuous yet infinite rhythmic dispersal that generates singularities. It isn’t knowledge
476 Gernot Böhme, “Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics”, Thesis Eleven,
36 (1993):117.
477 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, trans. Philip Armstrong (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2013), 94.
478 Robertson, “Time in the Codex”, 13.
479 Martin Heidegger, “Time and Being”, 2.
160
at all. It’s a timely dallying and surge among a cluster of minute identifications. I prefer to
become foreign and unknowable to myself in accordance with reading’s audacity”.480
*
Reading as a desire not for knowing, but the escape of identity – a plunge into an experience
of possibility. And perhaps why Robertson and her collaborator, Matthew Stadler, speak of it
as “revolution”, in their collection of textual encounters gathered as Revolution: A Reader –
the title ambiguously playing upon the double sense of a reader as collection, and a reader as
collector. For what they present is not a historic chronology of “Revolution”, but what might
be better described as a gesture of collecting, where the texts presented speak to
“Revolution” only in an analogical fashion, according to the criteria of similarity, as those
whose readability they have encountered and were transformed by. The “revolution” is
situated, in this way, not so much as a concept but as a structure of possibility, and an
engagement in the limits of one’s being – the bodying-forth of a sense from within an
ecology of care.
Our choice of texts answered our desire to be faithful to our existing histories as
readers, rather than any need to become historians of a category. So this book
doesn’t represent revolution as a general concept, but it follows the specific
revolutions we have experienced in our conversations with one another, in our
friendships and communities, and with the writers we love. Every one of these texts
is in this book because we have been moved by it, emotionally, intellectually, and
bodily. And it was our need to bring revolution home into our bodies, to experience
the radical potential of our limit, our human embodiment, that energised our work.
The risk of embodiment is what these texts have in common too. We think that there
is no public space that is not an embodied public space. We think that there is not a
politics that does not begin in our desiring cells. We think that this corporal surplus,
the movement beyond our biographies and our perceived or administrated limits, is
the force that makes and changes worlds.481
*
Reading, the strange sense upon encountering that philosophical text, that poem, that dense
essay, not, as might be thought, as the garnering sense of intelligence, but rather more the
scattering sense of stupidity – the stupor of an engagement that does not give information,
reasons, theses, but gifts her back to the place she currently stands – there – the text’s
announcement coming as a break, an encounter, an interruption in the otherwise ordinarily
ordinary – an articulated shock that remains unarticulable; expressed but inexplicable. A
recombination of an ecology of care – the same furniture but rearranged.
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Reading books or even writing them brings no relief. If I have to explain why I find
one book rigorous and another shallow, I can only point to the frequency of passages
that bring forth a disconnection in the head, passages that draw my thoughts straight
to places where no words can survive. The more frequently these passages occur in
the text, the more rigorous the book; the sparser they are, the shallower the text. For
me the criterion of a text’s quality has always been: does it bring about a silent
disconnection in the head. Every good sentence flows to a place in the head where
what it triggers speaks in something other than words. And when I say books have
changed me, that’s why. Although the contrary is often stated in this respect, there is
no difference between poetry and prose.482
Müller speaks of this as a paradigmatic understanding – a sense presenting itself in a giving
that distances itself from itself, includes a spacing, a gap, an opening: “In Vona’s sentences
the disconnection is provoked by the lapidary style, what is stated becomes estranged from
itself, it expands into a paradigm, and I don’t know how or by what means. From the
sentence’s appearance you don’t believe it capable of triggering what happens in your
head”.483 Each of the authors she quotes “achieve the same thing in my head in completely
different ways: they bind me to their sentences and astound me to the extent that I stand
outside myself again and must bring those sentences to bear on my own life”.484 Reading as
rupture – the breaking open of being cast, being thrown – instituted into a strange
questionability – being reminded of this openness of which you are comprised, this inherent
groundlessness. The text offers a reawakening to the strangeness in which you already
reside, where you are nothing but the disclosure of this there – the opening of the room
within which the facticity of the world occurs in its enigmatic suchness.
The task is akin, as Müller details in her description of writing from within, to holding a
silence in what is said. “From the outside perhaps writing resembles talking. From the inside
it’s a matter of being alone. Written sentences are to lived facts what silence is to speaking.
When I put lived experience into sentences a ghostly move begins. The guts of facts are
packed into words, they learn to walk and move house to a place as yet unknown”.485 In the
transpositioning of lived experience into words what is captured is done so in the tacit gaps
between what is said as such; the truth of what occurred rendered only in a tensional
articulation; an architectonics of resonance.
Lived experience doesn’t give a damn about writing, is incompatible with words.
Real experience can never be captured one to one by words. In order to describe it, it
must be cut out to suit the words and entirely reinvented. To enlarge, diminish,
482 Herta Müller, “In Every Language There Are Other Eyes”, Christina and Her Double, trans.
Geoffrey Mulligan (London: Portobello Books, 2013), 29.
483 Ibid., 31.
484 Ibid., 31.
485 Herta Müller, “When We Don’t Speak we Become Unbearable”, Christina and Her Double, 172.
162
simplify, complicate, include, omit – a tactic that has its own paths and that uses
lived experience merely as a pretext. While writing, one drags lived experience into
another field. One tests which word is capable of what. It’s no longer day or night,
village or city. Noun and verb are now in control, main clause and subordinate
clause, beat and sound, line and rhythm. What really happened persists as a side
issue, through words one gives it one shock after another. When it no longer
recognises itself, it’s back in the middle. To write about it one has to demolish the
grandiosity of lived experience, leave that real street and turn into an invented one,
for only the invented one can resemble the real one again.486
It is only by becoming similar that a relation to the lived experience is established. Rather
than a language which attempts to correspond with “reality” through a documentative
detailing of it, attempting to render it the “same”, it is only in being described in a
singularised language that it resembles the “real”; in a disclosure that retains an
unconcealment; in a chiasm of reality and fiction.
Writing always seems to me a tightrope walk between revealing and keeping secret.
But it changes step between the two. While revealing something the real bends into
the invented, and with that which is invented the real shines through, precisely
because it’s not formulated. Half the effect of the sentence upon reading is not
formulated. This unformulated half makes the disconnection in the head possible,
gives rise to the poetic shock, which we can call thinking without words. Or perhaps:
feeling.487
Müller’s description serves to highlight a relation of writing to the world which does not
seek to represent it, does not give a present at hand content to be consumed, but is a sense
that is meaningful only in an encounter, in a chiasmatic meeting, in a passage across – the
bearing of these sentences onto her own life. It is a sense that occurs only in movement, in
the transitional sense of the parting of the text with itself. The crux, perhaps, of an etho-
poetic thinking where understanding is an ontological event – you are changed, transformed,
othered to yourself. In the text’s articulation the world taken for granted as that which is
given, is questioned through its opening-up of another world that is seen as such – a
fictitious making. What characterises this truth is its difference from “reality”, which is
nothing less than the taken for granted – the imperceptible there we are inhabiting. Such is
an uncanninness that is not the strange but the very ordinary itself awoken to itself in the
sense that this is happening. Here is the inexplicit familiarity shaken up and encountered in
the character of the unfamiliar, instituted once more into being a begun beginner – one




Reading not taking up occupancy of a text as what is simply “there”, but as what is in its
being inhabited for a while, at a particular time; a text not fully formed as such, but a form
in-formation; a sketching-out; a sense that occurs in making-room, that is, in what “is” only
as a being-there, what must be participated in, must be experienced – the danger, (perium),
being that this flight might destroy you completely, question your whole abode, your ethos,
your way of living. Reading as a bodying-forth of what is articulated – of a thinking that
occurs only in conjuncture with a not-thinking, with a being-grasped in a Stimmung. The text
not as a present at hand sense, but a sense which is only ever tending towards itself, caught
in the disclosure of a tensional here-there; an I-you; a writer-reader.
Whilst Müller speaks of literature, her emphasis that this gap of a not-thinking space is what
both prose and poetry share could also serve in any attempt to dismantle a similar binary
between philosophy and literature.
*
“The others’ words make me speak and think because they create within me an other than
myself, a divergence (écart) by relation to…what I see, and thus designate it to me myself.
The other’s words form a grillwork through which I see my thought. Did I have it before this
conversation? Yes, as a unique fundamental tone…not as thoughts, significations or
statements”.488
*
The shock of which Müller speaks must be a shock as much for the writer as for the reader –
a surprise occurring within the happening of the writing – the unexpected slot of another
word where the more familiar would have otherwise occurred; the comma where a full stop
was anticipated; the parataxis of a paragraph break, illuminates, in a flash, a sense of the
whole of the text’s coherence – only to all too suddenly flit on again. Here is a writing which
is a gathering, a gesture, in that it cannot simply be an articulation from a knowing “I”, from
an author’s will, but is a writing infused with moments where there is a gifted saying – a
sudden dictation.
488 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 224.
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*
Reading, she perceives not simply something, but perceives that she perceives; hears that she
hears; experiences experience. Reading as this is happening – the text the enigmatic that it
exists, drawing attention to its very facticity – that-it-is-and-has-to-be.
*
The claim of reading akin to the encounters of friendship and love – those we do not so
much choose, as what happen to us – the divergences and differences which recombine our
ecologies of care.
for me, the topos of reading is necessarily inconspicuous, and if there can be any
collectivist model of that inconspicuousness, I think that the complicities, erotics and
discontinuities of friendship could suggest its shape. There is a dissidence in
friendship, a necessary one. It happens often outside of, or in spite of, communities.
Two people face one another; between themselves they project a world, which they
then populate with gestures of care, mutual pleasure, conflict, futurity and
sometimes failure. Or one friend dies. The specific agency of this space between two
is an immodest one – it remains mostly unavailable to a community. This site is for
the particularity of the other whom one faces – ‘because it was him; because it was
me’, as Montaigne said of his passionate friendship with la Boetie…I have a strong
sense that reading chooses me, as have my friendships.489
Robertson gestures here to the origins of essaying in the epistle form – the passionate letter
conversations between de Montaigne and la Boetie, interrupted by la Boetie’s death, and yet
somehow continued in the creation of another kind of letter form. The continuity might be
understood as the inclusivity in both letter writing and essaying, of a dedication – a giving
and bestowal to another down the line. The letters now written, though not sealed in an
envelope, are nonetheless still an address to another – to a living being who can dispute,
reject, acclaim, accede, renounce, joke, conjecture, sympathise, offer advice. The erotic zone
of friendship now transposed onto the sphere opened between text and reader.
All letter writers, as Virginia Woolf tendered, “instinctively draw a sketch of the person to
whom the letter is addressed…without someone warm and breathing on the other side of the
page, letters are worthless”.490
In her reflection on this note by Woolf, Jan Zwicky, in an essay (re)reading Plato’s Phaidros,
understands Woolf’s comment as a testament to the link between eros and thinking, eros and
writing, established through its being an address:
489 Robertson, “Lastingness”, 23-24.
490 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (London: Hogarth, [1938] 1986), 5.
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What, then, does it mean to say that a piece of writing is alive only insofar as it is an
address? It means that living writing proceeds from persons and that, in its
imaginative gestures, it establishes other persons for whom its questions are a
concern. There must be something about which the writer genuinely cares – enough
that it prompts speech; and the writer must then conceive the addressee as a being
with genuine interests and intelligence, capable of walking away if the discussion is
boring. Or, to put this another way: it is impossible to conceive writing as alive – as
what I have been calling a gesture of address – without conceiving it to be driven by
eros. Perhaps all good writing, good conversation, is in this sense philosophical.491
*
In the prefatory text, “Dedication”, of his collection of aphoristic fragments, Minima
Moralia, Theodor Adorno inscribes their gathering as owed to the “true field of philosophy”
which has been covered over in its lapsing into method – that is, the “teaching of the good
life”492 – what stems only from “subjective experience” and from an ecology of care, as
noted in his bestowal of the book to the one with whom he had remained in dialogue with,
despite their forced separation.
The immediate occasion for writing this book was Max Horkheimer’s fiftieth
birthday, February 14th, 1945. The composition took place in a phase when, bowing
to outward circumstances, we had to interrupt our work together. This book wishes
to demonstrate gratitude and loyalty by refusing to acknowledge the interruption. It
bears witness to a dialogue interieur: there is not a motif in it that does not belong as
much to Horkheimer as to him who found the time to formulate it. The specific
approach of Minima Moralia, the attempt to present aspects of our shared
philosophy from the standpoint of subjective experience, necessitates that the parts
do not altogether satisfy the demands of the philosophy of which they are
nevertheless a part. The disconnected and non-binding character of the form, the
renunciation of explicit theoretical cohesion, are meant as one expression of this. At
the same time this ascesis should atone in some part for the injustice whereby one
alone continued to perform the task that can only be accomplished by both, and that
we do not forsake.493
In the thrownness of exile, Adorno’s writing is one carried out only by remaining turned
towards, in conversation with his collaborator in thinking, on the “subjective experience” of
being only by being in relation. This is a writing characterised not by theoretical cohesion
but by its parting-with itself.
491 Jan Zwicky, “Plato’s Phaidros”, Alkibiades’ Love: Essays in Philosophy (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2015), 79.
492 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott




Robertson diverges again into the idea of friendship in an aside of an essay “Dispatch from
Jouhet”, to counter to the notion of a “community” of writers.
When I try to think of what a friend is, I imagine these activities we pleasurably
share with someone we love—grooming, reading, sleeping, sex perhaps but not
necessarily, intellectual argument, the exchange of books, garments and kitchen
implements, all these exchanges and interweavings that slowly transform to become
an idea and then a culture. Or a culture first, a culture of friends, and then an idea. Or
both simultaneously. Writing is an extension and expression of friendship. Maybe
friendship is more dangerous to think about and talk about because of its corporal
erotics, mostly not institutionalized, not abstracted into an overarching concept and
structure of collective protocols. For me, the drive to talk, to be in a room with
someone I want to laugh or dance or fight with, to feed, all of those things—this has
more to do with how writing happens for me, and also how I receive others’ writing,
than community does. I think my friends have become models and incentives for my
relationships with books and writing…I don’t want to call this community. I want to
preserve the dark body of friendship.494
What marks the space is the preservation of the singularity of the other, the friend is for the
other in their inappropriability, their bodily limit. What it is predicated on is not an
homogeneous identity, but an ecology of care, an internal relation of being-with the other, of
being in attunement with them and open to being passionately altered. Friendship preserves,
in this sense, an analogical being-with, a relationality based on identity-in-difference,
difference-in-identity.
*
In an occasional seminar, Agamben comes to speak of friendship and philosophy as co-
constitutive neighbours, where friendship “is so closely linked to the very definition of
philosophy that one can say that without it, philosophy would not in fact be possible”;495
philosophy holding within its very name the philos, the friend. The risk in attempting to
understand this link is that which abides with all such close proximities – of not being able to
get at it for its closeness. Something perhaps which happened in Agamben’s first failed
attempt to understand friendship, when he and his friend, Jean-Luc Nancy, decided to
converse on the subject of friendship through the exchange of letters. “We were convinced
that this was the best way of approaching and almost ‘staging’ a problem which seemed
otherwise to elude analytical treatment. I wrote the first letter and waited…This is not the
494 Lisa Robertson, “Dispatch from Jouhet”, Poetry Foundation,
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2009/11/lisa-robertson-dispatch-from-jouhet/
495 Giorgio Agamben, “Friendship”, Contretemps 5, (2004): 1.
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place to try to understand the reasons…that caused the arrival of Jean-Luc’s letter to signify
the end of the project. But it is certain that our friendship – which according to our plans,
should have given us privileged access to the problem – was instead an obstacle for us and
was consequently, in a way, at least temporarily obscured”. Friendship is shown not as a
discernible “thing”, a something to be conceptualised or made a property of, but belongs
more to the openness of being-with, to the facticity of being-there, where the friend is
perceived in the open enigma of their very existence – that they are, rather than are not, the
perception that they exist, as articulated in the quote Agamben comes to dwell on in this
essay, from Aristotle:
And if the one who sees perceives (aisthanetai) that he sees, the one who hears
perceives that he hears, the one who walks perceives that he walks, and similarly in
the other cases there is something that perceives that we are in activity (oti
energoumen), so that if we perceive, it perceives that we perceive, and if we think it
perceives that we think; and if perceiving that we perceive or think is perceiving that
we exist (for we said, existing [to einai] is perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving
that one is alive is pleasant (edeon) in itself (for being alive is something naturally
good, and perceiving what is good as being there in oneself is pleasant); and if being
alive is desirable, and especially so for the good, because for them existing is good,
and pleasant (for concurrent perception [synaisthanomenoi] of what is in itself good,
in themselves, gives them pleasure); and if, as the good person is to himself, so he is
to his friend (since the friend is another self [hereros autos]) then just as for each his
own existence (to auton einai) is desirable, so his friend’s is too, or to a similar
degree. But as we saw, the good man’s existence is desirable because of his
perceiving himself, that self being good; and such perceiving is pleasant in itself. In
that case, he needs to be concurrently perceiving his friend – that he exists, too – and
this will come about in their living together, conversing and sharing (koinonein) their
talk and thoughts; for this is what would seem to be meant by ‘living together’ where
human beings are concerned, not feeding in the same location as with grazing
animal.496
The attempted speaking about friendship in the letter writing perhaps concealed the very
facticity of its taking-place as the letter writing itself through the address to another.
Friendship occurs in the space between a face turned to another face in their singular
inappropriability – that they are, where perception of one’s own existence is concurrent with
perception of the existence of the friend. The friend, in this sense, is the always already
being-singular-plural of being-with – the ontological structure of being already not pure self,
but a being who exists only in the xenos of coexistence. Here is the voice of the friend, as
Heidegger would put it, where “existing itself is divided, it is non-identical to itself: the I and
the friend are the two faces – or the two poles – of this con-division”.497 It is in this sense that




otherness immanent in self-ness, a becoming other of the self”. In perceiving the suchness of
my own life, I am concurrently aware of a perception that “dislocates it and deports it
towards the friend”. The political dimension of friendship is that it is a continues showing of
this being-with which is our ontological make-up, our existing only as coexisting. Friendship
is the sharing of what Nancy calls our partage – the reality of a hyphenated existence, an
identity-in-difference, which is only its taking-place, its sheer facticity. The community of
friendship in this sense, is not, as Robertson is afraid of, a subsumption under a common
identity, the “sharing” of a fixed nomenclature, but the “sharing” of singularity, of the being-
in-relation itself, rather than its objectification; a cohabitation “not defined by participating
in a common substance but by a purely existential con-division and, so to speak, one without
an object: friendship, as concurrent perception of the pure fact of existence”;498 a scene
where you are both seer and seen.
*
“Something can change. The dispersed rhythm of a wandering – musical and conceptual – is
what its folds conduct. Rhythm is a figured, embodied improvisation, not a measure”.499
*
What is this silence: the silence that intervenes in reading, in the more or less
(un)trustworthy and quantified speed of the reading voice? This interim, this
punctuation of reading by a silence (the silence, perhaps, of a pause for breath in the
headlong rush to complete the reading) is nothing less than the ‘now time’ of which
Benjamin wrote, and which Agamben finds in the Aristotelian understanding of
pleasure. Another name for this pleasure is reading itself, a reading which cannot be
quantified in terms of abstract divisions of poetry which Augustine rejects and which
constitutes a gap, a breath, a suspense, a halting of the speed of the representation of
the poem by the reading voice. This silence is the interim or the gap between
theatrical performances, between the instant which announces the imminent arrival
of truth and the institution of a process conceived in terms of its completing or
fulfilling final instance. The name I will give, in conclusion, to this silent now that
intervenes, for Augustine as for Agamben, is criticism.500
498 Ibid., 6.
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II
Like all authentic quests, the quest of criticism consists not in discovering its object but in assuring the
conditions of its inaccessibility
– Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture
If a thinker could be said to have a haunt as such, a space where they tend to reside,
Agamben’s would be Benjamin’s scene of (re)collecting, that is, not a pre-established
definite spot, but an inhabiting the threshold and passage of its occurrence, where each text
becomes not so much the expression of an idea, as the staging of its taking-place, a scene of
writing, which cannot be definitively named, but only gathered as an on-going collection of
heteronyms; experimentum linguae; gesture; middle; idea of prose; stanza; preface; study;
whatever being. It is to this scene which Agamben perhaps gestures to at the beginning of his
collection Idea of Prose, in a text whose title refers both to its subject matter and to its very
taking-place – “Threshold” – an opening text which opens onto opening itself.
In a mode that repeats itself throughout this gathered collection, Agamben begins by taking a
figure and an instance from history and sets about telling us its story. Dates are given, places,
names, but the veracity of its narrative adheres not to the objective historian’s recounting,
but more to Benjamin’s idea of the storyteller, with whom stories are re-told not for the
dissemination of information or report, which must surrender and explain themselves to the
moment completely, “without losing any time”,501 but in order for them to live on, by
imparting them, allowing them to retain their vitality by becoming something else, joining
up with a storyteller’s life through which it is re-experienced and the capacity of the story
not exhausted, but preserved, in the binding of their trace in the narrative, like “the
handprints of the potter” clinging “to the clay vessel”.502
Damascius is the first such figure, and the story told is of his last philosophical pursuit in
exile, in which he attempts to take thinking back to the opening, to the origin from which
anything is to be thought, devoting the last years of his life to the writing of a work entitled
“Aporias and Solutions Concerning First Principles”.503 It is a pursuit as difficult and weary,
as Agamben compares, to the thinking of first principles Plato had warned was “the root of
all evil”, which he nonetheless also ascribed as the only possible path to the naissance of
truth in the soul of the seeker, given that “the suffering that the question caused in the soul
was like birth-pangs”.504 Damascius helplessly admits this struggle and the impossibility of
501 Benjamin, “The Storyteller”, Illuminations, 90.
502 Ibid., 91.
503 Agamben, “Threshold”, Idea of Prose, 31.
504 Ibid., 32.
170
the task at hand: “all that can be said in praise of my exposition is this: that it condemns itself
through its recognition of its inability to see clearly, and its impotence to look at the light”.505
His work is interrupted constantly by the doubt and uncertainty of this not-knowing, this
inability and impotence, and yet he goes on, until the next inevitable crisis, for, as Agamben
moots, “how can thought pose the question about the beginning of thought? Or in other
words, how can one comprehend the incomprehensible”. 506
The response comes for Damascius not in the form of an answer, or in a relief from the
questionability in which he dwells, but in a moment of revelation which could be said to be
only the disclosure of disclosure itself. Hence we are taken by Agamben to the scene of
Damascius’ thinking, to his study, wherein one night
the image suddenly sprang to mind that would guide him – so he thought – through
to the conclusion of his work. It was not, however, an image, but something like the
perfectly empty space in which only image, breath, or word might eventually take
place. Or, rather, it was not even a space, but the site of a place, as it were, a surface,
an area, absolutely smooth and flat, on which no point could be distinguished from
another. He thought of the white stone yard of the farm where he had been born, at
the gates of Damascus, where the peasants threshed the wheat in the evenings to
separate the grain and chaff. Wasn’t what he was searching for exactly like the
threshing floor, itself unthinkable and unspeakable, where the winnowing fans of
thought and language separated the grain and chaff of everything?507
The image interrupts Damascius and “For an instant”, he lifts his hand away and gazes at the
tablet upon which he had been writing and remembers, suddenly, the “passage in the book on
the soul in which the philosopher compared the potentiality of the intellect to a tablet on
which nothing is written”,508 prompting the dawning realisation that it was
this that he had been so futilely trying to grasp day after day, it was this that he had
unceasingly pursued by the light of the brief flash of the unglimpsable, blinding
halo. The uttermost limit thought can reach is not a being, not a place or thing, no
matter how free of any quality, but rather, its own absolute potentiality, the pure
potentiality of representation itself: the writing tablet! What he had until then been
taking as the One, as the absolutely Other of thought, was instead only the material,
only the potentiality of thought. And the entire, lengthy volume the hand of the
scribe had crammed with characters was nothing other than the attempt to represent
the perfectly bare writing tablet on which nothing had yet been written. This was
why he was unable to carry his work through to completion: what could not cease
from writing itself was the image of what never ceased from not writing itself. In the
one was mirrored the ungraspable other. But everything was finally clear: now he






which can never be first let him glimpse, in its fading, the glimmer of a
beginning”.509
In the momentary suspension of not-writing, Damascius is confronted with the pure
potentiality of thought that he had been pursuing and which had concealed itself in its
dissimulating proximity, its closeness at hand. In a flash, the task is revealed in its
impossible possibility. The limit he was in pursuit of existed not elsewhere, was not an
absolute other of thought, but that which gives thought to itself – a radical, inappropriable
passivity. What he had been seeking was not something that could be sought, but the opening
of seeking itself – what “withdraws from every composition of name or discourse”, along
with any distinctions between the “knowable and the knower”.510 What the flash reveals is
that the greatest potential of thought, of writing, is what cannot be written, not because it
cannot be reached, but because it is the very opening of any reaching, the very blank page of
any threshold of writing.
Whilst Agamben is speaking here of a philosopher who lived in 529 A.D., he is, at the same
time, it might be conjectured, speaking only about himself. For what is his own project of
thinking if not this attempt to seek an understanding of possibility itself? To think thinking
itself? To write what never stops from not writing itself? Indeed, as much is admitted by
Agamben himself in at least two instances in his work where he gestures to this scene as the
site of his own questionability:
Following Wittgenstein’s suggestion, according to which philosophical problems
become clearer if they are formulated as questions concerning the meaning of words,
I could state the subject of my work as an attempt to understand the meaning of the
verb ‘can’ [potere]. What do I mean when I say: I can, I cannot?511
If for every author there exists a question which defines the motivum of his thought,
then the precise scope of these questions coincides with the terrain towards which all
my work is orientated. In both my written and unwritten books, I have stubbornly
pursued only one train of thought: what is the meaning of ‘there is language’; what is
the meaning of ‘I speak’?512
For the inappropriable beginning which occupies Agamben’s thinking, and to which it seems
he always attempts to return, is the having been begun of language itself – the presupposition
inherent in any use of language that there is language, rather than not a word at all; the “pure
509 Ibid., 34.
510 Ibid., 34.
511 Agamben, “On Potentiality”, Potentialities, 177.
512 Giorgio Agamben, “Preface”, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz
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fact” that one speaks, the possibility of speaking, rather than this or that signifying
proposition.
An example of an instance when this “I can” was uttered lies at the beginning of his
ruminations in his essay “On Potentiality”:
For everyone a moment comes in which she or he must utter this ‘I can’, which does
not refer to any certainty or specific capacity but is, nevertheless, absolutely
demanding. Beyond all faculties, this ‘I can’ does not mean anything – yet it marks
what is, for each of us, perhaps the hardest and bitterest experience possible: the
experience of potentiality.513
This poignant paragraph comes after Agamben has just recounted how the poet Anna
Akhmatova came to write the poems gathered in her collection Requiem. In the queues
outside the prison of 1930’s Leningrad, whilst trying to hear news of whether her son had
been arrested, for months Akhmatova stood in line, where one day she was asked by another
woman who recognised her, “Can you speak of this?” Akhmatova, as Agamben tells it, “was
silent for a moment and then, without knowing how or why, found an answer to the question:
‘Yes’, she said, ‘I can’”.514 What she meant by this, as Agamben reads it, is not that she was
such a technically capable writer, but that she was willing to undergo an experience of
potentiality – what is, as with Damascius, the hardest and bitterest experience possible.
It is in Aristotle’s ruminations on potentiality that this link is made for Agamben,515 where he
thinks with him what it means to have a faculty, to have the capacity to see, to speak, to
think, if the nature of them implies that something “is or is not ‘in one’s power’”.516 What
Agamben comes to understand from this is that potentiality, rather than being an absence
which can become present, what is not but which may be, is instead, the “existence of non-
Being, the presence of an absence”.517 Rather than that which is outstanding, yet to be
actualised, the “pure” potentiality Agamben comes to understand is the coexistence of
potentiality and impotentiality. Rather than a not-yet possibility that passes into actualisation,
what is at stake is “a presence and a face of potentiality”.518 Potentiality is the strange
opening at the centre of our lives which we never ourselves catch a glimpse of – the
concealed blind spot at the core of our perception, the darkness which accompanies all light
and which allows us to experience not only light, but the absence of it. If the faculty of sight
513 Agamben,“On Potentiality”, Potentialities, 178.
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was only that of the potentiality for vision, if it existed only in the seeing of light, then “we
could never experience darkness (or hear silence, in the case of the potentiality to hear). But
human beings can, instead, see shadows, they can experience darkness: they have the
potential not to see”.519 The faculties of the human being, in this way, are constituted by their
relation to their own lack, and so, the capacity to think is only in relation to a not-thinking; a
knowing, only in relation to not-knowing; speaking, only in relation to a not-speaking.
As Agamben continues to read Aristotle, he strikes upon two statements which make even
more explicit this relation of potentiality and impotentiality: “Impotentiality [adynamia]…is
a privation contrary to potentiality. Thus all potentiality is impotentiality”.520 And, “What is
potential [dynatos] is capable [endekhetai] of not being in actuality. What is potential can
both be and not be, for the same is potential to be and to not be”.521 What defines potentiality
in this sense is both the capability [endekhetai] to be and not to be. Dekhomai, as Agamben
notes, means “I welcome, receive, admit”.522 Potentiality, in its pure sense, becomes the
welcoming, the receiving, the hosting, of non-Being – “fundamental passivity” – which is not
the hosting of something other than itself, but the hosting of its own otherness – a “passive
potentiality” that does not undergo “something other than itself”, but “undergoes and suffers
its own non-Being”.523 What potentiality is contingent upon is a xenos coexistence of being
and non-being.
The question becomes, “what is the actuality of the potentiality to not-think?”524 What is at
stake is a potentiality in which there would be, as Aristotle puts it, “nothing impotential”,525
which is not the irradication of impotentiality in the moment of actuality, as Agamben
highlights it has been traditionally read, but the potentiality to not-be which belongs to all
potentiality passing into actuality. “This does not mean that it disappears in actuality; on the
contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality”.526 Agamben concludes his essay with an
extract from Aristotle which proposes that “to suffer is not a simple term”:
In one sense it is a certain destruction through the opposite principle, and in another
sense the preservation [soteria, salvation] of what is in potentiality by what is in
actuality and what is similar to it…For he who possess science [in potentiality]










– since here there is the gift of the self to itself and to actuality [epidosis eis auto] –
or this is an alteration of a different kind.527
What is revealed to Damascius in the momentary flash of insight is the radical impotentiality
of the potentiality of thought – what cannot be thought as such, but is the not-thinking which
allows and preserves thinking. The attempt to think the threshold of thought is the
undergoing of this impotentiality, this non-being, this thrownness of one’s being. What he
comes to understand in his grappling with the incomprehensible is the “sense of the maxim
stating that by knowing the unknowable it is not something about it we know, but something
about ourselves”.528 Standing in the concealment of the opening of thought, experiencing his
own incapacity, Damascius suffers and undergoes a hosting not of something other, but his
own non-Being – a giving of himself to himself. The inquiry, after all it seems, is a seeking
his own self through the radical depropriative and desubjectivising experience of potentiality
– being cast into hosting his own otherness, his being a stranger to himself – the hardest and
bitterest experience possible. The task it seems, for writing, is to welcome and host a not-
writing, a not-saying within what is said – for the blank tablet to, as Agamben puts it in
another sketch, write its own passivity:
Thanks to this potential to not-think, thought can turn back to itself (to its pure
potentiality) and be, at its apex, the thought of thought. What it thinks here, however,
is not an object, a being-in-act, but that layer of wax, that rasum tabulae that is
nothing but its own passivity, its own pure potentiality (to not-think): In the
potentiality that thinks itself, action and passion coincide and the writing tablet
writes by itself, or, rather, writes its own passivity.529
The facticity of speaking is the very blank tablet Damascius is confronted with – an
unsayability which does not lie outside language, but is its very possibility, is its opening, its
revelatory capacity; the radical passivity of its impotentiality.
the un-said, are in fact categories which belong exclusively to human language; far
from indicating a limit of language, they express its invincible power of
presupposition, the unsayable being precisely what language must presuppose in
order to signify…The singularity which language must signify is not something
ineffable but something superlatively sayable: the thing of language.530
The unsayable facticity of language, whilst not utterable through language, is, nevertheless,
what is always spoken in language as its immediate communicability, to speak with
Benjamin, its opening, its threshold – the blank tablet which does not say something, but
527 Ibid., 184.
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which allows for all saying to occur – the revelatory capacity of language which cannot
reveal itself. “The meaning of the revelation is that human beings can reveal beings through
language but cannot reveal language itself…humans see the world through language but do
not see language”.531
What Agamben’s opening text of Idea of Prose opens onto is not the clarity of a prefatory
statement of what the book will be “about”, but a demonstration of the opening onto an
opacity which he attempts in each “idea” of the sketched essays in the collection. The task, it
seems, as Agamben here shows, is to inhabit this facticity of language, where writing
becomes not the ordinary presupposition of such communicability, but, as Daniel Heller-
Roazen puts it, its “exposition”.532 The task, as Agamben sees it, is to “bring language itself
to language”,533 that is, to experience “not some language content or some true proposition,
but the fact itself of speaking”.534 In this sense, what is presented is not a proposition about
something, but a writing that “does not have any objective content”,535 and refers only to an
event of language – to its taking-place, “to the factum loquendi”.536 Rather than supposing
an object to be known and one who can know it in advance of the text’s writing, there is only
the revealing-concealing situation of writing. The intelligibility, how something is able to be
known, is not taken for granted or presupposed, but inhabited.
Agamben ends the sketch of the title of the collection, “Idea of Prose”, evoking Plato, who
“rejected the transmitted forms of writing, and fixed his gaze on that idea of language which,
according to the testimony of Aristotle, was for him neither poetry nor prose, but their
middle term”.537 Alexander Duttmann, in his introduction to the collection, shifts the
translation of Agamben’s “Ne poesia ne prosa, ma il loro medio”,538 from the translator’s
rendering of medio as “middle term”, to milieu/midst in order to highlight how this medio is
not a “term placed in between” poetry and prose, nor is it an amalgam of an element of
poetry and an element of philosophy, but the original shared between of language itself in its
communicability, its impartability. Rather than a static term of a medium to be occupied, this
medio is the immediate mediality of language as the opening, each time, of the dynamic
milieu of its taking-place. The idea of prose, in this sense, is a writing which attempts to
531 Agamben, “The Idea of Language”, Potentialities, 40.
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535 Ibid., 116.
536 Agamben, “Linguistics and Philosophy”, Potentialities, 66.
537 Agamben, “Idea of Prose”, Idea of Prose, 41.
538 Agamben, “Introduction”, Idea of Prose, 3.
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inhabit this passage as what gives rise to a scene of writing – both the event and the place
where the event occurs.  What Agamben stages in the opening of his book is the opening
itself – the inherent theatricality of a writing that cannot be divorced from its mediality –
each text operating not on a ground laid out in advance, but as the staging of its own scene of
making. “The task of philosophical presentation is to come with speech to help speech, so
that, in speech, speech itself does not remain presupposed but instead comes to speech”.539
The task of il loro medio is to inhabit language in its taking-place, its coming to be placed.
The task of thinking, as performed in the opening to Idea of Prose, is not to presuppose the
opening, but to show its taking-place. Here there is not an object to be known by a subject,
but the revealing-concealing of something from within a scene of writing from which writer-
reader are not divorced but are implicated in – must suffer in undergoing an experience of
potentiality, like Damascius and his scene of study where he does not know.
In such a way, the question of form cannot simply be the concern of a literary adventure of
writing, but philosophy itself becomes a language of inquiry: “To restore the thing itself to
its place in language and, at the same time, to restore the difficulty of writing, the place of
writing in the poetic task of composition: this is the task of the coming philosophy”.540 In
inhabiting the communicability of language, the taken for granted barrier between
philosophy and poetry ceases to operate, and is instead occupied as the il loro medio of what
they share. The point at which a dichotomy of form versus content, a word that is beautiful
and a word that knows, breaks down is in a writing that attempts to show its own
communicability, its own intelligibility, inhabiting the (im)potentiality of language – what
Agamben comes to proffer as the gesture of writing – “the exhibition of a mediality…the
process of making a means visible as such”. 541 Here to show “a word does not mean to have
at one’s disposal a higher level (a metalanguage, itself incommunicable within the first
level), starting from which we could make that word an object of communication”, but it
means instead to “expose the word in its own mediality, in its own being a means, without
any transcendence. The gesture is, in this sense, communication of a communicability”.542
The gesture is the impartability of language in itself – what is not said but the mute showing
of language parting-with itself.
It has precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of
human beings as pure mediality. However, because the being-in-language is not
something that could be said in sentences, the gesture is essentially always a gesture
539 Agamben,“The Thing Itself”, Potentialities, 35.
540 Agamben, “The Thing Itself”, 38.
541 Agamben, “Notes on Gesture”, Means Without End, 58.
542 Ibid., 59.
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of not being able to figure something out in language; it is always a gag in the proper
meaning of the term, indicating first of all something that could be put in your mouth
to hinder speech, as well as the sense of the actor’s improvisation meant to
compensate a loss of memory or an inability to speak.543
Gesture, is not then, as he further emphasises in an essay engaging in the work of the critic
Max Kommerell, “an absolutely non-linguistic element”, but “closely tied to language”544 –
the “forceful presence in language itself, one that is older and more originary than conceptual
expression. Kommerell defines linguistic gesture as the stratum of language that is not
exhausted in communication and that captures language, so to speak, in its solitary
moments”.545 The solitude of gesture is the manner in which it exists for another only insofar
as it exists for itself. This a-conceptual, yet expressive dimension is, paradoxically,
speechless – indicative of the incommunicability of this immediate mediality. What it bears
resemblance to is Benjamin’s mimesis of language as it is akin to the face in which can be
read, as Kommerell puts it, “the history of solitary moments”, that is, the imprint of character
which comes not only in dialogue with others, but away from them, in the mimicry imposed
“by solitude and inner dialogue”546 – a solitariness which is mostly heard in poetry, where
language converses with itself. What Kommerell proffers with gesture, as Agamben comes to
read it, thus, is “the other side of language, the muteness inherent in humankind’s very
capacity for language, its speechless dwelling in language. And the more human beings have
language, the stronger the unsayable weighs them down”.547 The gesture is the blank tablet
which cannot be spoken as such, but which allows for the possibility of saying anything at
all. What gesture expresses is “Being in language itself” – the facticity of speech, which does
not say anything, but exists in the modality of (im)potentiality. The effort, it seems, and one
which Agamben has dedicated himself to in his own work, is to inhabit this opening of
language, this communicability – the emptiness that cannot be filled, as “humankind’s most
proper dwelling”.548 For it is in the relation between living and saying that gesture seems to
truly reside, as what Kommerell comes to read as the concern modern poets have in the
figures of the angel, the half-god, the marionette and the animal – not a substance or
property, but the “intimacy of living here and now’, in a profane mystery whose sole object
is existence itself”,549 that is, an initiation of life not into meaning, but into itself. “Into
something that, in its incarnation in beauty, pain, and enigmas, constantly borders on
543 Ibid., 59.







meaning without ever uttering it and while remaining unnameable. Life thus has a secret;
indeed, life is a secret. After every single realisation, however compelling, after every single
disenchantment, however terrible, life returns to its secret”.550 Gesture, as a way of coming
not to explain the enigma of existence, but of entering into it more fully, through the life
lived in the text as a theatricality which “lies beyond all psychology and, in a certain sense,
all interpretation. It opens not onto literary history or theory of genres but onto a stage”.551 It
is this staging of sense which Agamben comes to understand as criticism and as the political
stakes of gesture, where the authority of the author is nothing but an actor speaking in the
vise of an improvisatory gag – something Agamben returns to in another short sketch
entitled “Author as Gesture”, where the writer inhabits this border of meaning, a threshold,
where they are and are not there.
The author is the point at which a life is offered up and played out in the work.
Offered up and played out, not expressed or fulfilled. For this reason, the author can
only remain unsatisfied and unsaid in the work. He is the illegible someone who
makes reading possible, the legendary emptiness from which writing and discourse
issue.552
The text is attributable not to the psychological individual existing outside the text, nor to a
locatable presence within the text, but in the more ambiguous realm of a potentiality within
the text – the presence of an absence which results from:
the encounter and from the hand-to-hand confrontation with the apparatuses in
which it has been put – and has put itself – into play. For writing…is an apparatus
too, and the history of human beings is perhaps nothing other than the hand-to-hand
confrontation with the apparatuses they have produced – above all with
language…so must subjectivity show itself and increase its resistance at the point
where its apparatuses capture it and put it into play. A subjectivity is produced where
the living being, encountering language and putting itself into play in language
without reserve, exhibits in a gesture the impossibility of its being reduced to this
gesture. All the rest is psychology, and nowhere in psychology do we encounter
anything like an ethical subject, a form of life.553
The author as gesture is the theatricality of a thinking that exists only in the text’s taking-
place, its singular staging, where the “thought and sentiment” become real for the writer
“while writing”;554 where the sense is made transitorily, in the passage of the writer being-
there for a while, at a particular time. For, if feelings and thoughts “require a subject to
550 Ibid., 84.
551 Ibid., 80.





experience and think them”, the thoughts cannot reside “in” the text, nor “in” the one who
writes it, but within the text’s being imparted.
In order for them to become present, someone must take up the book and read. This
individual will occupy the empty place in the poem left by the author; he will repeat
the same inexpressive gesture the author used to testify to his absence in the work.555
It is precisely “this place that remains empty” that Agamben proffers “makes reading
possible”556 – what comprises its reading room, its readability, the veritable stanza which is
the capacity of what was protected by the poets of the thirteenth century as the “‘capacious
dwelling, receptacle’, because it safeguarded, along with all the formal elements of the
canzone, that joi d’amor that these poets entrusted to poetry as its unique object”.557
Agamben asks what is this object? This “receptive womb of its entire art?” A question which
cannot attempt to be answered without re-awakening its questionability, for it is a question
which is “barred by the forgetfulness of a scission that derives from the origin of our culture
and that is usually accepted as the most natural thing – that goes, so to speak, without saying
– when in fact it is the only thing truly worth interrogating”.558 This schism is nothing less
than the gulf between poetry and philosophy, distinguished here by Agamben as a language
that “enjoys the object of knowledge by representing it in a beautiful form”, “possesses its
object without knowing it”, and another which, “knows its object without possessing it”,
“has all seriousness and consciousness for itself but does not enjoy its object because it does
not know how to represent it”.559 It is between these poles of an “inspired-ecstatic” and a
“rational-conscious” that Agamben comes to place his own attempt at knowing, at
“criticism”, where the text becomes the tracing out precisely of a stanza, wherein is secluded
the preservation not of something, but the impotential nothing of possibility: “criticism
opposes the enjoyment of what cannot be possessed and the possession of what cannot be
enjoyed. In this way, criticism interprets the precept of Gargantua: ‘Science without
consciousness is nothing but the ruin of the soul. What is secluded in the stanza of criticism
is nothing, but this nothing safeguards unappropriability as its most precious possession”.560
Here is the purpose of a gesture of writing, which, unlike an “appropriation without
consciousness” or a “consciousness without enjoyment”, is an “enjoyment that cannot be
possessed and the possession of what cannot be enjoyed”561 – a writing which “traces…a
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topology of joy, of the stanza through which the human spirit responds to the impossible task
of appropriating what must in every case remain unappropriable”.562 What it occasions is an
approach to the object of concern which is neither master nor slave, but is more of a “refined
love”, that dwells in the both and of enjoying and deferring, negating and affirming,
accepting and repelling. In this sense, the stanza is not the “‘place’ as something spatial”, but
the more originary dwelling of “a pure difference” – this inhabiting the schism, the split of a
hyphenation that makes room in such a way where, as Agamben quotes Plato, “‘what is not,
will in a certain sense be; and what is, will in a certain sense not be’”.563 Rather than a
dichotomy of a knowledge that is contained in the form, and a knowledge that is contained in
the content, there is their complication in the inhabiting of the text in its taking-place, a
scene of writing, in which there is a movement between knowing and not-knowing and
whereby an object is “attained” only in this passage of seeing it as something from within an
ecology of care, where it takes-place by becoming not what it “is”, but what it is like564 – a
“topology of the unreal”,565 as Agamben terms it. The text becomes the room not presenting
what is there, present at hand, but what is coming to be there – the staging of a text that
exists only in its coming into existence, and as such, is one which never fully arrives.
Agamben situates the “sense” of the text as what occurs only in transition, in movement, that
is, not “in” the text as a present at hand sense, simply “there” in the words which lie printed
on the page, nor “in” the one who wrote it, nor even “in” the one who reads it, but rather in
the “in” of an inhabiting and imparting; an “in” which is not an enclosure but a dynamic
mode of coming to be placed; an in where sense is made in the hyphenated “in” of being in-
between, being in the midst, in il loro medio, that makes-room. In this sense, the structure of
readability, of a criticisability, is that which is never self-coincidental, but in existing for
itself, that is, in tending towards itself, it exists for another. As a staging of sense it can only
exist in a singular taking-place.
562 Ibid., xviii.
563 Ibid., xviii.
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An inventory of the uses of a word might have no end; an inventory of the uses of a sentence could
not even be begun.
– Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics
Naming echos. The nothing, like the poem, like the subject, has no referent, for it does not pre-exist
itself. Rather, it predicts itself, calls itself into being by means of calling or being.
– Norma Cole, To be at Music
To the gift of Being and its generous releasement corresponds the self-effacement of the thinker who
names what is by withdrawing in front of it.
– Martin Heidegger On Time and Being
As the putting into play a subjectivity within language, Agamben’s sense of gesture, as many
have noted, was borne out in his earlier work with reference to the linguist Émile
Benveniste’s writing on language, specifically what he came to call the discourse of sense
which takes-place in the discurre, the passage of language being put into use. One of
Agamben’s encounters with Benveniste comes in his essay Language and Death, wherein he
notes how Benveniste understood deictic indication as referring not to a substantial reality,
but rather, to the reality of the instance of its use, what Benveniste tendered as discourse, as
opposed to the system of language. The subject of language, the “I”, refers not to any
individual, but is an empty sign which obtains its significance only from within a singular
situation, only by referring to the singular instance of use.
There is no point in defining these terms and demonstratives in general through
deixis, as is the usual practice, if we do not add that deixis is contemporaneous with
the instance of discourse that bears the indication of the person; from this reference
the demonstrative derives its unique and particular character, which is the unity of
the instance of discourse to which it refers. Thus the essential thing is the relation
between the indicator (of a person, a place, a time, a demonstrated object, etc.) and
the present instance of discourse.566
The subject exists in language, in this sense, in the convergence of its saying with what is
said – a simultaneity which is also a split in the gap between the “I” that speaks and the “I”
that is spoken, between enunciator and enunciated, where this interval gives rise to the
singular event of a saying from within language. As Benveniste highlights, the subject exists
as the relation between the “I” and the instance of its occurrence.
Deixis or indication...does not simply demonstrate an unnamed object, but above all
the very instance of discourse, its taking place. The place indicated by
demonstration, and from which only every other indication is possible, is a place of
566 Émile Benveniste quoted in Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity,
trans. Karen E. Pinkus and Micahel Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24.
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language. They indicate that language takes place and so they refer to the ‘event of
language’.567
The subject in language is the very opening of what is presupposed in all uses of language –
its taking-place. Rather than referring to an external reality, an “I” of an autonomous
individual, it refers only to language itself. The subject is the fold of a making-room, where
language does not say something, but shows its communicability by indicating that it is
taking-place. The subject is present in the text as this relation, this referral, rather than what
is enunciated. They are present not as something directly attainable, as a “substantial reality
present in some place”,568 locatable somewhere in the text as “represented” therein, but are
the very presentation of the text itself, the stanza of a nothing which allows for something to
be shown.
We should pay attention to the specific condition of the utterance: it is the very act
of producing an uttered, not the text of the uttered…This act is the work of the
speaker who sets langue into motion. The relation between the speaker and the
langue determines the linguistic character of the utterance.569
The subject is the impotentiality of the very potentiality of language itself – the blank tablet
which allows for something to be said. What is not said, but shown in this gesturing of
language’s communicability is, in a move which seems to link this earlier thinking of
Agamben with its return, and differential re-iteration in his later work, this correspondence
between the taking-place of language and being as potentiality, though not named as such
here:
Linguistics defines this dimension as the putting into action of language and the
conversion of langue into parole. But for more than two thousand years, throughout
the history of Western philosophy, this dimension has been called being, ousia. That
which is always already demonstrated in every act of speaking…that which is
always already indicated in speech without being named, is, for philosophy, being.
The dimension of meaning of the word ‘being’, whose eternal quest and eternal
loss…constitutes the history of metaphysics, coincides with the taking place of
language; metaphysics is that experience of language that, in every speech act,
grasps the disclosure of that dimension, and in all speech, experiences above all the
‘marvel’ that language exists. Only because language permits a reference to its own
instance through shifters, something like being and the world are open to
speculation.570
The gesture as the emptiness within which something can be said speaks, in this way, to the
ontological dimension of language – what communicates not something, but our being-with
567 Ibid., 25.
568 Agamben, “The Author as Gesture”, Profanations, 72.
569 Agamben, Language and Death, 25.
570 Ibid., 26.
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each other, our being-in-the-world, whilst the ontic dimension of language corresponds to
what is said and signified within this opening. It is the voice which Agamben goes on to link
with this ontological opening of language, as it is voice which signals the deictic singularity
of language in use: “contemporaneity and existential relations can only be grounded in the
voice. The utterance and the instance of discourse are only identifiable as such through the
voice that speaks them”.571 This voice, however, as the emptiness within which something is
said, is not coterminous with an “individual”, nor is it simply the sounds of the words, but is
the ground of the text as what “goes to the ground and disappears in order for being and
language to take place.”572 The “voice” is the passage of the writing as the inhabiting of an
interval between what is being said and the saying itself, that is, the event of a signifying.
The “voice” is “present” in the text only as the text’s singular way of parting-with itself, the
occupying of il loro medio. Rather than a stable objectifiable “thing”, the voice is only the
tendency of the text, in the on-going movement of tending towards itself, caught always in-
between this and that. The “voice” is the passion of the gesture where sense is bourne out in
the present instance of discourse – in the non-coincidental time of the text; the articulated
absence; the presence of an absence. As Agamben puts it, “Nothing is in the voice, the voice
is the place of the negative…that is, pure temporality”.573
Voice constitutes the model according to which Western culture construe one of its
supreme problems: the relation and passage between nature and culture, between
phusis and logos. This passage is always already conceived as an arthron, an
articulation; or rather, as a discontinuity that is also a continuity, a removal that is
also a preservation (arthron, like armonia, originally derives from the language of
woodworking; armotto signifies to conjoin, to unite, as the woodworker does with
two pieces of wood). In this sense, the Voice is truly the invisible harmony, which
Heraclitus said was stronger than visible harmony…because in its double negativity,
it enacts the conjoinment that constitutes the essence of that zoon logou echon that is
man. In this definition, the echein, the having, of man, which unifies the duality of
the living being and language, is conceived of as always already existing in the
negative mode of an arthron. Man is that living being who removes himself and
preserves himself at the same time – as unspeakable – in language; negativity is the
human means of having language.574
The voice is the pure temporality of a time not as the flow of instants, an on-going
continuity, but as the time of a discontinuous continuity; a time that is re-iterative, doubling,
both ahead of and after itself; a time that is localised and yet never simply locatable in a






but shifting; a time that gives and also refuses; a time that moves and yet goes nowhere; a
time that is, each time, a singular staging. The gesture is the demonstration of a subject who
is nothing but this groundlessness of not having language but having to take it up as a ground
that exists as a nothing but the there of the text in its singularised taking-place, for a while, at
a particular time. It is the infancy of one who never coincides with their language, but must
continuously take it on, must continuously attempt to dwell in it, yet not as a permanent
residence, but only as a singular staging, which, in its very taking-place is always already
parting-with itself, pointing elsewhere. The “voice”, then, as the resonance of sense – the
singular attunement of the text in its gathered harmony, what is and is not there – the jointure
of an articulation of a structure of the “as”, where this “as” itself is not presupposed, but
exposed.
The thinking that tries to grasp being as being retreats toward the entity without
adding to it any further determination…comprehending it in its being-such, in the
midst of its as, it grasps its pure non-latency, its pure exteriority. It no longer says
something as ‘something’, but brings to speech the as itself.575
The voice, then, as the Stimme of a singular articulation of what is present only as the
jointure-separation of a Stimmung which Agamben labels as the joy of criticism founded on
the refined love which stands in the open concealment of the facticity of language, its
opening which allows for something to be said as-such. A Stimmung of the angst of “Care”
which Agamben reads as akin to the “thaumazein, astonishment or wonder, which according
to a very old and constant tradition is the arche of philosophy”.576 The angst of having to be
the there not as what is contrary to joy then, but as Heidegger himself put it, is in “secret
alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing”.577 The stanza of criticism
is marked, in this way, as the enclosed nothing of a Stimmung of love, an eros re-inscribed
from an identity game, to the love as the giving of an emptiness, an openness. Reading
against the grain, Agamben comes to argue in his essay “The Passion of Facticity” for an
understanding of the very structure of Dasein itself as love. What marks the human being in
their passionate existence, as Agamben notes, quoting Heidegger in his text Ordo Amoris, is
our being first and foremost those whose beings are comprised of a capacity to love: “Before
he is an ens cogitans or an ens volans…man is an ens amans”.578 Love is what first opens the
possibility of knowing, of access to the truth. Indeed, Heidegger himself would later gesture
to such an understanding of the ontological “Care” of Dasein when he underscores how love
cannot be “added” to Dasein, but is the very structure of their being-there: “if understood
575 Agamben, The Coming Community, 99.
576 “Vocation and Voice”. Qui Parle 10, no. 2 (1997): 93.
577 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 93.
578 Agamben, “The Passion of Facticity”, Potentialities, 186.
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correctly, that is, in the sense of fundamental ontology, Sorge can never be differentiated
from ‘love’ insofar as it names ‘comprehension of Being’ as the fundamental determination
of the ek-static temporal constitution of Dasein.579
What Agamben tunes into is the sense of Dasein as the passion of facticity, of not-knowing,
as the emptiness of a love which procures for thinking the necessary inappropriability of
criticism:
(in the etymological sense of the word passion, pati, paskhein). Love is the passion
of facticity in which man bears this nonbelonging and darkness, appropriating them
while guarding them as such. Love is thus not, as the dialectic of desire suggests, the
affirmation of the self in the negation of the loved object; it is, instead, the passion
and exposition of facticity itself and of the irreducible improprieity of being. In love,
the lover and the beloved come to light in their concealment, in an eternal facticity
beyond Being.580
The passion of this gesture of writing is the undergoing, in this way, not of something other,
but a suffering one’s own non-being – coming back to this one beneath you who carries you
through. It is, then, an understanding of love as the “Care” of one who undergoes an
experience of making-possible something, or someone, by giving their single possession they
have been gifted with in life – being a “self” as the nothingness of being-there.
To attempt a practice of writing which is a care of the self, in this sense, is one marked by
standing in the opening of language, its facticity and inappropriability – in the manner in
which it shows and does not show, connects us to the world and does not connect us to the
world; the manner in which it gives us what something is like – a fictitious making which is
its truth. A writing which follows, thus, that “method” Mallarmé tendered, of language
reflecting upon itself.
The writing subject exists as the X of what can’t be said, but is the gathering of what makes
for a place of thinking as abandonment, as exposure to the singularised differential of a
making-room, a stanza as staging. In this way, the Stimmug of a gesture of writing as “Care”,
is a text where writer and reader can be resolute, in the sense of confronting their death, in
the emptiness of being nothing but the there – a dissolution of self so that something, the
object of criticism, and someone, the writer-reader, can be given over to their singularised
possibility.
The essential relationship between language and death takes place…in Voice. Death
and Voice have the same negative structure and they are metaphysically
579 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, 304.
580 Agamben, “The Passion of Facticity”, 204.
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inseparable…To experience Voice signifies…to become capable of …no longer
simply a deceasing, but a person’s ownmost and insuperable possibility, the
possibility of his freedom.581
It is in this sense that voice is the site of an ethics construed not on the identity of the
individual, but as the abandonment of “Care”, that does not appropriate the world in its
facticity, but bears it forth in its singular being-such. What is proffered to another is only this
empty room for themselves to undergo an experience of expropriation, to be cast to their
own freedom of the love of abandonment. The reading room is simply the enclosed silence
of a listening in an art of fugue.
philosophy must necessarily leave behind its habit, always already alienate itself and
divide itself from its habit, in order to be able to return there, walking through
negativity and absolving it from its demonic scission. A philosopher is one who,
having been surprised by language, having thus abandoned his habitual dwelling
place in the world, must now return to where language already happened to him. He
must ‘surprise the surprise’, be at home in the marvel and in the division. When it
wishes to return to its arche, philosophy can only grasp the taking place of language
in a negative; that is, the daimon itself as ethos…That which it has to grasp is, after





Tension is the song. The tune carries the words. When one
separates them, nothing more than words cross over – the decoys of meaning.
– Henri Meschonnic, “Rhyme and Life”
a state of significance indefinitely being born
– Henri Meschonnic, “Rhyme and Life”
Poetically, we do what we do before knowing what we do. And we must never do what we know
– Henri Meschonnic, Ethics and Politics of Translating
Agamben’s stanza of the gesture of writing, as an attempt to undo the schism between the
word that knows and the word that is beautiful, is akin to what Henri Meschonnic came to
proffer as the poetic subject, that subject who is manifested in a singular, situated use of
language – a subject articulated not through what is said, but in its modality, what he came to
call the rhythm of writing. As he perceived it from within his practices of writing, as poet,
critic, translator, and inspired by Benveniste’s conception of discourse, and essay on rhythm,
Meschonnic came to proffer rhythm not as an addendum to sense, but what first opens it – a
crucial factor which is lost in treatments of language according to what he understood as the
politics of the “sociology of the sign” still governing the topos of our understanding in terms
of opposed binaries; life and words; rational and irrational; poetry and prose; the
discontinuous and continuous; individual and social; personal and political; domestic and
civic. In his ethics of translation, he came to argue for a practice of translation which
attempted to render meaning not as the transfer of one system of language into another, but
as the transformation of the “subjectivisation” of discourse in another, rendering, that is, the
idio-local rhythm of a text; the “poem” of discourse.
An ethics of translating means translating the maximum subjectivisation of a system
of discourse created by the poem. To translate a poem into an enunciation by the
terms and means of the sign is to reduce the infinite to a totality. The poem has
disappeared because the ethics of the poem has disappeared.583
In a sentiment which resonates with Benjamin, Meschonnic argues for the necessity of
translating to be a creative practise not through a lexical rendering of meaning, but through
the translating of the text’s tendency, where the text “lives on” in its parting-with itself, its
becoming something similar, rather than a re-iteration of the same. What Meschonnic
presents in his understanding of rhythm is an attempt to preserve the capacity of the text, the
stanza if you like, where the translator’s/reader’s role is to consign the text once more to
potentiality, where its sense means only in being set into motion once again, experienced: “it
583 Henri Meschonnic, Ethics and Politics of Translating, trans. Pier-Pascale Boulanger (Philadelphia:
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001), 55.
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is not only a matter of keeping what the words want to say, it is a matter of reinventing what
they say. That is what does achieve and always has achieved poetry, the thought of poetry,
the poetry of thought”.584 This “poetic subject”, this subjectivisation of discourse, is not
coterminous with the individual, but is the individuisation of language in use – the singular
rhythm of the text which makes for a “poem of thought”.585 It is this aspect of the text which
is the political and ethical dimension of writing for Meschonnic, as it is here where its
transformational capacity lies:
Conscience and the individualistic idea of the individual both act as obstacles to the
historicity of language. They split language into the dual components of the sign:
society is split into the individual and the social, literature into the writer and the
work. But what one calls a work (oeuvre) is what can be passed on to others,
indicating that the subject is that very property of transformation and continuity –
not the individual as a person. The writer and the reader become subjects through the
work. An “agent” would imply that some previous entity passes through it.586
It is a sense of the power of the text which must be translated – not what the text says, but
what it does – what lies in the tension, for it is only in the sense of resonance that the poetic
subject resides, that is, a residing not as the occupancy of a site, of a subject present at hand,
one who is “there”, but the making-room of a subject who is coming to be there, who is there
as a present absence, as a capacity, a transformational property which constitutes an etho-
poetic effect of a form of life – turning writer and reader into subjects through a listening – in
the reflexive movement of language as a listening that compels a listening.
Poetry turns everything into life. It is that form of life that turns everything into
language. It does not come to us unless language itself has become a form of life.
That is why it is so unquiet. For it does not cease to work on us. To be the dream of
which we are the sleep. A listening, an awakening that passes through us, the rhythm
that knows us and that we do not know. It is the organisation in language of what has
always been said to escape language: life, the movement no word is supposed to be
able to say. And in effect words do not say it. That is why poetry is a meaning of
time more than the meaning of words. Even when its course is ample, it is contained
in what passes from us through words. It does not have the time of glaciers and
ferns. It tells about a time of life. Through everything that it names. Even its haste
transforms. Since it is a listening that compels a listening.587
the only task of the poet'...is to listen to everything that one doesn't know that one
hears, everything that one doesn't know that one says, and everything one doesn't
know how to say, because one believes language to be made of words.588
584 Ibid., 96.
585 Henri Meschonnic, “The Rhythm Party Manifesto”, trans. David Nowell Smith, Thinking Verse 01
(2011), 170.
586 Henri Meschonnic, “Interview”, by Gabriella Bedetti, Diacritics 18, no. 3 (1988): 101.
587 Henri Meschonnic, “Rhyme and Life”, Critical Inquiry 15, no. (1988): 90.
588 Meschonnic, “Rhythm Manifesto”, 168.
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The poetic subject exists “in” the text not as a present at hand sense, but as the singularised
organisation of the text, in the internal architectonics of its taking-place, an idio-local space-
time as the form of language in use – the configuration of a sense which is not contained in
the words – rhythm is not what is in the “meaning”, as understood as the unit of the sign, but
in the sense of a present absence as what must be listened to, articulated in what he calls the
“signifiance”.
In discourse, discourse is rhythm and rhythm is discourse, not a parallel discourse,
interior, hidden under the words but the same discourse. Rhythm is the synthetic
ensemble of all the elements which contribute, organisation of all the unities small or
big,....I define rhythm in language as the organisation of marks by which the
signifiants, linguistic and extralinguistic…produce a specific semantic, distinct from
the lexical sense and which I call the signifiance: that is to say the values, proper to a
discourse and only one.589
Signifiance is a term Meschonnic constructs from the present participle signifiant in a way to
highlight how the “meaning” of the text resides not in a present-at-hand manner, but in the
rhythm of a sense that is always coming, arriving, not standing still to be comprehended or
apprehended once and for all. It is an attempt to undo the binary of signifier/signified and its
concomitant segregation of form and content. A move which is analogous to a rhythmic
translation Weber performs in tuning into Ferdinand de Saussure’s thought in an attempt to
listen to him otherwise than how he has been historically translated. Here Weber re-begins
an understanding of Saussure: “The particular translation that I am referring to has become
so familiar that it may be difficult for you to see it as a problem at all. I mean the translation
of the French word, signifiant, by the English signifier. In French the word is a gerund,
formed from the present participle of the verb, but used as a noun”.590 In the present
participle there is a non-coincidence between what is signified and the process of signifying.
What Weber comes to draw out from this, is the manner in which signifying is constituted in
a non-coincidence of a time of the present participle parting-with itself, which makes for a
dynamic of sense-making which is on-going and without any internal property of closure. As
re-iterative, it can only achieve a status of “signified” by being interrupted – something
which “over time may be sanctioned by routine, convention and therefore naturalised. It can
then appear to be more or less self-evident, like a proper noun”.591 What is inherent to the
signifier as such, is its heterogeneity. In light of this, Weber argues that the English gerund
589 Henri Meschonnic, Critique du Rhythm (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1982), 216. All translations are my
own.
590 Samuel Weber, “Singularity of Literary Cognition”, 5.
591 Ibid., 7.
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“signifying”, may be closer to the French “singifiant” – what cannot be so easily defined,
resists determination, and exists as a tendency:
it is iterative, ongoing, a discontinuous series of articulations that moves both away
from its immediate appearance or location and toward something or somewhere else.
It is thus split between enactment and articulation, and as such never complete. As
an iterative movement that is situated by reference to its articulation, the present
participle has no internal principle of closure. It therefore requires some sort of
intervention from without, some sort of interruption, in order to achieve the status of
‘signified’.592
What such a translation undermines is the ability of language to cohere into a definite
signified, it is to cast into doubt a determinable object to be cognised, as this play of
“differential signification” never congeals into an identified signified, it remains
questionable – a questionability which  “in turn can call into question the identity of the
cognitive subject as well”.593 Weber is here speaking in relation to the singularity of literary
texts but it is precisely this aspect which is what Meschonnic construes is the etho-poetic
element of any text – any text, that is, which is a “poem of thought”, a situated singularity of
sense in which the reader-writer does not know, but is given over to bearing-forth of sense
which could be this, or could be that – inhabiting the gap, the interval between what is being
signified and the signifying process itself – this articulation of the as.
The sense of the text, in this way, is established not in it but by pointing away, to an
elsewhere – a “here” which is only in relation to a “there”, an “I” in relation to a “you”, a
“has been” only in relation to what is “not yet”. The heterogeneity of the present participle is
such that it can only tend towards itself, never coinciding, but always anticipating ahead
through what has been. To inhabit the text’s tendency, thus, is to inhabit the way in which it
was anticipating you – “you” being the future it was pointing towards. It is this pointing
elsewhere that must be translated, in this sense, as it is in this respect that language is
continuously re-generating itself – making similar what was said. What is crucial is the
difference between a sense oriented towards the past participle, a sense that can be fixed in
time that occurred once and for all, and a sense oriented towards possibility, to the future, to
the heterogeneous outside – a context the text cannot control and which will not so much
determine its meaning, as participate in its participle of parting-with. The reading-writing for
rhythm in this way, is one which must necessarily be situated – taking-place not fully, or
determinably, but in a manner which is continuously arriving. It is in this way that




encounter that “meaning” resides – one which is always idio-local and incomplete. The
sense articulates only a singular sense, what cannot be held, grasped, or consumed, but only
experienced, only sensed, only, that is, bodied-forth by she who bears-forth what is and is
not there, in her locus of being in-between. The sense lies in the inhabiting of the gap of the
present participle, in the “internal cut”594 of signifier and signified. The sense exists in the
text, only in the tendency of a tension, and so it cannot come to say what something “is”, but
articulates a possibility – what something is like – one which cannot be cognitively grasped,
but must be attuned to. Rather than the “meaning” of what resides “in” the text, the
signifiance is a sense that must be participated in by a bodied other down the line. What is
clear is that rhythm is not, for Meschonnic, an aesthetic addendum to the writing, but is the
way that something is revealed-disclosed, how something comes to show itself as something
– it is the opening that lets us open-up to a meaning that exists only in the experience of a
singularity, in what can’t be held, but what holds us. It is contingent upon what Meschonnic
retains from Saussure’s work as the notion of “value” – a certain force of meaning which is
contextual – the valence of a word contingent upon the internal relations of a given text and
which can add a new or renewed sense to a word.
Saussure speaks of “the river of language” (la fleuve de la langue), which means that
the system and history are in constant relationship, synchronic and diachronic at the
same time, whereas structuralism placed the synchronic in opposition to the
diachronic, the static in opposition to the dynamic. My Saussureanism balances what
you would call my Heracliteanism – not as a compromise, but in the same direction.
The continuous and discontinuous are both at work and inseparable.595
The text operates, in this sense, as only a proffering, a sketch, a call – as a sense which is not
present at hand but is coming to be there, it is a proposition, a hailing. The poetic subject
exists only in the encounter of a face to face meeting of reader and writer, an “I” in relation
to a “you”, in the sense Karl Bühler proffers in respect to his understanding of deixis as
reception signals – what causes “the gaze to turn...and the result is a reception”.596
A text is a point of departure, not a point of arrival. It is a text because it is, on the
translinguistic level, that which a I-here-now is on the linguistic level, namely a
shifter, indefinitely metaphorizable, indefinitely bearer of the relation with a reader
who is always new, despite the aging of language.597
594 Meschonnic, “Rhyme and Life”, 92.
595 Meschonnic, “Interview”, 102.
596 Karl Bühler, Theory of Language, trans. Donald Fraser Goodwin (Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company, 2011), 122.
597 Henri Meschonnic, “Texts on Translation”, trans. Anthony Pym, Target 15, no. 2 (2003): 337.
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This is the sense of those face to face forms Susan Stewart traces whose meaning cannot be
divorced from how they are articulated, how they have been framed: “Deixis fuses form,
expression, and theme as one event in place and time – the inseparability of frame and
context in deictic forms is evident in the impossibility of paraphrasing or abstracting
them”.598 It is the singular thisness of the text’s rhythm which strangely makes for its
openness – its being extended to unknown others: “The form creates or defines its location
and the listener, viewer, or apprehender finds his or her position in established in relation to
the concrete determinants of the form – everything “matters” as an aspect of the
manifestation. In this way the artwork’s very specificity, its “finality of form”, enables its
context independence”.599 It is the finitude of form which allows for an infinite capacity of
generating sense, where each reading is a situated listening, an experience of sense-making
contingent upon a desubjectivisation – the paradox of the etho-poesis of a “poetic subject”,
given that listening is a sense sensed only in being towards ourselves. As Nancy puts it,
listening is to be on the “lookout for a subject, something (itself) that identifies itself by
resonating from self to self, in itself and for itself, hence outside of itself, at once the same as
and other than itself, one in the echo of the other”.600 Here is the formation of a subject as a
unity in and of diversity.
This rhythm, this signifiance which provokes a listening, “works outside or against the
notion of literary genre: poetry, novel, drama, essay, philosophical text”, if rhythm is
the subjectivisation of a system of discourse by a subject inventing itself in and
through its discourse, inventing a new historicity, the continuum of the poem does
not know the difference between genres. From this point of view, there is poem in
novels, plays and even in a so-called philosophical text if there is invention of the
subject, invention of historicity. It is in the inseparation of affect and concept that
meaning finds its power and invention. It is even because it holds a poem within it
that a novel is a novel and not a dime novel, and that a philosophical text is an
invention of thought and not a discourse on philosophy.601
The meaning resides not in a signified, a determined sense, where something is seen as
something, but it is the as which is brought forth. In bearing-forth a singular rhythm it is the
participation in movement that is being asked of the reader, where sense is made only in the
transitions between words, sentences, paragraphs etc. in the lateral internal relations of the
text. Meaning is not made into a static “thing”, but is to be bodied-forth by another down the
line, where they must suffer their own non-being in a sensing whose perception is a visibility
598 Susan Stewart, Fate of the Senses (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 156.
599 Ibid., 156.
600 Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening, 9.
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lined with invisibility, a touching lined with a tactic no-touching, a listening to articulated
silence
IV
What everybody takes to be intelligible is in fact not intelligible at all…When something becomes too
familiar it stops making sense. What is immediately accessible is bound to be lifeless.
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
An exaggeration which no longer measures itself against something given or presupposed, something
to which it could be reduced and which would account for its intelligibility is neither an indication of
truth nor a symptom of madness and delusion, it is neither thinking nor its opposite, rather it is
thinking as gesture
– Alexander García Düttmann, “Thinking as Gesture”
Gesture is that play of meaningfulness among words which cannot be defined in the formulas in the
dictionary, but which is defined in their use together; gesture is that meaningfulness which is moving,
in every sense of that word: what moves the words and what moves us.
– Blackmur, Language as Gesture
Another name to add to the collection of heteronyms to describe the gesture of writing as a
practice of criticism, could be that experimentum linguae otherwise known as the essay, in
the manner Theodor Adorno comes to read it, as a writing which adheres to the logic of
music, that is, to a sense characterised by its cohesion through tension – a sense that exists in
the singular attunement of its momentary jointure. What Adorno articulates, without
articulating it, is a proffering of the essay as an idio-local rhythm of sense, in the manner in
which it is a singular configuration, where the text is a collection of words, an assemblage
drawn together and apart where meaning resides in this singular structure.
All of its concepts are presentable in such a way that they support one another, that
each one articulates itself according to the configuration that it forms with the others.
In the essay discreetly separated elements enter into a readable context; it erects no
scaffolding, no edifice. Through their own movement the elements crystallise into a
configuration. It is a force field, just as under the essay’s glance every intellectual
artefact must transform itself into a force field.602
Here the meaning rests not in the words, but in the conferment of their being joined together,
articulating a singular correspondence in which their sense is constituted only para-tactically,
only through the lateral relations of their configuration, where they, as Nancy proffers in his
own consideration of rhythm, “respond to one another”, “refer to one another”.603
This is called rhythm, which in Greek is initially a configuration – quite simply, the
fact of not escaping into infinity but of coming back toward one’s self and of turning
602 Theodor Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, New German
Critique, No. 32 (1984), 161.
603 Nancy, The Pleasure of Drawing, 70.
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the division of space, the cut which opens it, into a curve that folds it without closing
it.604
The text’s sense operates in a referral of sense, in a sense of resonance, where, as Adorno
puts it, there is no ground set out in advance only the “grounding” of the text’s singular
taking-place – in the articulated transitions of a tensional sense:
the essay verges on the logic of music, the stringent and yet aconceptual art of
transition; it aims at appropriating for expressive language something that it forfeited
under the domination of a discursive logic which cannot be circumvented, but may
be outwitted in its own form by the force of an intruding subjective expression.605
Here sense is contingent upon the use of language, the discourse of a sense manifested in a
way akin to the one who comes to know through experience, through an engaged
involvement for a while, at a particular time, rather than an abstract theoretical knowledge. A
method comparable to, as Adorno sketches it,
the behaviour of a man who is obliged, in a foreign country, to speak that country’s
language instead of patching it together from its elements, as he did in school. He
will read without a dictionary. If he has looked at the same word thirty times, in
constantly changing contexts, he has a clearer grasp of it than he would if he looked
up all the word’s meanings.606
The essayer as the reader gleaning sense from a situated use, where words find their sense
not by being defined in advance, but by being taken up within a scene of unfolding sense,
where words turn back upon other words and disclose between them a silent realm of
possibility – a non-coincidental space for thinking.
The “scaffolding” of the essay, in this way, is a spatiofugal making, given that its structure is
obtained not from without, according to a model or plan measured in advance, but in the
singular measuring of sense from within – in an idio-local making of inhabiting a there for a
while, at a particular time. It is an articulation of an ecology of care, an, as Alan Bleakley has
coined it, “eco-logical” reflection, rather than “ego-logical”, where reflection is not modelled
on a constituted “I” reflecting on itself, but is the reflection of being absorbed in an
experience, what he comes to proffer as an aesthetic reflection:
The locus for reflection is then not “in” the individual (decontextualised), but ‘in’
the total event, involving the embedding of act in a context that itself guides or
moulds the act. Importantly, the reflective act can then be framed as a sensitivity –
604 Ibid., 70.
605 Ibid., 169.
606 Adorno, “The Essay as Form”, 161.
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an aesthetic event rather than a functional or technical adjustment (the Greek
aesthesis means ‘sense awareness’).607
It is in this sense that writing from within is an articulation not from a self who is the director
of the situation, but its participant. Rather than an identity of “designer”, here is the design of
a Dasein involved in a making in the jointed time of a present presenting itself, in the non-
coincidence of an on-going shifting situation where past and future press on the scene of
writing. It corresponds to what Bleakley calls a “reflection-as-action”, as distinct from
“reflection-on-action”, and “reflection-in-action”, which both suppose a separate subject and
“are both open to technical-rational programming and can be readily defined as skills.
Reflection-as-action is rather a play of sensitivity within a habitat, based on immediacy, and
is not open to formulation as a taught skill. It is rather a mode of being grounded in passion
and body rather than cognition and mind”.608
It is as a reflexive text that Réda Bensmaia comes to define “the essay” too, as a form which
cannot be surmised in advance of its singular taking-place: “if an Essay cannot be
summarised or translated into terms other than those it presents, it is because the procedure
at the origin of its ‘objects’ designates less a form than an activity, less a structure than a
structuration”.609 Rather than an immobile form given in advance, the writing from within is
a singular manifestation which adheres not to systematisation but to the revealing-disclosing
play of language which cannot be divorced from its situated articulation, and yet is not
congealed “in” this situation.
Writing from within, in this sense, cannot be controlled or willed, but is the capacity to hold
out in a sense that is arriving, without forcing, but engaging in our impotentiality as
Agamben would have it, the inconnu as Meschonnic puts it, which is involuntary – the
“unknown in the subject which makes the poem, the rhythm”.610 What it involves is an
engagement in a capacity to see something as something, in a bodying-forth sense – the
projecting not from an “I”, but in being cast and undergoing the passion of this sense that is
always between, in a tension of what has been and is not yet. The writer is the collector who
inhabits that position between, bodying-forth as a gestalt which participates in every gestalt,
as Merleau-Ponty would have it – the “central hinge or a pivot which is openness to”.611
607 Alan Bleakley, “From Reflective Practice to holistic Reflexivity”, Studies in Higher Education 24,
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“turning about the text as if it were an anamorphosis, thus prompting the appearance not of
its signified but of its transversal reflection – what it reflects ‘obliquely’, as Montaigne
would say”.612 The emphasis on this writing from within, as a sense being inhabited in a
being in-between, is on the transitions as Hejinian articulates it, where the “eco-logical”
sense resides:
That, indeed, is the function of logics; they motivate the moving rather than on the
places – poetry follows pathways of thinking and it is that that creates patterns of
coherence. It is at points of linkage – in contexts of encounter, at what Andre Breton
called points sublime – that one discovers the reality of being in time, of taking one’s
chance, of becoming another, all with the implicit understanding that this is
happening.613
As Hejinian puts it: “The writer works from the inside out, but never gets out, partially
because she can’t and partially because, in any case, she doesn’t want to”.614 Rather than a
tool through which something is said, language is used as a medium for experiencing
experience; perceiving perception; thinking thinking. It is this inhabiting language from
within which necessitates a constant reinvention of form, where the efficacy of the writing
resides precisely in its being an experience of language as much for the writer, as for the
reader, in its (im)potential taking-place. As she states in relation to certain insights on the
relation between perceiving and writing, “…I want to make it clear that I learned most of
these things by writing the poem, not in preparation for it, and that this perceiving from
within the writing…provides me with the necessity for writing”.615 Here the language is a
seeking a form and the form of a seeking – an invention of form in its taking-place, where
form is a force, a dynamics – “not a fixture but an activity”,616 which must, if it is to be a
form of life, of thinking, involve “more than the filling out of forms – the exercise of
formalities; it requires an invention of form”.617 In a writing from within, the text is a form
that arrives at itself, in the manner in which there is no distinct “object” which is perceptible
before the writing takes-place, but the perception of what the writing is about occurs in and
as the taking-place of the text – a perception which is only a visibility lined with an
invisibility. The text is an on-going sketching-out between what has been articulated and
what has not yet been articulated, working out what something is like through the movement
of its articulation – the incessant question being from where to where, and how to get there –
a question of transitioning.
612 Bensmaia, The Barthes Effect, xxx.
613 Hejinian, “Introduction”, The Language of Inquiry, 3.
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The material is gathered, laid out on a table say – accumulation upon accumulation. The
thoughts have been encountered, they brim and agitate, and yet you wait, hold off, not for
anything in particular, only perhaps the right beginning that will set the tone and begin to
give form to the mess – a key note that will set the arrangement, will establish the relations
between – begin to show connections both perceived and unseen. It is, then, always a
question of composition, of a certain fit, of articulation; the joint-work of drawing together
articles through division – spaces, commas, periods – the placement which breaks and joins
the flow. It is a question of configuration, where elements come together, join and meet
through the play of centripetal and centrifugal forces outside of your own control. It is a
question of rhythm, of course, of where to end the line, begin another paragraph, when to
introduce this concept, how to connect that here. A question of how to interrupt the action –
What marks the “essay”, in this sense, is its attempt to present not a logical judgement of a
cognisable object, but as Adorno would elsewhere articulate it, a judgementless synthesis,
where what is proffered is an attunement, rather than a definite “thing”.
The ‘play’ of music is play with logical forms as such, of positing, identity,
similarity, contradiction, whole, part, and the concentration of music is essentially
the power with which these forms articulate themselves in the material, in the
notes…The threshold between music and logic does not therefore lie with the logical
elements, but rather with their specific logical synthesis, the judgement. Music does
not know judgement, but rather synthesis of a different kind, a synthesis which
constitutes itself purely from the constellation [i.e. the particular configuration of
musical material], not from the predication, subordination, subsumption of its
elements. The synthesis also stands in relation to truth, but to a completely different
truth from apophantic truth…The reflections would have to terminate in a definition
like Music is the logic of judgementless synthesis.618
This incredible resonance with the essay form and its allusions to its coherence through a
logic of music, comes from Adorno’s unwritten work “Bethoven: The Philosophy of Music”
– an attempt which remained in the note-stage as sketches – fragments and notes toward
writing – never finding a configured form for their articulation. The editor of the post-
humously published sketches describes the collection as his attempt to configure such a
form, to “bring the kaleidoscope of material to a standstill”.619 The difficulty for Adorno, in
his inquiry, seemed to pertain not so much to what to say about music, but how – how to find
a judgementless synthesis for what we do not grasp but what grasps us:  “We do not
understand music – it understands us. This is as true for the musician as for the layman.
618 Theodor Adorno, Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund
Jephcott (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11.
619 Ibid., x.
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When we think ourselves closest to it, it speaks to us and waits sad-eyed for us to answer”.620
It was a question of how to find an adequate arrangement, a configuration.
It is a judgementless synthesis which he perhaps did achieve in another unfinished, though
closer to complete work, in his Aesthetic Theory. In a remark which bears allegiance to
Benjamin’s syntactic translation, and Meschonnic’s rhythmic rendering of form, Robert
Hullot-Kentor, translator and editor of the 1997 English version of the book, speaks in the
introduction to his attempt to retain the spatial organisation of the text, where the
major sections of the English text are divided only where the original divides. The
sentence structure and phrasing of the original were maintained wherever possible,
given the tremendous differences of English syntax from the original. All words
foreign to the original, including English words, occur here in italic. This translation,
however, took its lead not so much from the aim to copy the appearance of the
original, but rather from Adorno’s description of the hearing implicit to Mahler’s
music: an ‘amplitude of a hearing encompassing the far distance, to which the most
remote analogies and consequences are virtually present’. In Aesthetic Theory this
amplitude occurs…in the medium of concepts as their subterranean, dynamic
relations.621
Hullot-Kentor’s allegiance is to the possibilities of the text – what is not there as such, but is
the presence of absence in the text – what must, as he evokes, be listened to. And it is
precisely in the text’s parting-with itself, in the paradigmatic parataxis of its arrangement
that these relations are rendered – in the “density of insight” rather than “external
structure”.622 It is in the transitions articulated from within the writing in its movement that
the relations are rendered. As Hullot-Kentor learns in his inhabiting the text in translating,
the “sense”, or signifiance, exists not in a progressive argumentation, in propositional
statements, but in the propositional tension of the text’s internal relations, which “defines the
text’s – and its translation’s – particular vulnerability: the slightest slackening of intensity
threatens to dissolve the text into a miscellany”. What he attempts to preserve is precisely the
text’s tendency, its lack of ground other than the “intensity with which it draws on and
pushes against itself”.623 Whilst the thrust of the movement is forward, it proceeds
“concentrically” rather than in a linear progression.624
His effort to preserve the singularity of the form is in stark contrast to its initial rendering
into English in the 1984 edition where it was viewed, as Hullto-Kentor himself puts it, as “a
620 Ibid., xi.
621 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of





superstitiously imposed impediment that would only stymie the book’s consumption…the
1984 translation arrived on bookstore shelves divided into numbered chapters with main
headings and subheadings inserted in the text. Paragraph indentations were distributed
aribitrarily throughout, completing the image of a monodirectional sequence of topic
sentences that could be followed stepwise from chapter 1 through chapter 12. This
subordinated the text’s paratactical order to a semblance of progressive argumentation that
offered to present the book’s content conveniently”.625 The readability is reduced to the
schema of a form already known and the etho-poesis of the text’s singular rhythm is
nullified.
The rigorous, eventmental taking-place of language is, for Adorno, as it was for Meschonnic,
a political necessity – and to write to be understood, is simply to write under “the sign”, to
speak with Meschonnic – something Adorno echoes in a note entitled “Morality and style”:
“Only what they do not need first to understand, they consider understandable; only the word
coined by commerce, and really alienated, touches them as familiar”.626 A writing which
assembles itself otherwise, apart from a re-iteration of predictable “pre-existent patterns,
appears inconsiderate, a symptom of eccentricity, almost of confusion”.627 And in another
note “Memento”: “The prudence that restrains us from venturing too far ahead in a sentence,
is usually only an agent of social control, and so of stupefaction”.628 What Adorno seems to
point towards in this fragment is an attention to the rhythm of the text – the manner in which
words are bound together: “A word is seldom banal on its own: in music too the single note
is immune to triteness. The most abominable clichés are combinations of words…For in
them the brackish stream of stale language swill aimlessly, instead of being dammed up,
thrown into relief by the precision of the writer’s expressions. This applies not only to
combinations of words, but to the construction of whole forms”.629 The etho-poetic question
of the text concerns its arrangement, the organisation of its combinations. Indeed, such was
the struggle Adorno intimated in relation to his final incomplete(able) work, Aesthetic
Theory – a text configured in para-tactical form.
The essay above all perhaps, is a text which, like Benjamin’s reflective medium, contains a
germ – is a generative capacity – a language that calls other language into being through the
bound singularity of its rhythm of thinking.
625 Ibid., xiv.






My tendency is not to oppose poetry to philosophy, in the sense that these two experiences
both take place within language. The home of truth is language, and I would distrust any
philosopher who would leave it to others – philologists or poets – to look after this home. We
must take care of language.
– Agamben, “Thought is the Courage of Hopelessness”
An author who teaches a writer nothing, teaches nobody anything. The determinant factor is
the exemplary character of a production that enables it, first, to lead other producers to this
production, and secondly to present them with an improved apparatus for their use. And this
apparatus is better to the degree that it leads consumers to production, in short that it is
capable of making co-workers out of readers or spectators.
– Walter Benjamin “The Author as Producer”
Poetry may show us that when we sing to the subjectivity of the other, without determining that
subjectivity, this is politics.
– Henri Meschonnic, Ethics and Politics of Translating
The “form” of the essay, of a gesture of writing, of an experimentum linguae, of a writing
from within, is not, in this sense, a form as a static schema, but is the form as the singular
passage of a subject being put into play in language – the formation of a poetic subject
through the discourse of a situated rhythm of sense: “A rhythm is a sense if it is a passage of
a subject, the production of a form – disposition, configuration, organisation”.630 Rather than
cohering into a genre where it is subsumed under the logic of identity, this writing from
within escapes such generalisation, for it is defined only through its making a paradigm of
itself, of being only ever an identity-in-difference and a difference-in-identity – an analogical
singular as-such, each time, defined by its reflexivity, that is, its being in relation to itself,
existing for itself.
What the writing is “about” is not discernible but exists only in the going about, in the
movement itself between, and so is not a stable “thing” only the perception of similarity,
there is only a sense that must be sensed, that is, bodied-forth, for the synthesis it proffers is
that of a cohesion without concept – a certain judgementless synthesis of attunement through
tension. What is at stake is a thinking, a language of inquiry, which is not the expression of a
constituted subject’s willing, but the passionate undertaking of something being brought into
being – something entirely improbable and unforeseen in a making-room, an anticipative
understanding, where what is becomes what is not, what is not becomes what is; what is
closest most distant, most distant closest. Not an actual sense, but a possible one. The
gesture as the undergoing and bearing-out a sense that is being born in its taking-place,
630 Meschonnic, Critique du Rhythme, 83.
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producing, as Thomas Carl Wall puts it, “the imaginary…something like fiction, something
that remains only possibly intelligible”.631
The poetic subject does not exist “in” the text, nor does it exist “in” the one who wrote it, nor
even “in” the one who reads it, but only in the “in” of an inhabiting, where the sense is made
in the chiasm between writer-reader and text, in the between, the fold, of a thrown-
projection; in the re of a referral; in the resonance of a sense; in the relation of an as-such.
The roles are reversed. It is the reversibility of listening. The encounter takes place
in a moment where we relate to the infinite of history and to the infinite of meaning.
A voice hearing its own history, a voice speaking its history is heard as a recitative.
What we hear in it is not what it says but what it does. What it does to itself, to the
one speaking it, and also what it does to the one hearing it. It transforms. It does
what we do not know to be hearing. The work of listening is to recognise at certain
moments, unpredictably, all we did not know we were hearing. The mouth to ear
becomes the mouth to mouth.632
What is the transformational quality of the poetic subject is, for Agamben, what he comes to
call the developmental capacity of the text – that articulated emptiness within what is said,
that tension of difference, that fold of divergence, that ruthmos, which is the philosophical
element that makes room for further thinking – its etho-poetic effect if you like.
If a work, be it a work of science or art or scholarship has some value, it will contain
this philosophical element. It is something which remains unsaid within the work but
which demands to be unfolded and worked out. By the way I think this is a very
good definition of philosophy. Philosophy has no specificity, no proper territory, it is
within literature, within art or science or theology or whatever, it is this element
which contains a capability to be developed. In this sense philosophy is scattered in
every territory. It is always a diaspora, and must be recollected and gathered up.633
These texts gather into their saying an incapacity to say, an incompleteness that is not the
flaw of writing, but its impotentiality. “This ignorance names the supreme art of writing, to
allow something to remain as a potential so the reader can develop it”.634 The text is, in its
structure of possibility, not the constructed end of a thought, but rather, its beginning – it is
an opening, a sketch – something which retains an inherent incompleteness not accidental to
its sense, but constitutive of it – indicative of the incapacity of language here not concealed,
not stepped over, but inhabited. A writing that cannot close, or end, but only interrupt itself,
631 Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity, 2.
632 Meschonnic, Ethics and Politics of Translating, 137.
633 Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Paradigm”, lecture presented at European Graduate School 2002,
www.file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Giorgio%20Agamben.%20What%20is%20a%20Paradigm..pdf.
This “developmental capacity” is a borrowing by Agamben from Feuerbach and is originally rendered
in the German as Entvicklungsfahigkeit, whose literal sense can be translated as “viability”.
634 Ibid.
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or be interrupted – a thinking held in suspension – a conflict momentarily halted rather than
completed in a synthetic synthesis.
It is in such a way that the schism between poetry and philosophy comes undone in an
experiment of language taking-place, an experimentum lingaue, whose purpose is not to
pursue or present a consumed or consumable thought, but for the writing itself to be an
articulation of a possibility of thinking, where the writer-reader’s own being is at stake
through their undergoing an experience of language in its taking-place.
What characterises gesture is that in it nothing is being produced or acted, but rather
something is being endured and supported. The gesture, in other words, opens the
sphere of ethos as the more proper sphere of that which is human.635
I call thought the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable context as
form-of-life. I do not mean by this the individual exercise of an organ or a psychic
faculty, but rather an experience, an experimentum that has as its object the potential
character of human life and of human intelligence. To think does not mean merely to
be affected by this or that thing, by this or that content of enacted thought, but rather
at once to be affected by one’s own receptiveness and experience in each and every
thing that is thought a pure power of thinking.636
In being delivered over to something that not only gives, but also refuses, the reader is given
a suggestion which must be borne-out, carried-through, in a sketching-out. It is a solicitous
making-room for another to inhabit the text from their own situated being-there – an
openness for a situated other to make sense of what is not overtly said, but gestured to,
sketched; a saying which leaves room for the play of your own singular being-there, your
own carrying-out and bearing a sense. It is only in the gag, the incapacity of a text, where the
pure possibility of undergoing an experience in language resides.
The Wittgenstenian definition of the mystic as the appearing of what cannot be said
is literally a definition of the ‘gag’. And every great philosophical text is the ‘gag’
exhibiting language itself, being-in-language itself as a gigantic loss of memory, as
an incurable speech defect.637
As the para-ergon to a work that is not written and cannot be written, the text itself does not
accomplish thought, but points towards it – its meaning must be developed by a reader who
inhabits, or allows themselves to be inhabited by, the white space of the page, in the
muteness and silence which underscores what is said. In this sense, the words are a frame for
something that can’t be articulated directly and the task of the reader is to listen to rhythm,
635 Agamben, “Notes on Gesture”, Means Without Ends, 57.
636 Agamben, “Form-of-Life”, Means Without End, 9.
637 Agamben, “Notes on Gesture”, Means Without End, 59.
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rhythm being that which is not heard but is the articulated silence, the stanza of a reading
room, in the imaginative task of coming to read what was never written.
What the work opens us onto is the manner in which we are still undecided beings – those
who always have their existence to be regardless of all the numerous schemas of existence
we have subscribed to. Such is the radicality of reading – an encounter that can throw you
into a groundlessness that destroys your very way of being and forces you to question who
you are. The etho-poetic text opens you onto this space beside yourself – the impotentiality
of your developmental capacity. It is in this sense that the philosophical element is truly the
text’s capacity, its room, to develop the one who encounters it, in the sense of creating a
situation where they must body-forth a sense, undergo an experience of impotentiality, where
they are othered to themselves in a not-knowing, in having to suffer their own non-being.
The developmental capacity engages this space beside you – this there that is still, always,
on-going, it casts you into a situation of having to tend towards yourself. What is at stake for
the writer-reader is undergoing and bearing forth sense from this not-knowing, this
impotentiality, and from it, letting something be.
Only when we succeed in...experiencing our own impotentiality do we become
capable of creating, truly becoming poets. And the hardest thing in this experience is
not the Nothing or its darkness, in which many nevertheless remain imprisoned; the
hardest thing is being capable of annihilating this Nothing and letting something,
from nothing, be.638
fold of the presence on which they are established: the logos, which characterises the
human as zoon logon echon (living thing using language), is this fold that gathers
and divides all things in the ‘putting together’ of presence. And the human is
precisely this fracture of presence, which opens a world and over which language
holds itself.639
The reading room is the thinking space, in this sense, not as the thinking about something,
but as thinking the nothing, being confronted by the not-knowing of being thrown, the
impotential of not-seeing, where there is a holding-back, a restraint on knowing.
In order for it to be an experience of thinking, thought cannot have simply passed into an act;
in order for communication to be an experience of sense it cannot have simply passed into
what is said – we can think and communicate only through what remains potential, in
ourselves as in others, that is, our impotentiality, our radical passivity, our not-thinking
thrownness. “We can communicate with others only through what in us – as much as in
others – has remained potential, and any communication (as Benjamin perceives for
638 Agamben, “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, Potentialities, 253.
639 Agamben, Stanzas, 156.
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language) is first of all communication not of something in common but of communicability
itself”.640
The sign of the etho-poetic text is the extent to which it is inclusive of that which never
ceases from not-writing itself, in order for it to be readable, for it to be an experience of
potentiality. Such is the desubjectivising of etho-poesis, of a truth that is “without truth, for
truth is what is at issue in them”.641 The reader must inhabit the threshold of the text,
dwelling in its dark potentiality – being neither here nor there, but caught in the chiasm of
being grasped and attempting to grasp, being thrown and attempting to cast – the hyphenated
reality of being-there – in a suspended time within time.
In his own ruminations on rhythm, Agamben comes to read it as that “principle of presence”
which opens the work “in its original space. As such it is nether calculable nor rational; yet it
is also not irrational, at least in the purely negative meaning this word is commonly
understood to have. On the contrary, precisely because rhythm is that which causes the work
of art to be what it is, it is also Measure and logos (ratio) in the Greek sense of that which
gives everything its proper station in presence”.642 The rhythm of the work throws us out of
the chronometrically measurable succession of instants, into the more “original time” – that
of an ec-stasis, a “being arrested…being-outside”.643 What rhythm throws us to is our
thrownness, the impotential potentialilty of one who does not project sense but is projected –
one whose being is at stake, is an issue, in the poesis of a making-room. “In this authentic
temporal dimension, the poetic status of man on earth finds its proper meaning. Man has on
earth a poetic status, because it is poesis that founds for him the original space of his
world…Only because he attains, in the poetic act, a more original temporal dimension is he a
historical being, for whom, that is, at every instant his past and future are at stake”.644 In the
manifestation of a poetic subject, the writer occupies and is occupied by the gap of a time in
its taking-place, the non-coincidence between what is said and the saying itself, which places
their being into question – throwing them into this relation towards their existence that is
still outstanding. The reader in turn comes to occupy this gap of a sense that is not fully
present, but the presence of an absence – the relation that is also a suture – the gathering that
is also a separating. Their task is to occupy this reading room as a staging that must take-
place, singularly such, each time – to become the opening for a sense that has begun, is
640 Agamben, Means Without End, 10.
641 Agamben, “Bartleby, or On Contingency”, Potentialities, 260.
642 Agamben, “On the Original Structure of the Work of Art”, Man Without Content, trans. Giorgia




sketched, and at the same time, must begin, must be sketched-out. The poetic subject is the
gift of the present instance of discourse to the reader – between what has been and is not-yet.
The reading room is a space of suspension, a stanza, a halting place, a time within time,
interrupting the identity of an ego where the reader must be desubjectivised – occupying the
place of emptiness for the presencing of a sense that is not simply present, but on the way.
The reading room is a gift which gives and holds back, for what it proffers is only the
experience of (im)potentiality – the experience of being towards one’s self. The reading
room is, thus, an originary architectonics in the sense Agamben proffers as the poesis of
origin – “the gift of the original space of man”645 – that which throws us back into relation
with this one beneath you who has been carrying you through – not what “I” know, but what
she knows.
The reader, in this sense, is not one who comes after the text is written, but is a structure
operative within the text, as the split of a “there” in a jointure where it is only through what it
is not. The sense resides in the subtle showing, rather than what is directly said, a deictic
demonstration that comes to pass, tied to a situated articulation, to the hyphenation of its
taking-place. Here is her understanding which exists only in the attuned jointure, in the
participative sense that is always in-between – never solidifying into a distinct signified but a
sense that is constantly being worked-out through the non-coincidence of what has been
articulated and what is not-yet articulated – the articulated silence, the gaps in-between. She
a reader of that which is never written.
*
In his text, the writer sets up house. Just as he trundles papers, books, pencils, documents untidily
from room to room, he creates the same disorder in his thoughts. They become pieces of furniture that
he sinks into, content or irritable. He strokes them affectionately, wears them out, mixes them up, re-
arranges, ruins them. For a man who no longer has a homeland, writing becomes a place to live. In it
he inevitably produces, as his family once did, refuse and lumber. But now he lacks a store-room, and
it is hard in any case to part from left-overs. So he pushes them along in front of him, in danger finally
of filling his pages with them. The demand that one harden oneself against self-pity implies the
technical necessity to counter any slackening of intellectual tension with the utmost altertness, and to
eliminate anything that has begun to encrust the work or to drift along idly, which may at an earlier
stage have served, as gossip, to generate the warm atmosphere conducive to growth, but is now left
behind, flat and stale. In the end, the writer is not even allowed to live in his writing.




If there is an ideality, a thought that has a future in me, that even breaks through my space of
consciousness and has a future with the others, and finally, having become a writing, has a future in
every possible reader, this can be only that thought that leaves me with my hunger and leaves them
with their hunger, that betokens a generalised buckling of my landscape and opens it to the universal,
precisely because it is rather an unthought. Ideas that are too much possessed are no longer ideas
– Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible
Whoever wants to understand something verbal in a hermeneutical manner must constantly attend to
what is tacitly meant, though not openly expressed...and avoid the potentially objectivising view of
language that confines it to the purely logical content of what is stated
– Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics
It is this developmental capacity, this etho-poesis which characterises those texts which,
though they have been read to death it seems, continue to be readable, for their function is
not to deliver a content of thought, but to choreograph a situation of thinking. And so a text
like Being and Time can be considered such a writing from within. As Heidegger himself
understood it, the work was not a thought to be consumed, but a sense that had to be
inhabited in order to signify. Such a writing from within he himself rendered “gesturally” by
calling it a method of “formal indication” – a sense that is not “present” in the text, but a
sense that exists only in being set in motion, in its enactment character.
The formal indication is intended primarily as an advance indication of the relational
sense of the phenomenon, in a negative sense at the same time as a warning! A
phenomenon must be pre-given in such a way that its relational sense is held in
suspense. One must guard against assuming that its relational sense is originally
theoretical. This is a position that opposes the sciences in the extreme. There is no
insertion into a content-domain, rather the opposite: the formal indication is a
warding off, a preliminary protection, so that the enactment character remains
free.646
Heidegger’s formal indication can be understood as an attempt to open up a space between
what regular words have been taken to be and what they can signify – creating a gap between
sign and signification, where the relational sense is held in suspension, that is, the as is not
covered over, but exposed. Everyday words are emptied-out of their regular sense and only
sketched, awaiting another to come to inhabit them from within their own language of
inquiry. What the “there” means, what “time” means, what “understanding” means, are not
the conceptual strata of a system, but are only indicative and must take-place in order to
signify, suspended as they are in the relational “as-such”. In this way, they are akin to
“symbols” in Panikkar’s sense, or deixis, which signify only from within a situated taking-
place – there for a while, at a particular time – their sense contingent on the trans of  being
646 Martin Heidegger quoted in S.J. McGrath, “The Logic of Indirection in Heidegger and Acquinas”,
The Heythrop Journal 54, no. 2 (2013): 280.
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carried-out, borne by a Dasein and in this way are etho-poetic, implicative of their
possibility, their issue of being.
The whole connection between authentic and inauthentic existence, between the
moment of vision and the absence of such a moment, is not something present at
hand which transpires within man, but one which belongs to Dasein. We can only
understand the concepts that open up this connection as long as they are not taken to
signify characteristic features or properties of something present at hand, but are
taken rather as indications that show how our understanding must first twist free
from our ordinary conception of beings and properly transform itself into the Da-
sein in us.647
It is an understanding which takes-place only in movement, only in the transition of its
taking-place. The reader is prompted to undergo an experience of Being and Time, in the
sense of having to bear-forth its sense.
To undergo an experience with something – be it a thing, a person, or a god – it
means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and
transforms us. When we talk of ‘undergoing’ an experience, we mean specifically
that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure
it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that
comes about, comes to pass, happens. To experience something means to attain it
along the way, by going along a way. To undergo an experience with something
means that this something, which we reach along the way in order to attain it, itself
pertains to us, meets and makes its appeal to us, in that it transforms us into itself.648
To understand Heidegger’s sketch of Dasein is to be prompted to undergo a reading of it, a
sense that must be participated in, bodied-forth, from within your own situated being-there.
To understand it is to stand in the same world differently. What, in this sense, has been
called a great tome of philosophy is, after-all, only a mere sketch seeking to be sketched-out.
647 Heidegger, Being and Time, 296.
648 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins,
1971), 57.
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TOWARDS A LANGUAGE OF INQUIRY
You see, that’s why I work like a dog and I worked like a dog all my life. I am not interested in the
academic status of what I am doing because my problem is my own transformation...This
transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the
aesthetic experience.
– Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy and Culture: Interviews and Other Writings
The question of the world did not occur at the beginning of time, it occurs every day.
– Marcel Proust, Rememberance of Things Past
The activity of thinking is as relentless and repetitive as life itself, and the question whether
thought has any meaning at all constitutes the same unanswerable riddle as the question for
the meaning of life; its processes permeate the whole of human existence so intimately that
its beginning and end coincide with the beginning and end of human life itself; is processes
permeate the whole of human existence so intimately that its beginning and end coincide
with the beginning and end of human life itself.
– Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
The present is our greatest (im)possibility – inhabiting the gap of a non-coincidence, a
parting-with, taking up home in the uncomfortable zone between what has been and is not
yet. Such was the home in homelessness Arendt proffered for thinking as the time within
time needed for a critical conscience. Thinking is that which, as Arendt depicts it, is
interruptive – it forces a pause, a gap in the incessant doing, a removal from the day to day
existence and the inhabiting of a parenthetical pocket to the das Man – entering into a time
within time wherein a relation to the world can be established, where the necessary distance
can be gained in order to see it as something – something otherwise than we’ve taken it to
be. For, in this withdrawal, what is taken a distance from too is the ordinary language as it is
being used and schematised. In the time within time, time is taken to say something
otherwise than how it is being articulated – the phrases, the blocks of ways of saying, which
broker us against the strange ordinariness of what can’t be captured in any word.
Thinking as the inhabiting of a gap, is, as Arendt sketches it, the task of each generation,
each individual, to be worked out for themselves – a care of the self which must be sketched-
out anew by each new generation, by each beginner cast into having been begun into the
world. This gap is, as Arendt depicts it in Life of the Mind,
the region of the spirit…the path paved by thinking, the small inconspicuous track of
non-time beaten by the activity of thought within the time-space given to natal and
mortal men. Following that course, the thought-trains rememberance and
anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical
time. This small non-time space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the
culture into which we are born, cannot be inherited and handed down by tradition,
although every great book of thought points to it somewhat cryptically – as we found
Heraclitus saying of the notoriously cryptic and unreliable Delphic oracle:…(‘it does
not say and it does not hide, it intimates’). Each new generation, every new human
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being, as he becomes conscious of being inserted between an infinite past and an
infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought. And it
is after all possible, and seems to me likely, that the strange survival of great works,
their relative permanence throughout thousands of years, is due to their having been
born in the small inconspicuous track of non-time which their author’s thought had
beaten between an infinite past and an infinite future by accepting past and future as
directed, aimed, as it were, at themselves – as their predecessors and successors,
their past and their future – thus establishing a present for themselves, a kind of
timeless time in which men are able to create timeless works with which to
transcend their own finitudes.649
The time within time is a time aimed towards its own singularised taking-place, that is, for
the sake of itself. Thinking, in this sense, is characterised not by the production of certain
utilitarian “outputs”, but only begins to “assert itself”, when, as Arendt sketches it in The
Human Condition, the thinker overreaches themselves, and produces “useless things, objects
which are unrelated to material or intellectual wants, to man’s physical needs, no less than to
his thirst for knowledge”.650 In contrast, cognition is that which is always driven towards an
end-point, it is a process with a determinant beginning and end, rather than a dwelling in the
midst, and whose “usefulness can be tested” and thus, as such, can fail if it “produces no
results”.651 Cognition is ends-directed, thinking, in contrast, exists only for itself, it “has
neither an end nor an aim outside of itself, and it does not even produce results; not only the
utilitarian philosophy of homo faber but also the men of action and the lovers of results in
the sciences have never tired of pointing out how entirely ‘useless’ thought is”.652 Its purpose
is, perhaps, only the undergoing of experience – an intensification of living itself. In this
respect, it is telling that, above all, Arendt comes to understand thinking as coming closest to
itself in poetry – that art of recollection attributable to, as she proffers, “Mnemosyne, the
mother of the muses”653 – the goddess of memory who is, as Heidegger was want to remind
us, the daughter of earth and sky – hers the measure of the in-between, and a recollection
characterised above all, as Arendt would have it, by rhythm – that through which the life of
recollection lives on.
The recollecting of Mnemosyne is evoked by Agamben in his essay on Aby Warburg, in
which he reads a dark nameless method of an inquiry which dwells in the schism between
poetry and philosophy.






Perhaps the fracture that in our culture divides poetry and philosophy, art and
science, the word that ‘sings’ and the word that ‘remembers’, is nothing other than
one aspect of the very schizophrenia of Western culture that Warburg recognised  in
the polarity of the ecstatic nymph and the melancholic river god. We will be truly
faithful to Warburg’s teaching if we learn to see the contemplative gaze of the god in
the nymph’s dancing gesture and if we succeed in understanding that the word that
sings also remembers and the one that remembers also sings. The science that will
truly take hold of the liberating knowledge of the human will truly deserves to be
called by the Greek name of Mnemosyne.654
In Warburg’s work with the image, Robertson comes to read his inquiry as an attempt to
trace the irregularity of transformational process whereby
he foregrounded transitional periods, such as the Florentine quattrocentro, as
matrices of intense historical activity hinging on a kind of innovation that was
unopposed to a problematised continuity. It was the dynamic movement of life itself
that Warburg sought in the image and its stylistic developments and borrowings: the
late 19th century language of vitalism, so present in the thought of Nietszche,
Richard Semon, Bergson, strongly inflected Warburg’s methods of research as well
as that research’s subjects and figures.655
A dynamic movement which, as Roberton comes to trace it, was modelled on the spatial
figure of the ellipse: “the irregularly curving movement traced by the planets on their various
orbits around the sun” and the figure on which Warburg modelled the design of his library –
Mnemeosyme – his thinking space, his reading room, “the traffic island of the thoughtful”.656
What seems to possess Robertson’s attention in Warburg’s work was his interest in
movement, not simply as the content of his inquiry, but as the movement of that inquiry itself
– one of a strange discontinuous-continuity. At the time of the construction of Warburg’s
elliptical reading room, he was himself involved in a construction of his own – the panels
which would form the Mnemosyne Atlas – and which had an in-built place within the shelves
of the reading room itself, where they could be exhibited and shown in lectures: “there was a
lip built into the shelving for this purpose”.657 Yet the panels, as Robertson reads them, were
never merely illustrative teaching aids, but a staging of thinking. As montages of
“reproductions of various kinds of documents – maps, charts, documentation of sculptures,
frescos, ritual objects, paintings, drawings and news clippings” the “grouped images of each
panel function as a semantic circulation; they are stages, in the theatrical sense of the
word...”.658 Such a staging was an attempt, as Robertson reads it, to capture “the movement
654 Agamben, “Aby Warburg and the Nameless Science”, Potentialities, 100.





of complex historical explorations into the tropes of renewal, and life in motion”.659 The
panels are not, in this sense, secondary discursive aids, but each one a staging of gesture and
itself a staged gesture – a “material concept setting out a proposition about the movement of
ideas”,660 where each panel speaks to “knowledge in flux”. Robertson reads the panels then,
as “active sites of experimental thinking”.661
Above all, the elliptical movement is what Robertson comes to understand as “time itself”, in
the lived, experiential time, where
it wobbles, its centre shifts, it doesn’t pertain to hierarchy. The mode of rationality of
the irregular curve called the ellipse is fundamentally dangerous...it falls short of
predictability. The word itself comes from the Greek term for chasm or gap.
Warburg called the ellipse a space for thinking, and for him his library with its
elliptical hub was a lantern, and it was an observatory.662
The ellipse is better understood as the play of a force which cannot be named as such, the
dark body of a nameless science, as Agamben would have it. As Robertson quotes from
Sarduy’s conception of the ellipse, “now the reigning figure is no longer the circle, with its
single center, radiating, shining, paternal, but the ellipse, which opposes this visible focus
with another focus, equally active, equally real, but blocked, dead, nocturnal, a blind center,
the opposite of the solar, germinating yang: absent”.663 Mnemosyne then, as a reading room,
a space of recollecting in the gap of a time that is only in relation to what is not; a thinking in
relation to not-thinking; a presencing with absence; a singularised, unpredictable, attuned
jointure; a space-time of a situated metron of a making-room; a spatiofugal formation from
within; a singular configuration subject to change.
Robertson ends her essay by drawing us into the scene of her own thinking, its situated
articulation, where ideas are recollected in the gathering of a cohesion without concept, in
the gesture of a judgementless synthesis.
As for me, at this moment I write in a Paris hotel room, with papers and index cards
spread across the bed, and my computer propped up on one pillow. The desk is too
small. It’s a fifth story room and I look through ruffled tulle curtains across mansard
roofs. I’ve brought in my bag Frances Yate’s Art of Memory (Yates was a lifelong
member of the Warburg Institute), Thomas Bernhard’s Correction, which is itself
about the space of thinking as error, my battered red Carlyle, a large grey Muji
notebook I used for transcription in the Warburg archive, and many coloured index







taken, in my own way, Didi-Huberman’s description of Warburg’s method for the
Atlas – I keep moving ideas on a surface until there’s a fit, an energy, an engram-like
stimulus. But the fit isn’t about a collapse of ideas into one another, nor is it a chain
of causation or even influence. It’s about the charge of a distance, a tension.664
*
Etho-poetic thinking is not an abstract philosophical rumination, nor is it a “poetic” dally, it
is the critical stanza of a space of suspension, a halting place, a time within time, and a
thinking that takes time, dwelling in the doing, un-doing of an on-going inhabiting, making a
rhythm and room of one’s own; a thinking not purposeful – what is for something, nor
purposeless – what is not for anything, but a thinking whose only purpose is for itself, that is,
for entering into dialogue with the one beneath who carries you through, this inappropriable
daimon who constitutes your ethos, the abode where you abide only in relation to non-being.
Care of the self then, not as a practice of self-absorption, nor self-renunciation, but as the
critical practice of desubjectivisation – of entering into the solitude of a saying that
converses with itself; entering into the expropriation of a removal from the small mindedness
and pettiness of ego-centricism, into an ecological “Care” for being-in-the-world; connected,
yet distinct, in an attuned jointure with others, taking on a language that is and is not your
own – sketching-out an articulation that cannot equate with the on-going suchness of the
world. The “art” of an etho-poetic thinking is an attempt to exist for the sake, not of this or
that external prestige or gain, but for the sake of one’s self – attempting to inhabit the limits
of this situated being-there – making one’s existence one’s own in the short passage between
birth and death, unfolding in an improvisation of a language of inquiry, rather than the
schema of identity.
Etho-poetic thinking is a vocation, a call, which attempts to take care of one’s self, to protect
one’s self, not in the immunity of an “I”, but in the preservation of one’s own otherness – the
inappropriable strangeness which is the potentiality of a thinking-as-living, a form-of-life –
yearning and seeking, in a desire not to know, but to undergo an experience, in order, simply,
to be able to live, by accepting that we are able to die – not as an abstract event, but as the
shadow of our day, the dark body of our own impotentiality.
Etho-poetic thinking is not a reproducible method – its character of truth, as Foucault notes,
is recognised only by its difference, contingent, as it is, on saying not what something is but
what it is like from within a given situation, in an inquiry not divorced from one’s being, but
implicative of it. It is in this articulation in which the as is not presupposed, but exposed, that
664 Ibid., 40.
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a language of inquiry calls another into being – its dissimilitude, its silence, seeking another
to sketch-out what was not-said – seeking a correspondence with another whose own
language itself becomes a call, which itself seeks a response. A chain of continuous dialogue
which rests upon a certain ability to read what was never written – to become attuned to the
tactic of the tacit that must be sensed, rather than cognitively known, to undergo an
experience of (im)potentiality, of being-thrown. Listening to the call contingent on an ability
to attend, to become attuned to the milieu, the Stimmung, to the opening of what is said.
*
Whilst this thesis has spoken and argued for the situational historicity of an understanding, it
has not mentioned or gestured to its own situated historicity. And yet, perhaps it has,
implicitly, for to dwell on the question of what makes for an etho-poetic thinking is a direct
response to the contemporary malaise of an unpoetic dwelling, of a forgetfulness of a
language of inquiry, a care of the self, both within the university and outside it. The effort
has been, thus, an oblique critique of our contemporary situation, according to that approach
intimated by Heidegger when he said:
That we dwell unpoetically, and in what way, we can in any case learn only if we
know the poetic. Whether, and when, we may come to a turning point in our
unpoetic dwelling is something we may expect to happen only if we remain heedful
of the poetic. How and to what extent our doings can share in this turn we alone can
prove, if we take the poetic seriously.665
The jargon of learning outcomes which inquiry is currently being submitted to resides only
on the side of visibility; of actualisable potential; of accumulation and attainment; of
continuous activity. Whilst the impulse of study remains unquenched in our time, it is being
fostered and fed in a climate where the pearl of study is dimmed, and an inquiry whose only
purpose is for itself, replaced by the demonstrable purpose.
What is in danger of being lost perhaps, in our current milieu, is the beauty of study, its art –
the strange dissolution it operates in the inaccessibility of an encounter, in a xenos
experience where we are moved towards the radical depropriation of unknowing; the
political and ethical possibility of radical desubjectification – study as a giving one’s self
over to being otherwise, where its greatest “potential” lies in its inaccessibility, in an
invisible realm which cannot be brought out into the light of learning outcomes, or be made a
product of. Etho-poetic thinking cannot be result-oriented, or defined through “learning
outcomes”, as it is a thinking which is not causally determined, but as a gesture, is a thinking
665 Heidegger, “Poetically Man Dwells”, 226.
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determined by its tending towards, by the indeterminability of the future. It can only be
recognised by its similarity.
Perhaps what is beginning to mark our contemporary attempts at inquiry is what Arendt
proffered as a thoughtlessness. Thoughtlessness was, for Arendt, the defining feature of the
times she lived in – something captured in her infamous phrase “the banality of evil”, where
she came to perceive the actions of Eichmann not as those of a monster, but as bathed in the
ordinariness of a certain thoughtlessness, accomplished, significantly, through the manner in
which his language was only ever a repetition of the official speech of the Nazi apparatus, as
Arendt bore witness to at his trial, noting how, he “repeated word for word the same stock
phrases and self-invented clichés (when he did succeed in constructing a sentence of his
own, he repeated it until it became a cliché) each time he referred to an incident or event of
importance to him”.666 The language of this apparatus effectively shielded Eichmann from
confronting his own otherness in having to take on a language that is and is not his own, of
having to sketch-out a situated sense of articulation. In the on-going repetition of already
established stock phrases, the uncanninness of language, and thus his own questionability,
was effectively covered over. What characterised Eichman’s thoughtlessness, for Arendt,
was not that he was stupid, but that he didn’t think – he didn’t enter into dialogue with the
stranger beneath him, was, to all intents and purposes, not in a relationship of “Care”
towards his own existence.
It is perhaps this thoughtlessness of language which marks our own time, the alienation of
which Agamben spoke, in which it is being reduced to the repetition of stock phrases in the
framing of all inquiry, both in how it is anticipated – what outcomes, outputs, results it will
have, and how it has been carried out – missing the mark entirely of that space in-between in
which any language of inquiry actually lives.
What an etho-poetic thinking proffers to counter this thoughtlessness, is perhaps only the
thoughtfulness of gesture – what we acknowledge in the gifting of others which isn’t
something, but the facticity of something, (even if it is a nothing), being given.
We say that it is a “nice gesture” to give a gift or remember to telephone a sick
friend. The thing done may involve statements, but it is also framed as a statement in
itself. It is not the gift, or what is said on the phone, but ‘the thought’ (that is, the
gesture) that counts. Perhaps gesture is best understood as the moment when thought
666 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin
Books, 1963), 49.
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becomes visible, tangible, or palpable, staged and framed as form – something to be
held and to hold us in mutual prehension.667
It is, perhaps, only when thought becomes gesture that we are truly thinking, attempting not
to say what something “is”, but dwelling in the gag that lets something be shown, as such.
Gesture, then, a thinking as thoughtfulness – an attempt to give articulation to the world not
in an effort to appropriate it, but to show it as such, in the enigma of its dissimilitude, in the
chiaroscuro of its analogical is and is not. The gesture arises both from this necessary
solitude and withdrawal which divorces the self from their social role, and allows them to
inhabit a space of imagination in its strong sense; of possibility, in its impotential sense.
Here the self addresses their own being, sends themselves towards themselves, by inhabiting
their “two-in-oneness”, as Arendt would have it. And yet this two operates not as two
established identities which converse, but more as the movement of a conversing which lets
itself be taken by its own impotential, in the inhabiting of language’s solitude and
withdrawal. Here it is a case not of two established things but a reversible topology, a milieu
of relational forces, where the inhabiting of a gap involves being inhabited by a gap. The
etho-poetic thinker is the one who interrupts themselves – the trajectory of a life tending
towards death – they interrupt this, and dwell for a while in a thinking space, in a gap – the
parenthetical suspended time – these unnecessary remarks in brackets, these pockets, these
folds of time. The etho-poetic thinks beside, introducing a differential, complicating life
from within – the par-ergon workers who, in their making, create a relation to their life they
didn’t know was lacking.
Gesture names, thus, the zone of indeterminacy which is the inhabiting of a thinking, an
inquiry, which advances only insofar as it retreats; the movement of a reversing which
characterises learning as Benjamin would have it. “‘At mysteries and sacrifices, among
Greeks as well as barbarians’, writes Plutarch, ‘it is taught that there must be two primary
essences and two opposing forces, one of which points to the right and straight ahead,
whereas the other turns around and drives back’”.668 And it is such a reversing movement
which “transforms existence into writing”.669 The reflection comes in an essay where
Benjamin reads the defining feature of Kafka’s work, as the gestus, which he both
understands, and does not understand: “Kafka could understand things only in the form of a
gestus, and this gestus which he did not understand constitutes the cloudy part of parables.
667 W.J.T. Mitchell, “The Poetics of Sign Language”, preface to Signing the Body Poetic, ed. Dirksen
Baumen, Heidi Rose, Jennifer Nelson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), xxi.
668 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka”, Illuminations, 134.
669 Ibid., 134.
216
Kafka’s writings emanate from it”.670 The essay ends with a consideration of the gestus of
the “students” who appear in Kafka’s work as spokespeople for a clan who reckon with “the
brevity of life in a peculiar way”.671
*
Music, we could say, is one of the forms that the unconstruable question assumes, as an irreducible
otherness it resists full explication by rational argument and remains a question that must always pose
itself one more time.
– Ernst Bloch, Sound Figures of Modernity: German Music and Philosophy.
An etho-poetic thinking an attempt to reclaim the calling of Stimmung, from out of its
contemporary deafness – being that we are those “absolutely non-musical” people, “without
Stimmung, without, that is, a calling”672 – a calling not to be this, or that, but to be the
plenitude of emptiness of being-there, “the scoring in the soul of the inaccessibility of the
origin”.673
An etho-poetic thinking an attempt to claim, for its calling, an art of fugue, unfolding as a
melody that cannot be made to say anything, apart from its own facticity, its own strange
suchness, in the singularised rhythm of an arising and passing, a coming and going;
repeating a flow that we step and do not step in twice. Each singularised configuration a play
with the unconstruable question that has no mark, no final punctuation, but exists like an
asking played continuously through us – seeking not to take a naming, but to endlessly give
in resonating.
*
– here, hand withdrawn from the keyboard, fingers suspended – she could give herself back
to herself – to the assignment of being-there, without having to be this or that. Ending this
writing she could see the impossibility of her task, and realised, not unjoyously, that she
could cross out the words, score through all that had been written and stop writing – or
rather, now she could finally begin, returning to where she had never been.
670 Ibid., 125.
671 Ibid., 131.




She entered into it, something changed, not the situation, which remained the same, but the
milieu in which it was suspended – its possibility.  She owned each day in living it to its
limit – inhabiting each hour as if it was a large circle – its line her “I” only to discover at
each rounded hour not enclosure but a circling on. She came and went this way – the way
and going simultaneous. Letting the spiral loop around the emptiness of each hour, each
minute, each second. Days came to be lived like this. Which did not change the situation but
how it was. It went on like this. Never knowing more than what seemed to be so – the turn of
a face; the green of a backlit leaf; the wind tossing the boy’s hair. There was no refuge in
those circling hours, only the dense thickness of the world being like this, being like that –
and her along with it, in the coming and going of what seemed to be so.
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ART OF FUGUE
A room, a table, and four chairs.
The chairs are made of wood,
the floor is wood,
the walls are bare. But windowed.
West light, east light. And a scent
like cedar in the air. Here, the self
will sit down with the self.
Now it will say
what it has to say. It looks
into its own eyes. Listens.
A table, four chairs, east light,
west. This is your self:
what's left
when it has been forgiven
by itself, when it
forgives. You feel it  it's
the weight of breath,
transparent, clear.
It folds its hands,
looks up at you. You listen.
The self. They've told you
that there's no such thing. A truth.
But one of many. Come
from the other side, from underneath
erasure, chew your way through light toward
different intelligence: you find
that something, even in the task of letting go,
goes on, has been; and in the cold shock of the plunge,
your feet touch bottom. Sound comes out of silence, is
its inner sense. The river of your
listening, and the river of your voice.
West light, east light, a wooden table
and four chairs: multiple, multiple, multiple
are the voices of the inmost heart.
Sister, brother, husband, wife.
Father, mother, daughter, son.
The compass points of human being
and the being of red alder and
the black tailed deer. Sleep and hunger,
hope and loss. Silence,






The floorboards of the soul
are birth, are death,
the four eyed love
that makes a child.
The patterns in your life
repeat themselves
as premonitions, sudden gifts.
A scent like cedar
drifting in the room. A table
and four chairs.
Once again, the moment of impossible
transition, the bow, its silence voice
above the string. Let us say
the story goes like this. Let us say
you could start anywhere.
Let us say you took your splintered being
by the hand, and led it
to the centre of a room: starlight
through the floorboards of the soul.
The patterns of your life
repeat themselves until you listen.
Forgive this. Say now
what you have to say.
The dead are dead:
parents, siblings, children, spouse.
Death comes upon us:
blindness, deafness, madness, or
the slow gag of neglect.
Put your arms around them:
they are what is given, as you knew.
Hand takes hand.
Dave Dravecky: cancer of the elbow.
Sigmund Freud: cancer of the mouth.
The man who had a heart attack,
and who survived,
because he fell in love.
Your own death, lifting from your past
to meet you: palmprints multiple and
shaped to match your own.
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So it begins. Silence
gathers, looks up, and becomes
a voice: the thrum, the distillate,
we call a soul. Impossible
translation, for the breath
that moves in you
is wind, the wind
that cherishes the trees and cools
the stars. You are,
you are not,
nothing, shaped
by what you love. The echo
of what's left when everything
has been let go.
A voice from the other side, a river: here,
the current steady, there, thickened with silt
shoals, sandbars, the spill of grief, misunderstanding,
hope and love. You've come
to it before, birdwatching maybe,
looking mostly at the trees. But
now you know. Now you will set
the suitcase down, the backpack, and the book
you love, the book you haven't read, your lunch.
The water's neither cold nor warm.
Your mind has never been as clear.
Once again, the moment of impossible
translation: how good it is
the heart has settled out its load
of wanting and regret. To take
what's left and lead it to the centre of the room
a table, four chairs, and the river
of the human voice. The floorboards
have been swept, the room
is bare, square to the compass of
your death and birth. You fold




674 Jan Zwicky, Forge (Kentville, NS: Gaspereau Press, 2011).
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